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A message from the President  
of the Royal Society of New Zealand 
The Climate Agreement adopted at the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015, and 
supported by 195 countries, gave us a timely reminder that all New Zealanders need to understand the need 
for meaningful action on climate change. New Zealand must contribute effectively to the global effort to avoid 
dangerous climate change. New Zealand is already experiencing, for example, more frequent floods, storms and 
droughts, scrub and forest fires causing damage to the environment and people’s livelihoods. 
The good news is that there are many opportunities to limit climate change by reducing our greenhouse gas 
emissions, the main cause of climate change or global warming as it is often called. New Zealand can also 
prepare for and adapt to living in a changing climate. While there is some uncertainty about the size and timing 
of changes, it is certain that it is happening and acting now to protect our environment, economy and culture  
will always be worthwhile.
To consider how to deal with climate change, New Zealand needs to have the evidence to hand, presented in 
a clear and understandable way, so people can see how they can and should contribute. Last year, the Royal 
Society of New Zealand established two expert panels: the first to present evidence on the impact of climate 
change on New Zealand, and the second to provide possible options New Zealand might take to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions.
This is the report of the second of these panels, the Climate Change Mitigation Panel, which investigated how 
New Zealand can reduce the impact of climate change (mitigation options) and assessed the technical and 
socio-economic options available to reduce New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions, or remove them from the 
atmosphere (sequestration).
The report identifies the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions; the interactions between technology, 
policy and behaviour; and considers factors either limiting the potential for action or providing opportunities 
for change. It also provides insights on which future technologies and practices might help, and on issues 
around implementation and adoption. Finally, the report proposes what further research, development and 
demonstration is needed.
I believe New Zealand has a significant opportunity to both prepare and adapt for the future while transitioning 
to a low-carbon economy. The risk of not acting to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change, or not 
protecting ourselves from these effects is vastly greater than the risk of over investing to protect ourselves and 
our environment.
Professor Richard Bedford QSO FRSNZ
President, Royal Society of New Zealand
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Key findings 
Global increase in Greenhouse Gas emissions
• The climate is changing. Average temperatures  
are increasing due to human activity, particularly 
the historically high level of greenhouse gas  
(GHG) emissions.
• In order to limit temperature rise, and associated 
risks of accelerated sea level rise and more 
frequent extreme weather events for example, 
the world must reduce GHG emissions and work 
towards a low-carbon economy.
• Stabilising the world’s climate requires net global 
emissions of GHGs to be reduced to zero before 
the end of the 21st century, especially carbon 
dioxide (CO2) that is long-lived in the atmosphere. 
New Zealand’s GHGs increasing
• Our gross GHG emissions per capita are well  
above average for developed countries.
• Our annual gross and net GHG emissions continue 
to increase. (Net accounts for CO2 removed  
by forests.)
• The main sources of CO2 emissions are from  
heat and electricity supply, transport fuels,  
cement manufacture and forest harvesting. 
• New Zealand also produces an unusually large 
portion of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) 
emissions due to the significant role of agriculture 
in our economy. This accounts for around half of 
our gross annual GHG emissions.
Understand the risks and trade-offs and take action
• All New Zealanders need to understand the risks 
of climate change, accept that we need to change 
the way we act, realise that trade-offs will need to 
be made, and become personally involved  
in implementing mitigation solutions.
Opportunities to reduce emissions 
• There are good opportunities to reduce GHG 
emissions in all sectors and hence make the 
transition to a thriving low-carbon economy.
• Achieving a transition would rely on carefully 
planned policy interventions and behaviour 
changes at the individual, business, city and 
organisational levels.
Reducing fossil fuel use
• Around half of New Zealand’s GHG emissions  
arise from the burning of coal, oil and gas for 
electricity generation, industrial heat processes, 
transport, and everyday activities in homes and 
commercial buildings. 
• There are many opportunities to reduce fossil  
fuel dependence and hence CO2 emissions across 
all of these sectors.
Increasing renewable electricity
• Increasing the share of renewable electricity 
generation to reach New Zealand’s 90% target  
by 2025 is technically and economically possible.
• An even higher share is possible but would need 
a more flexible grid, energy storage, and back-
up generation (possibly thermal-plant) to meet 
seasonal peaks, especially in dry years when 
hydroelectric power is constrained. 
Smart energy for heat and electricity
• Renewable heat systems have good potential for 
buildings and industry. Distributed heat energy 
systems and a smart electricity grid incorporating 
small-scale, renewable electricity generation 
systems, demand-side management, and 
intelligent appliances could play a future role. 
Low carbon transport
• New technologies and low-carbon travel choices 
can play a part, including more fuel-efficient 
vehicles;low-carbon fuels such as renewable 
electricity and biofuels; using buses, light rail, 
cycling and walking; and improving urban design 
to encourage their use. 
• Journey avoidance and modal shifts for freight 
such as greater use of rail and sea t, will also assist.
Energy management in buildings and appliances
• GHG emissions can be reduced in the residential 
and commercial building sector through better 
energy management and improved minimum 
performance standards for appliances.
• Emissions reductions can also result from 
improving insulation levels; retro-fitting existing 
building stock; integrating renewable energy 
systems; and supporting innovative ‘green 
building’ designs.
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Industrial energy use
• The present dependence on burning coal and 
natural gas for process heat can be displaced by 
bioenergy, geothermal, solar thermal and electro-
thermal technologies. 
• Energy efficiency initiatives can reduce GHG 
emissions significantly but may need further 
incentivising to meet the short investment time 
frame of business.
• Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) could  
be an option in the long term and, if coupled  
with bioenergy (BECCS), would give negative  
GHG emissions.
Agriculture 
• Increasing adoption of best practices can help 
reduce the present growth in emissions, but 
even if current research into additional mitigation 
technologies proves successful, strong reductions 
in absolute emissions would eventually involve 
trade-offs with current growth targets for 
livestock production and would rely on developing 
alternative low-emitting land-uses. 
• Some measures to reduce emissions could  
also support water quality. 
Forest planting and harvesting
• Significantly increasing the land area of plantation 
forests could offset up to a quarter of our total 
GHG emissions over the next two to three 
decades. However, there are only low levels of 
planting at this time so when current forest stands 
are harvested our net emissions (gross emissions 
less CO2 removals) are likely to rise.
• Forest sinks can only be an interim solution  
because there is a limit to the area of available land.
Emissions trading 
• The NZ Emissions Trading Scheme has been 
ineffective in reducing New Zealand’s emissions. 
This has reflected low international carbon credit 
prices. Reform is needed to provide clear and 
stable investment signals.
• Emission pricing has an important role but to be 
most effective it needs to be embedded in a wider 
package of mitigation policies and actions. 
Supporting low-carbon choices
• Policies, targets, regulations, infrastructure, 
and market settings should be developed 
systematically to support low-carbon choices  
by businesses, cities and households. 
• An independent board or entity to provide 
evidence-based advice to Parliament and the 
public would be valuable.
More ambitious action needed now
• There is a clear case for immediate action.  
New research and technologies will continue to 
emerge but many mitigation options are already 
well-understood and achievable. Delaying actions 
would result in a greater amount of emissions 
overall, given that CO2 emissions accumulate in the 
atmosphere for hundreds to thousands of years. 
• Evidence for mitigation pathways for New Zealand 
is deficient. This has hampered the analysis 
conducted in this study and limits effective public 
engagement and debate about our future options. 
• Investment in data gathering and deeper analysis 
will help refine early mitigation actions and 
support a transparent public debate about longer 
term desirable and feasible mitigation pathways.
Starting now
• We can start immediately by deploying low-risk 
mitigation actions whilst planning for and trialling 
more ambitious emission reductions options 
and system changes to commence the necessary 
transition to a low-carbon economy.
   7
Extended summary
The problem
The climate is changing. Average temperatures are 
increasing due to human activity, which has driven 
increasingly high levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions1. The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement adopted  
by 195 countries has the goal that the world will limit  
the increase in global temperature to well below 2 degrees 
Celsius (2 oC) above pre-industrial levels, and will pursue 
efforts to limit the increase to below 1.5 oC.
1 Climate change is largely attributable to emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) due to human activity. It is also 
exacerbated by nitrous oxide (N2O) and the shorter-lived methane (CH4). Other gases in the GHG family 
include hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF
6
) that are used 
as refrigerants, solvents etc. Even though they have grown since 1990, these other gases remain of little 
significance in New Zealand (~2% of total emissions) so were not covered in this study.
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Global GHG emissions continue to rise and under 
current trends, the world is heading towards a global 
3–4oC temperature rise. This will result in negative 
impacts on the global economy and significantly 
increase the risks from climate change through rising 
temperatures, accelerated sea level rise, changes in 
rainfall patterns, more frequent extreme weather 
events, and higher costs to adapt or protect ourselves 
and our infrastructure. We will need our economy to 
become more resilient. In order to limit temperature 
rise we must reduce GHG emissions and work towards 
a low-carbon economy.
The low-carbon economy for New Zealand, as defined 
in this study, is one that trends towards net zero 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), over the next few 
decades, while also reducing emissions of shorter-
lived gases, mainly methane (CH4). Reducing CO2 is 
particularly important as it stays in the atmosphere  
for hundreds to thousands of years.
Prioritising CO2 emission reductions in the near term 
is consistent with the authoritative assessment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
concerning the actions needed globally to stabilise  
the climate and to limit warming to well below 2°C.
This study provides a scientific analysis of the complex 
situation we find ourselves in and what we can best 
do about it. All New Zealanders need to understand 
the threats of climate change, accept that we need to 
change the way we act, realise there are trade-offs that 
will need to be made, and become personally involved 
in implementing mitigation solutions. Mitigation is 
where we take action to either reduce emissions, or 
support the removal of GHGs from the atmosphere.
We have the potential to make the transition to a 
low-carbon economy within several decades by taking 
mitigation actions. While this will have costs, it will 
also bring benefits and opportunities that need to be 
considered. This study is a first step to enable an open 
debate around options, choices and time frames.
There is very limited publicly available information 
on what we can and need to do, or the costs and 
policy options for their implementation now, or later, 
in individual sectors and across the economy. Such 
information is critical if we want to have a broad and 
inclusive debate involving all New Zealanders about 
how we best make the transition to a low-carbon 
economy, and the emissions reductions that could 
be achieved over time (commonly called emissions 
pathways). Addressing the information gaps so that 
we can have an informed debate is a very high priority.
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Figure ES-1. 2013 Emissions by sector
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Note: Annual greenhouse gas emissions and removals in New Zealand are shown from each sector in 2013, 
with emissions from the heat and electricity supply sector allocated to the transport, buildings, industry and 
agriculture end-user sectors to avoid double counting
Source: MƒE, 2015a.
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New Zealand’s emissions and trends
New Zealand’s annual gross GHG emissions are 
continuing to increase. Our net emissions, after taking 
into account removal of CO2 from the atmosphere by 
our forests as they grow, have also risen. Neither gross 
nor net emissions are expected to decline significantly 
within at least the next two decades based on  
current policies.
The main sources of CO2 emissions in New Zealand 
are heat and electricity supply, transport fuels, and 
industry. Buildings and industry are important users 
of the heat and electricity from fossil fuel combustion 
that produces a large share of these emissions  
(Figure ES-1) and thus are an important part of 
mitigation options. 
New Zealand also produces an unusually large  
portion of methane (CH4)and nitrous oxide (N2O) 
emissions due to the significant role of agriculture 
in our economy. This accounts for around half of our 
total annual GHG emissions. 
Emissions of CO2 per capita are not as high as for 
many other developed countries but, in contrast to 
many, have increased slightly since 1990. However, 
because of our unusually large proportion of CH4 and 
N2O emissions, our annual emissions of total GHGs 
per capita are well above the average for developed 
countries, though they have fallen since 2005. 
What can we do to reduce emissions,  
and in what order? 
New Zealand can transition to a low-carbon economy 
over the next few decades if individuals, households, 
communities, cities, industries, commercial 
enterprises and land-users share aspirations and 
take action. Some mitigation options are well 
understood, for example reducing the use of fossil 
fuels. These options can be implemented or increased 
immediately, while others will take time to adopt 
and implement. In some cases, appropriate solutions 
remain the subject of intensive research.
There are good opportunities to reduce GHG 
emissions in all sectors in New Zealand in the short 
term. Some measures would save costs and bring 
additional benefits such as improved health, easier 
mobility and liveable cities. Other actions would 
become cost-effective if a substantial carbon price is 
imposed on GHG emissions. 
In the medium to long term, there are additional 
mitigation opportunities, although there are many 
uncertainties over the scale and rate at which they 
will be implemented. In many instances the mitigation 
costs are unknown and further analysis is required 
due to limited publicly available information. This is 
measured in terms of dollars per tonne of CO2 or per 
tonne of other GHGs when calculated to be equivalent 
or give similar impacts ($/t CO2-equivalent). 
Based on broad assumptions of future population, 
economic growth, business as usual (BAU) emissions, 
and the rate and scale of deployment of major low-
carbon technologies and systems, most sectors have 
the technical potential to take steps toward reducing 
emissions and to eventually reach net zero emissions 
over several decades. This is referred to as ‘moving 
along a low-carbon transition pathway’. The notable 
exception to this is agriculture.
Options exist to reduce the growth in emissions 
from the agriculture sector and there has been 
considerable investment in research to attempt 
to substantially increase the number of mitigation 
options available. Nonetheless, reducing absolute 
emissions substantially from this sector will be 
challenging even in the long term, unless there was a 
strategic decision to gradually reduce the reliance on 
animal protein production from meat and milk for the 
growth of New Zealand’s economy.
Taking action
This study identifies a number of mitigation actions 
that New Zealand could take across each specific 
sector: heat supply, electricity supply, transport, 
building, industry, agriculture, forestry and other land 
use;possible actions by individuals, businesses, local 
and central government are also discussed.
In doing this it was not always possible to make 
detailed evaluations of their social and economic 
impacts due to lack of available data. Further data 
gathering and analysis will be required to fully 
understand the trade-offs, risks and challenges from 
taking specific actions, as well as to identify the 
opportunities and quantify the additional benefits.
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 Figure ES-2. Potential emission reductions by New Zealand economy sectors over time
Figure ES-2 is an approximation based on expert 
opinion and simply serves to illustrate that all  
sectors can contribute to GHG emission reductions 
in New Zealand; achieving zero emissions will be 
more rapid in some sectors than others with the 
decarbonising of the electricity sector likely to  
happen first; and that achieving zero emissions for 
New Zealand’s agricultural sector is unlikely this 
century unless there are trade-offs with current 
growth targets for livestock production and the 
development of alternative low GHG emitting land-
uses. However, for the current farming systems, there 
is some potential for total agricultural emissions to be 
reduced over time compared with BAU. 
Potential actions that New Zealand could take from 
the range of mitigation opportunities that exist in  
all sectors, are outlined in more detail in the sections 
below. They are also based on expert opinion, are 
approximations only, and purely indicative given  
the high uncertainties of factors such as future costs, 
trade-offs, technology deployment rates, policies 
and the absence of detailed data and analysis. 
Some mitigation options are ready for immediate 
deployment, while others will not come on  
stream until various times in the future.
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Sectoral mitigation options
Note: The figures on the following pages are an approximation and indicative only given the high uncertainties  
on future costs, trade-offs, technology deployment rates, and in the absence of detailed data and analysis.
Heat supply
Cost effective options to reduce or avoid GHG 
emissions have not been fully realised to date.  
These options include the greater uptake of biomass, 
solar thermal, and geothermal resources to displace 
coal and natural gas in the heat sector. The technical 
mitigation potential for renewable heat is high and 
an increased carbon price ($ /t CO2) would further 
encourage uptake. 
Electricity has been the major focus of policy debate, 
and this has been a barrier to the development 
of low-carbon heat applications. There has been 
little recognition of the opportunities to reduce 
GHG emissions within the heat market despite 
heat accounting for around 28% of New Zealand’s 
consumer energy use. Electricity equates to only  
23% in energy terms.
Direct use of geothermal heat is growing, with many 
small and large-scale domestic and commercial 
applications that are economically viable where 
geothermal resources exist. In other locations, 
ground source heat pumps for heating and cooling 
of buildings have been recently installed. The wood 
energy heat market also has economic potential and 
as a result demand is growing for biomass-fired heat 
plant for a range of applications including swimming 
pools, greenhouses, schools, and hospitals. Where 
biomass resources exist locally there can be few 
barriers to greater uptake at all scales and bioenergy 
heat could become a significant contributor to 
achieving early mitigation targets.
BAU
Time
M
t C
O
2-e
q/
yr
2010
10
Heat Supply 
Zero emissions by medium to long term
Improved heat plant 
efficiency
Bioenergy displacing 
coal and later 
natural gas
Geothermal, ground 
source heat pumps
High temperature 
electro-technologies
High temperature solar 
thermal systems
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Electricity supply
Around 80% of New Zealand’s electricity is generated 
from renewable sources, primarily hydropower.  
This can be further increased cost effectively to  
reach New Zealand’s renewable electricity target of 
90% by 2025. Eventually, it will be technically possible 
to reach close to 100% zero carbon generation (noting 
that geothermal power generation releases some CO2 
during brine extraction). This would possibly include 
coal-fired or gas-fired power plants linked with carbon 
dioxide capture and storage (CCS). Near zero carbon 
generation could be achieved without reducing the 
reliability of the supply system by making the power 
grid more flexible, improving efficiency of existing 
generators, integrating energy storage systems, 
utilising demand response, and retaining or installing 
back-up capacity (possibly thermal plant) to meet 
seasonal peak demand, especially in dry years. 
If there is a high proportion of variable renewables in 
the mix of electricity generation, specifically designed 
equipment will be needed along with collaboration 
from stakeholders to ensure frequency fluctuations 
can be controlled to provide grid stability in the 
wholesale electricity market. Distributed generation 
systems and ‘smart grids’ using low-carbon generation 
technologies, smart appliances and electric vehicles 
(EVs) could become common as costs continue to 
decline and technology integration and electricity 
market issues are resolved.
BAU
2010
Time
M
t C
O
2-e
q/
yr
10
Electricity Supply 
Zero emissions by medium term
Improved efficiency of 
existing generation
Additional renewable 
generation to meet 
90% target by 2025 
and later close to 
100% renewables
Distributed generation 
and smart grid 
technologies
CCS – linked with 
bioenergy
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Transport
New Zealand’s transport system is 99% dependent on 
fossil fuels and produces about 17% of our total GHG 
emissions. Annual emissions continue to increase but 
could be reduced by at least 60% by 2050 if appropriate 
policy measures are introduced, such as vehicle fuel 
efficiency standards and encouragement for people and 
organisations to use low and zero emissions vehicles. 
The current dependence on privately owned gasoline 
and diesel light duty vehicles for mobility can be 
reduced through urban design that would prioritise 
walking and cycling and give greater provision of 
comfortable and convenient bus and rail. The early 
adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) has begun but 
support may be required to accelerate deployment, 
including encouraging community-ownership, 
driverless designs, and smart-transport technologies. 
The declining retail prices for EVs (including E-bikes, 
E-cycles and E-buses) and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, 
coupled with the carbon price reaching a high level, 
could drive the large scale adoption of low-carbon 
mobility choices. To speed up development of EVs 
will require policy instruments and other incentives 
as, for example, used in Norway to incentivise private 
ownership of over 100,000 EVs in 2015. 
For freight movement, rail and coastal shipping have 
significantly lower emissions per tonne -kilometre 
than road transport. The transport of one tonne of 
freight by diesel-powered rail produces less than a 
third of the emissions than transport over the same 
journey by road. Emissions could be further reduced 
by additional rail electrification, given New Zealand’s 
low-carbon electricity system. 
Domestic biofuels based on by-products from food 
processing (such as ethanol produced from whey, 
biodiesel from tallow or used cooking oils, and biogas 
from organic wastes) avoid competition for land use 
and can be competitive with petroleum products. 
These are currently being utilised only at a small scale 
since the feedstocks are limited in volume. Large scale 
commercialisation of advanced biofuels produced 
from ligno-cellulosic plant matter could be used 
primarily for aviation, marine and heavy duty vehicle 
fuels but, based on existing processes and available 
feedstocks, remain costly. Viability will be enhanced 
with process technology improvements and high oil 
and carbon prices. 
Time
M
t C
O
2-e
q/
yr
2010
BAU
10
Passenger transport (domestic excluding international aviation) 
Zero emissions by long term
More fuel efficient 
vehicles and fuel 
efficiency standards
Improved bus and  
rail services
Infrastructure for  
non-motorised 
Avoid journeys  
e.g. by using ITC
Electric vehicles
Biofuels and/or 
hydrogen
Community sharing of 
driverless vehicles
M
t C
O
2-e
q/
yr
2010
10
Freight transport (domestic excluding international shipping) 
Zero emissions by long term 
More efficient vehicles
Modal shift from  
road to rail and  
coastal shipping
Infrastructure to 
improve logistics
Biofuels, electric, 
hydrogen fuels
Time
BAU
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Buildings
The buildings sector is indirectly responsible for 
around 20% of New Zealand’s energy-related GHG 
emissions. These mostly arise from the consumption 
of fossil fuels to meet the demand for heating and 
cooking, as well as ther thermal share of electricity 
generation when used for appliances, heating, 
ventilation and cooling. Renewable heat and 
electricity systems integrated into the building fabric 
could provide energy services instead. New buildings 
can be designed to have a low energy demand and 
the total energy demand for heating, cooling and 
appliances can be met autonomously. Buildings can 
incorporate timber construction materials that store 
carbon over the medium to long term.
The majority of buildings that will exist in New Zealand 
by 2050 have already been built. Therefore improving 
the energy efficiency performance of the current 
building stock by retro-fitting is an important action. 
Energy efficiency benefits in building design and use 
are included in the NZ Building Code clause on  
Energy Efficiency but this is weak and gives only 
minimum requirements. Instruments such as 
Greenstar Buildings and the Green Building Council’s 
NABERSNZ2 rating can drive greater GHG emission 
reductions. 
2 http://www.nzgbc.org.nz/
Instruments to help us do this are currently 
available, but for only a limited range of building 
types. Therefore, improving the energy efficiency 
performance of many buildings is partly constrained 
by their original design.
Appliances have a shorter life than buildings but 
often continue to consume energy 15 to 20 years 
after purchase. The application of minimum energy 
performance standards (MEPS) have helped remove 
the most energy inefficient appliances from the 
market. ‘Doing better’ type labels such as EnergyStar 
can help encourage manufacturers to design, import 
and supply more efficient appliances. 
While technological improvements are important, 
education and training for those designing, 
manufacturing, installing and using buildings are also 
key to reducing GHG emissions. There is limited up-to-
date knowledge about how energy is used in buildings 
and this also needs to be addressed if this sector is  
to play a greater mitigation role.
BAU
BAU
M
t C
O
2-e
q/
yr
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Commercial buildings 
Zero emissions by medium to long term
Lighting efficiency
More efficient heating, 
ventilation, air 
conditioning and  
smart controls
Building design and 
low-carbon materials
Integrated solar;  
smart windows
Residential buildings 
Zero emissions by longer term
Improved appliance 
efficiency
Lighting efficiency
Water use and  
heating efficiency
Space heating/ 
cooling efficiency
Building design; 
low-carbon materials; 
stringent building code
Integrated solar 
systems e.g. roof  
paint collector;  
smart windows
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Industry
The industrial sector directly produces 6.3% of 
our gross emissions mainly from cement and steel 
manufacture and minor contributions from HFCs 
used for solvents and refrigerants. A similar amount 
of indirect emissions comes from the electricity 
consumed by industry plus fossil fuel combustion to 
raise process heat (with around 45% of that coming 
from coal). As outlined in the ‘Heat supply’ section 
above, there are few technology barriers to the 
greater use of renewable heat energy, but there may 
be concerns by businesses over security of supply 
unless the biomass feedstock is produced on-site. 
Municipal sewage and landfill wastes can provide 
economic bioenergy opportunities and also reduce 
CH4 emissions. 
Industries that have large single point sources of 
emissions have the opportunity to consider CCS once 
the technology is proven but the cost-effectiveness 
will be based on the future carbon price as well as the 
availability of suitable CO2 storage facilities close to 
the emitters. In addition, on-site bioenergy heat and 
power generation can potentially be linked with CCS 
(known as BECCS) that can physically remove CO2 from 
the atmosphere. BECCS will be needed globally before 
the end of this century in order to constrain global 
temperature rise to below 2oC.
Agriculture
Direct emissions from agriculture make up almost 
half of New Zealand’s gross GHG emissions. These are 
mainly CH4 emissions from ruminant animals,  
N2O from animal wastes, with CO2 emissions related  
to energy demand on farms for electricity, greenhouse 
heating, crop drying, tractor fuels, water pumping etc. 
being relatively small. 
On-farm GHG emissions per unit of farm product 
(emissions intensity) have fallen consistently over the 
past two decades owing to increased productivity 
per animal or per hectare. Nonetheless, absolute 
agricultural emissions have grown because of an 
increase in total production, mainly of dairy products 
in response to growing global demand. Further 
productivity gains are feasible and would reduce 
emissions intensity further, but absolute emissions 
are expected to rise in the longer term as the sector 
expands in response to continued global demand 
and in the absence of significant policy change or 
sustained depression of commodity prices.
While a range of mitigation options already exists 
within current farm systems, including utilising local 
renewable energy resources, they tend to focus 
on increasing adoption of best practices relating to 
increasing the productivity per animal and overall 
efficiency of farm systems. However, these mostly 
only produce small emission reductions over and 
above those that would have occurred under business 
as usual (BAU) in any case. Some mitigation options 
could have significant additional benefits such as 
improved water quality, particularly reductions  
in fertiliser use per animal or utilisation of lower 
nitrogen feeds, and reduced water use through 
precision irrigation. 
M
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Time
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Industry 
Zero emissions by longer term
Energy efficiency 
(motors, lighting, boiler 
refrigeration etc.)
Renewable process 
heat (bioenergy, 
geothermal, solar 
thermal)
Additional renewable 
electricity including 
on-site generation
CCS on-site
BAU
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Research and investment in new agricultural 
mitigation technologies offer the potential for 
significant emission reductions in the medium to 
long term. However, even when such technologies 
are developed successfully and deployed widely, it 
appears that it will be very difficult to reduce absolute 
on-farm emissions below roughly 1990 levels based 
on projected production growth trends. Exploration 
of alternative land-uses, taking into account climate 
and carbon constraints as well as other economic, 
social and environmental objectives, would be needed 
if New Zealand wished to eventually reduce total 
agricultural emissions to well below 1990 levels  
in the next few decades.
Agriculture 
Zero emissions not considered possible even in the long term especially for livestock based systems.
M
t C
O
2-e
q/
yr
Time
2010
Water and energy  
use efficiency
Low nitrogen diet
N fertiliser constraints
Animal waste N2O 
management 
Low CH2 breeding
CH4 inhibitor/vaccine
Move towards lower 
emitting land uses
40
0
BAU
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Forests and other land-use
Planting new forests in unforested land is a practical 
method to remove large volumes of CO2 from the 
atmosphere at a relatively low cost and thereby 
offset a portion of New Zealand’s gross GHG 
emissions. Other mitigation actions include reducing 
deforestation, altering the species grown to faster 
growing species, and enhancing the carbon stocks of 
natural forests through improved management.
Since trees accumulate and store carbon over their 
life, forest sinks are an easily implemented means 
of offsetting future emissions of CO2 from the 
combustion of fossil fuels and other GHGs. This is an 
effective strategy in the short to medium term whilst 
other sectors take time to deploy new, and possibly 
disruptive, low-carbon technologies. 
Together, plantation forests and regenerating natural 
forests in New Zealand offset 29.1 Mt CO2-eq per year, 
on average, over the period 1990-2013, equivalent 
to more than one third ofour annual gross GHG 
emissions. Around 600,000 ha of pasture and scrub 
land planted in fast-growing forests post-1989, (with 
the annual area planted peaking in the mid-1990s), 
played a significant role in reducing New Zealand’s net 
GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. 
These ‘Kyoto forests’ averaged removals of 14.3 Mt 
CO2 per year over the first Kyoto commitment period 
2008-2012. Therefore, endeavouring to plant more 
forests in future would gain further CO2 removals 
and, if planted into marginal hill country, also reduce 
erosion. Planting additional pasture or scrub land in 
forests (afforestation), or allowing native forests to 
regenerate naturally (reforestation) should be part of 
a strategy to achieving a low-carbon future and would 
allow New Zealand to reach its mitigation reduction 
target earlier. However, it should not be viewed as a 
means of avoiding implementation of GHG emission 
mitigation actions and there are limits from continuing 
afforestation due to the limited availability of suitable 
land. Hence the long-term mitigation potential from 
planting more forest stands is uncertain. 
Reporting rules for forest and land use under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) govern the estimates of carbon 
stock changes, whereas accounting rules as used in 
the NZ ETS define eligible mitigation actions.. Recent 
forest planting rates in New Zealand have been too 
small to significantly offset future CO2 emissions. Our 
total net GHG emissions will increase as existing post-
1989 forests mature and are harvested over the next 
decade under Kyoto accounting rules. 
Planted forests can also support ecosystems by 
contributing to improved water quality and erosion 
control when planted on marginal land, and forest 
residues can provide a significant biomass feedstock. 
Soil carbon contents vary with land use change 
between pasture and forests, but they are difficult to 
assess and are not always easily accounted for as a 
carbon sink or source. Soil carbon has shown different 
trends in grazed flat land and hill country, but there 
is insufficient evidence to demonstrate a significant 
overall trend of soil carbon storage in New Zealand’s 
pastoral land, including from adding biochar (charcoal 
produced from plant matter and then stored in soil).
Behavioural and policy mitigation options
Reducing emissions and creating a low-carbon 
economy will involve changes in behaviour across  
all sectors of society, from families and communities  
to businesses and government, and will require  
a carefully developed programme to support these 
changes. The social and technological changes required 
are significant. Increasing people’s knowledge and 
understanding of climate change is important, but  
is only part of the behaviour change solution.
Policies, infrastructure and social norms all need  
to align to make it easier for people and organisations 
to consistently make low-carbon choices. To be 
successful, behaviour change initiatives should be 
coordinated across sectors and domains; target 
social and material contexts, not just individuals; and 
communicate additional benefits. In performing its 
leadership role, the government could consider how 
to develop climate change policy most effectively 
by involving New Zealanders, our organisations, 
businesses and councils.
New Zealand has committed to a range of emissions 
targets for 2020, 2030 and 2050 but there is no 
publically available information as to how those 
targets are intended to be met, the relative 
contributions anticipated from different sectors, and 
the reliance on international carbon markets versus 
domestic abatement. It is important that actions 
and measures are put in place to ensure that the 
mitigation targets, as set, are ultimately reached. 
Whether we achieve these goals or not will depend 
on how effective the policies are and on widespread 
acceptance of the need to change from BAU to a new 
low-carbon pathway. New procedures, strategies 
and action plans, and new institutions such as 
independent monitoring and advisory committees, 
may help ensure climate change policy-making 
is effective. Businesses prefer a stable regulatory 
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environment, so clear and consistent messaging 
regarding low-carbon expectations is critical.  
Public debate could be better informed by providing 
information about the strengths and weaknesses  
of the different policy options. 
The current policy approach aims to meet emission 
reduction targets by relying on the New Zealand 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) where it is cost 
effective to do so relative to purchasing carbon credits 
from a range of overseas sources. This approach 
allows emissions prices to create market drivers for 
making trade-offs. As a result, our Kyoto target to 
be below 1990 emission levels on average over the 
first commitment period from 2008 to 2012 was 
largely met through CO2 removals via forest sinks 
and from purchasing international emissions trading 
units. Some of these units have had low credibility 
internationally and, since 2015, the NZ ETS no longer 
involves international units. 
The effectiveness of the NZ ETS in reducing actual 
domestic emissions has been limited, although it has 
served to raise the awareness of the need for GHG 
accounting and the importance of reducing emissions.
Few regulatory measures that are common overseas 
to reduce GHGs exist in New Zealand, such as motor 
vehicle fuel efficiency standards, mandatory biofuel 
requirements, green taxes, or renewable and energy 
efficiency portfolio standards. New policy provisions 
are needed alongside the ETS to support change in 
areas in which the market acts imperfectly to add to 
the few climate policy measures in place that include 
supporting research and providing consumers with 
information.
Global context
The globe has warmed by around 1 oC since pre-
industrial times and this is already having impacts 
including more extreme weather events, ocean 
acidification and sea level rise. To succeed in limiting 
global warming to below 2 oC, the world needs to 
reduce current annual global GHG emissions by 
40-70% below 2010 levels in the next 30 to 40 years 
and with net emissions of long-lived GHGs (especially 
CO2) approaching zero before the end of this century. 
This will require significant actions by all countries 
including phasing out the use of fossil fuels  
(unless linked with CCS) and the greater use of 
biomass and bioenergy to actively remove CO2 from 
the atmosphere, thereby ultimately reaching net zero 
emissions of CO2.
The 2015 Paris Agreement was a significant step 
forward to achieving a low-carbon future and reflects 
a growing global concern for climate action. The 
growing global movement, as expressed outside of 
the negotiation rooms by businesses, cities, financiers, 
bankers, and other institutions, has continued. 
Setting emissions targets will require nations to make 
ethical judgements while considering the economic, 
social and environmental consequences. However, 
the intended targets to reduce GHG emissions, 
which nations set for themselves prior to the Paris 
meeting and then submitted to the UNFCCC3, when 
accumulated, imply higher costs in the long term as 
they would then require extremely rapid and much 
more costly reductions beyond 2030 to limit warming 
to below 2oC. Therefore, the Agreement enables and 
encourages countries to strengthen their nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs) before they ratify 
the Agreement in the next few years and to prepare 
and maintain even more ambitious targets by 2020 
and onwards. 
In the global context, all nations are expected to take 
responsibility for what are likely to be increasingly 
stringent expectations of emissions reductions.  
New Zealand has signed the Paris Agreement and 
already made some commitments to emissions 
reduction, indicating its intention to make the 
transition to a low-carbon economy and be a part  
of the world’s endeavours to decarbonise, as driven  
by the d post-Agreement negotiations.
3 http://newsroom.unfccc.int/ 
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Knowledge gaps
Publicly available data for producing emission and 
mitigation pathways for New Zealand are extremely 
limited and this has hampered the analysis conducted 
in this study. This included limited available data on 
the costs and potentials of climate change mitigation 
options. These are needed for analysing GHG 
mitigation options in most New Zealand sectors.  
Due to the time and resource constraints of this 
study, it was not possible to undertake scenario 
modelling, life cycle assessments, nor sensitivity 
analyses of major uncertainties such as future energy 
costs, carbon prices, rate of uptake of low-carbon 
technologies and systems, behavioural change, policy 
interventions etc. 
Models, tools and analytical methods developed and 
used overseas for other emission reduction pathways 
could be employed for assessing New Zealand’s 
climate change mitigation options, but need time 
and resources to adapt them to suit local conditions. 
Investment in data gathering and analysis, possibly 
involving international collaboration, could help 
refine early mitigation actions and thereby enable a 
transparent public debate to be had about desirable 
and feasible mitigation pathways.
Detailed integrated assessment modelling would 
help test the wide range of assumptions being used 
to evaluate possible pathways to reach a low-carbon 
economy. Even so, great uncertainties would remain 
since the rate of uptake of disruptive technologies is 
not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy in 
a scenario modelling study. For example, airbnb, and 
Uber taxi services have become common far more 
quickly than many people predicted and no global or 
national scenarios produced only 15 to 20 years ago 
included the present impacts of the internet  
and social media on people’s lifestyles. 
Accumulating more scientific knowledge takes time, 
but meanwhile our GHGs continue to increase. The 
need to obtain more scientific knowledge should not 
be a reason to delay mitigation actions, especially 
if a lack of action would mean deeper cuts in GHG 
emissions in the future that would be harder to 
achieve. Long-lived GHGs such as CO2 accumulate in 
the atmosphere so reducing or capturing emissions 
as soon as possible is preferable to waiting for future 
advancements.
In summary
Many mitigation options are already well-understood 
and achievable. New Zealand’s current target is to 
reduce emissions to 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. 
If we want to achieve this target through increased 
contributions from domestic actions rather than relying 
on reductions off-shore and purchasing the related 
carbon credits, this will require immediate attention.
Accumulating more scientific knowledge takes time, 
but meanwhile our GHGs continue to increase. The 
need to obtain more scientific knowledge should not be 
a reason to delay mitigation actions, especially if a lack 
of action would mean deeper cuts in GHG emissions in 
the future that would be harder to achieve. Long-lived 
GHGs such as CO2 accumulate in the atmosphere so 
reducing or capturing emissions as soon as possible is 
preferable to waiting for future advancements.
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Section 1:  
Introduction 
GHG emitting human activities over the past two  
centuries, including from the combustion of large amounts 
of fossil fuels and deforestation, have resulted in changes 
to the climate. This is starting to have widespread impacts 
on human and natural systems including water supplies 
and food production (IPCC, 2014a). 
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
succinctly summarised current knowledge on climate 
change in four headline statements (IPCC, 2014a):
• Human influence on the climate system is clear, 
and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) are the highest in history. Recent 
climate changes have had widespread impacts on 
human and natural systems.
• Continued emission of GHGs will cause further 
warming and long-lasting changes in all components 
of the climate system, increasing the likelihood 
of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for 
people and ecosystems. Limiting climate change 
would require substantial and sustained reductions 
in GHG emissions which, together with adaptation, 
can limit climate change risks.
• Adaptation and mitigation are complementary 
strategies for reducing and managing the risks  
of climate change. Substantial emission reductions 
over the next few decades can reduce climate 
risks in the 21st century and beyond; increase 
prospects for effective adaptation; reduce the 
costs and challenges of mitigation in the longer 
term; and contribute to climate-resilient pathways 
for sustainable development.
• Many adaptation and mitigation options can 
help reduce the risks from climate change 
impacts, but no single option is sufficient by itself. 
Effective implementation depends on policies and 
cooperation at all scales and can be enhanced 
through integrated responses that link adaptation 
and mitigation with other societal objectives.
These global challenges and opportunities provide  
the context for this report. All indications are that,  
if the world wishes to limit warming to below 2oC,  
we must change our current development trajectories 
as soon as possible and without impacting on future 
well-being. A rapid gain in momentum is needed if  
the world is to reach zero-carbon emissions before  
the end of this century. 
New Zealand has the opportunity to reduce its GHG 
emissions by undertaking climate change mitigation 
actions. These can start immediately and continue 
over the next few decades. There are costs and 
risks involved, but there are also various co-benefits 
that can be identified from a transition to a low-
carbon economy. The Royal Society of New Zealand’s 
emerging issues report in 2014, ‘Facing the Future – 
Towards a Green Economy for New Zealand’ provided 
a broad overview of the potential benefits, including 
this summary statement on climate change: 
‘Lowering greenhouse gas emissions will require 
changes in patterns of production and consumption, 
but need not reduce well-being.’ 
This current study provides a detailed assessment  
of the numerous mitigation actions that exist to  
lower our GHG emissions over the next few  
decades but starting now. 
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Definitions
Adaptation involves responding to and coping 
with climate change as it occurs.
Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2 -eq) is a standard 
unit for measuring carbon footprints, expressing 
the impact of each different greenhouse gas in 
terms of the amount of CO2 that would create  
the same amount of warming.
Carbon sequestration is the capture and storage 
of carbon by either natural or artificial processes.
Climate-smart agriculture is an approach to 
managing cropland, livestock, forests and fisheries 
to increase productivity, enhance resilience and 
reduce GHG emissions per unit of food produced.
Global warming is the increasing temperature of 
the earth’s climate system and its related effects.
Greenhouse gases (GHG) produced from 
anthropogenic activities include primarily 
carbon dioxide, but also methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and 
sulphur hexafluoride.
Low-carbon economy is one that tracks towards 
reaching net zero GHG emissions, primarily  
of long-lived CO2 that makes up three quarters  
of global GHG emissions.
Mitigation involves a human intervention to 
reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of GHG 
emissions, such as through the planting of forests.
Adaptation, as a response to the actual or potential 
impacts of climate change, is not discussed in detail  
in this report. However, it is well understood 
that, along with taking mitigation measures, it is 
imperative for our cities, communities, households, 
and businesses to become more resilient to the 
inevitable effects of anthropogenic climate change 
and the unprecedented rate of change, including 
changing weather patterns, sea level rise, and ocean 
acidification. Mitigation and adaptation are both 
essential if we are to reduce overall risks.
Mitigation will not be straightforward. Almost all 
our everyday activities, from household routines 
to business and government operations, produce 
GHGs. Almost half of New Zealand’s emissions 
consist of CO2 released to the atmosphere during the 
combustion of coal, natural gas, or oil products (with 
small amounts arising from geothermal projects and 
other sources) This supplies us with heat and around 
20% of our electricity supply (Section 5.1), together 
with transport services (Section 5.2). Most heat and 
electricity is used in our buildings (Section 5.3) and 
industry (Section 5.4). Smaller volumes of GHG arise 
from forest clearing and during cement manufacture. 
Our agricultural sector directly emits mainly methane 
(CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) that, together, 
contribute almost half of our total GHGs (Section 5.5). 
A portion of our GHG emissions is offset in those land 
use practices which absorb carbon dioxide into our 
forests (Section 5.6).
This study reviewed the latest scientific knowledge  
on climate change mitigation opportunities in  
New Zealand. It considered what social changes are 
needed to help us take up these opportunities.  
It attempted to identify the options available to 
reduce our GHG emissions and hence do our part  
in addressing the global challenge of climate change. 
While people, communities and companies are 
already taking actions of their own, government 
actions to make a concerted effort to reduce our 
GHG emissions will involve political choices from the 
options available.
On a per capita basis, New Zealanders were the 
seventh highest net emitters in OECD countries  
in 2012; 13.26 tonnes of CO2-eq per capita, if  
CO2 removals through land use change and forests 
are included. For our gross emissions that exclude 
forest removals, in 2012 we were the fifth highest 
OECD emitter (17.37 tonnes CO2-eq per capita) after 
Australia, Canada, Luxemburg and USA (CAIT, 2015; 
Section 3.1). 
To reduce or eliminate GHG emissions, New Zealand 
needs to develop a greater understanding of what 
activities produce GHGs, how we might alter our 
usual processes and routines, and what new low-
The Royal Society of New Zealand’s 2016 publication 
‘Climate Change Implications for New Zealand’ stated 
that: 
“New Zealand’s climate is changing. The Australasian 
region continues to show long-term trends toward 
higher surface air and sea surface temperatures, more 
hot extremes and fewer cold extremes, and changed 
rainfall patterns. Warming is projected to continue 
through the 21st century along with other changes 
in climate. Without adaptation, further changes in 
climate, atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), and ocean 
acidity are projected to have substantial impacts on 
water resources, coastal ecosystems, infrastructure, 
health, agriculture, and biodiversity”.
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carbon technologies we might adopt. The information 
presented in this report aims to help policymakers 
make decisions and enable families, businesses and 
organisations to determine what actions they could 
take to reduce their ‘carbon footprint’. 
A low-carbon future could come at a cost, but also 
offers significant economic, social and health benefits 
for New Zealand, particularly if we take actions and 
collaborations across all sectors. If the world fails to 
significantly reduce GHG emissions, this will increase 
the risks and costs of consequential damage and 
adaptation. At the international level, New Zealand’s 
previous Minister of Climate Change, the  
Hon. Tim Groser stated: 
“While New Zealand’s emissions are small on a global 
scale, we are keen to make a fair and ambitious 
contribution to the international effort to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and avoid the most harmful 
effects of climate change”4. 
Climate change mitigation involves fundamentally 
changing our dependence on fossil fuels over the 
next few decades and modifying some existing 
consumption patterns. New Zealand has options for 
mitigation in all sectors, particularly when combining 
low-carbon technologies that have good economic 
and market potential5 with good practices, policy 
and regulatory changes. However, there are many 
uncertainties regarding the future rate of uptake  
of particular options, including how rapidly disruptive 
technologies may be deployed and what fluctuations 
there may be in future international and local  
prices for carbon, oil, gas, coal and our exported  
food commodities. 
4 Minister Tim Groser, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/
climate-change-target-announced 
5 The technical potential of a technology or system ignores any 
cost constraints but considers current practical limits to uptake 
based on climate, engineering, or competition for resources 
such as land. It can increase over time when technologies using 
an available resource become operational in future years after 
the socio-economic conditions change, given certain economic 
and operating conditions.
 The market or economic potential for utilising an energy 
resource is based on current market prices and any policies and 
measures in place. It is based on private discount rates and all 
barriers and hidden costs are included. 
 The socio-economic or realisable potential is when uptake of  
an energy technology is viable or close to becoming viable 
under current market conditions but with some projects not 
being implemented due to market barriers, externalities and 
social costs. 
The mitigation challenges come with potential 
benefits for New Zealand but the problem for both 
individuals and the government is to make investment 
and regulatory decisions under uncertainty. 
• We could invest in mitigation actions in the near 
future which would possibly maximise co-benefits 
and hence be more cost-effective than waiting  
for high carbon prices to materialise.
• We could wait until other countries have acted, 
which could be argued to be a cheaper option 
since New Zealand is a technology-taker.  
However, this option also carries the high risks  
of loss of international status as well as the 
inevitable impacts of climate change being felt  
in the global economy. 
In the longer term, investing early in mitigation 
globally is likely to reduce the cost of adaptation, 
achieve greater resilience, and reduce the risk of 
runaway climate change. The whole issue of risk 
management, adaptive planning and balancing the 
energy portfolio, in light of New Zealand’s specific 
circumstances now and in the future, requires 
additional analysis.
• Behaviour and culture have a considerable 
influence on mitigation of GHG emissions.  
The challenge is to find low-carbon development 
pathways that New Zealanders are willing to 
adopt and that allow continued socio-economic 
prosperity whilst supporting a healthy, functioning 
environment. There is already a strong and 
growing interest in mitigation actions across  
New Zealand communities6, businesses7 and local 
governments8. Collaborative approaches between 
local and central government, businesses and civil 
society will help enable a successful transition to  
a low-carbon economy. 
6 See for example http://parihaka.maori.nz/taiepa-tiketike/ 
7 Sustainable Business Council (http://www.sbc.org.nz )
8 Local Government New Zealand (http://www.lgnz.co.nz/new-
zealand-local-government-leaders-join-global-community-to-
address-climate-change )
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1.1 Report framework 
This report identifies that New Zealand has good 
potential to shift towards a low-carbon economy 
in innovative ways. These could have positive 
repercussions including the development of new 
climate technologies and services for export to the 
global market. The report covers the global context 
for GHG emissions and climate change mitigation 
potentials (Section 2) before outlining emission 
trends, current actions and policy settings in New 
Zealand (Section 3). Behavioural issues relating to 
mitigation are then discussed along with the policy 
framework and options for policy processes, although 
the report does not attempt to prescribe policy 
measures (Section 4). Evaluations of GHG reduction 
potentials and co-benefits are then given for each 
of the sectors covered: heat and power supply, 
passenger and freight transport, commercial and 
residential buildings, industry, agriculture, forests 
and other land use (Section 5). Plausible integrated 
emission reduction pathways are discussed, based 
on the sectoral assessments (Section 6). Critical 
knowledge gaps are identified throughout the report. 
Public and private research investments to fill these 
gaps could help support and accelerate the pursuit of 
mitigation development pathways.
No new research was commissioned for this report. 
The study authors relied largely on key analyses 
of climate change mitigation recently published 
in New Zealand9, and on international studies 
including the 5th Assessment Mitigation Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 
2013; IPCC, 2014a; IPCC, 2014b). The material was 
assessed and synthesised with regard to the specific 
New Zealand context and aims to provide science-
based information in an accessible manner for the 
New Zealand public and policy makers. 
9 Examples include the work of Motu (http://www.motu.org.nz/
our-work/environment-and-resources/emission-mitigation/) 
and Business NZ Energy Council (http://www.bec.org.nz/
projects/bec2050).
This scientific assessment on its own cannot 
determine what New Zealand’s future emissions 
should be in ‘doing our fair share’, given the relatively 
small absolute quantity of national emissions and our 
unusual emissions profile. Deciding on how much 
and how quickly our emissions should be reduced 
invariably relies not only on a technical analysis of 
abatement options and costs, but also on ethical 
judgements (such as considerations of what is ‘right’ 
when contrasted with what results in lowest costs). 
Emissions abatement options are also based on 
conjectures about the implications if New Zealand 
fails to do what others would have considered its 
fair share and the potential indirect economic, social 
and environmental consequences of our actions. 
This report makes no judgement on those matters, 
but limits itself to presenting the current scientific 
knowledge to better inform a public discussion.
• The transition to a low-carbon economy will need 
to extend far beyond technical solutions and 
will require political will and political leadership 
to alter aspects of New Zealand’s regulatory, 
economic and infrastructural frameworks.  
Such a transition can only succeed if it is a 
collaborative approach that gains broad support 
from a majority of the population and key 
stakeholders including public and private sector 
decision-makers.
• Gaining the opportunities as offered by the 
transition to a low-carbon economy for New 
Zealand will require a much improved information 
base to better manage risks. Currently, the 
publically available evidence for mitigation 
pathways for New Zealand is extremely limited 
and the analysis conducted in this study was 
constrained as a result. Investment in data 
gathering and more detailed analysis, possibly 
involving international collaboration, will help 
refine early mitigation actions. Improved data 
availability will also give supporting evidence  
for a transparent public debate to be undertaken 
about desirable and feasible mitigation pathways.
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Section 2:  
Global context 
The 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) has made it clear that human 
influence has already impacted on the Earth’s climate 
system. The IPCC calculated that if the world is to stay 
below the 2oC level, then only 2,900 Gt (billion tonnes) 
of CO
2
 in total can be emitted to the atmosphere. Around 
two thirds of this total carbon budget has already been 
released from the combustion of fossil fuels and through 
deforestation over the past 150 years. If under business-as-
usual the world continues to burn coal, oil and gas and does 
not slow deforestation, then the remaining one third of the 
total CO
2
 budget will be released in less than 15–20 years.
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Key messages
• Global GHG emissions continue to rise  
in spite of all the new technologies being  
used, policies being implemented, or changes 
made to the way we act worldwide to reduce 
energy demand. 
• The world is currently heading towards a 
3–4 oC temperature rise that will significantly 
increase the likelihood of accelerated sea level 
rise, more frequent extreme weather events, 
and higher costs to adapt or protect ourselves. 
• To succeed in limiting global warming to below 
2oC the world needs to reduce current annual 
global GHG emissions by 40–70% below 1990 
levels by 2050. This will require significant 
action including phasing out a major portion 
of CO2 emissions from the use of fossil fuels 
over the next few decades and implementing 
stringent mitigation policies.
• The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement was a 
significant step forward, but the initial targets 
which nations set to reduce GHG emissions will 
be insufficient to limit warming to below 2oC. 
Hence, the Agreement enables and encourages 
countries to strengthen their nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs) and target 
before they ratify it in the next few years and 
every five years subsequently. 
• Setting emissions targets like the NDCs will 
require nations to make ethical judgements 
while considering economic, social and 
environmental consequences.
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Figure 2.1 Around 1,900 Gt CO2 of the total budget of 2,900 Gt CO2 of anthropogenic CO2 emissions that  
can be emitted into the atmosphere in order to keep below the agreed 2oC temperature rise target,  
has already been released.
Amount Used 1870–2011: 
1900 Gt CO2
Amount Remaining:  
1000 Gt CO2
Total Carbon Budget 
2900 Gt CO2
Source: IPCC (2013).
In order to avoid increasing the unmanageable risks 
from climate change, world citizens and businesses 
will have to move away from fossil fuel dependence 
under BAU. IPCC scenarios show that to have a 
likely chance of limiting the increase in global mean 
temperature to below 2oC, means lowering global 
annual GHG emissions by 40 to 70 % below 2010 
levels by 2050, and to near-zero before 2100  
(IPCC, 2014b)10. A critical component of mitigation 
actions is to reduce the emissions of long-lived CO2 to, 
or even below, zero before the end of this century. 
Reducing emissions of non-CO2 gases is also an 
important element of mitigation strategies. It is not 
imperative that short-lived GHGs such as CH4 are 
reduced to zero although all GHG emissions and other 
forcing agents such as black carbon will affect the rate 
and magnitude of climate change over the next few 
decades, (IPCC, 2014a). Debate is continuing on the 
best metrics for trading off actions on different gases 
based on prioritising these actions, value judgements, 
and, most critically, depending on climate policy 
objectives (IPCC, 2009; Harmsen et al., 2016). 
10 http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ar5/pr_wg3/20140413_pr_pc_ 
wg3_en.pdf 
Calculations of the economic costs of mitigation vary 
widely due to different assumptions made about key 
future uncertainties. Several of the more ambitious 
scenarios show the projected global BAU consumption 
growth of between 1.6 to 3% per year would be 
reduced by around 0.06 percentage points per year  
if effective climate policies were implemented 
promptly by most countries (IPCC, 2014b). This slight 
slowing of the consumption growth rate will deliver 
overall economic benefits resulting from reduced 
climate change impacts as well as from any resulting 
co-benefits such as improved health. 
This report endeavours to address the potential to 
instigate a broad range of technological developments 
and changes in behaviour from the New Zealand 
perspective in order to equitably contribute to 
reducing climate risks through reducing global GHG 
emissions. However, achieving the necessary emission 
reductions may also need to involve major changes  
at the national level (Box 2.1). 
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Feasible mitigation policies, practices and 
technologies with high-potential for low-carbon 
policy options are outlined in the UNFCCC (2015a) 
report ‘Climate Action Now ’ that aims to support 
policymakers in implementing current and future 
mitigation actions in the pre-2020 period. The report 
highlights effective approaches to rapidly reduce GHG 
emissions that could be considered in New Zealand. 
Key messages include:
• Enhanced action is urgently needed as current 
pre-2020 emission reduction pledges fall short  
of the 2°C – compatible emissions trajectory.
• Solutions to limit warming to 2°C exist with a  
wide range of policies, measures and actions 
already in place that can be replicated by other 
countries wishing to increase the ambition of  
their mitigation efforts.
• Leadership and willingness to act are required to 
overcome financial, technological and capacity-
related barriers to mitigation action. Cooperative 
initiatives are essential to mobilize climate action 
across a range of stakeholders and need to be 
further promoted.
• Co-benefits can be gained in other economic, 
social and environmental areas.
2.1 Co-benefits
Climate mitigation options can intersect with other 
societal goals, create the possibility of resulting 
co-benefits, and hence strengthen the rationale for 
undertaking climate actions (IPCC, 2014a). Co-benefits 
vary with the specific circumstances but can include 
improved human health and livelihoods, greater food 
security, increased business viability, new business 
opportunities, enhanced biodiversity, better local air 
and water quality, greater energy access and security, 
and more equitable sustainable development. 
IPCC mitigation scenarios showed reduced costs for 
achieving air quality and energy security objectives 
with additional benefits for human health, ecosystem 
impacts, sufficiency of resources for energy supply 
systems to meet national demands, and their 
resilience to price volatility and supply disruptions. 
However, depending on the specific circumstances, 
there could be a wide range of other possible side-
effects and spillovers resulting from mitigation 
measures, such as on biodiversity conservation,  
water availability, food security, efficiency of 
the taxation system, employment, and income 
distribution, that have not been well quantified 
(IPCC 2014b). Section 5 covers mitigation options for 
specific sectors, including discussions on co-benefits.
Box 2.1
The following statements from the IPCC 
Synthesis Report (2014a), concerning climate 
change mitigation measures to reduce GHG 
emissions at the global level, relate to actions 
that can be taken at the national level.
“Mitigation options are available in every major 
sector. Mitigation can be more cost-effective 
if using an integrated approach that combines 
measures to reduce energy use and the GHG 
intensity of end-use sectors, decarbonise 
energy supply, reduce net emissions, and 
enhance carbon sinks in land-based sectors”.
“Adaptation and mitigation responses are 
underpinned by common enabling factors. 
These include effective institutions and 
governance, innovation and investments in 
environmentally sound technologies and 
infrastructure, sustainable livelihoods and 
behavioural and lifestyle choices”.
“There are many opportunities to link 
mitigation, adaptation and the pursuit of 
other societal objectives through integrated 
responses (high confidence). Effective 
adaptation and mitigation responses will 
depend on policies and measures across 
multiple scales: international, regional,  
national and sub-national”.
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2.2 UNFCCC 21st Conference of Parties, 
Paris, December 2015
During 2015, for the first time ever, 195 national 
governments met and pledged to reduce or control 
their national GHG emissions between 2020 and 
203011. Their collective aim is to limit the future mean 
global annual temperature rise to well below 2oC 
above the pre-industrial level, and thereby constrain 
future impacts of climate change on current and 
future generations, as well as on ecosystems. 
Each country was asked to produce an Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), outlining 
its intended mitigation actions. However, based on 
the latest IPCC science assessment (IPCC, 2014a), 
the Paris Agreement recognised that the INDCs, 
as submitted by countries prior to the Paris 21st 
Conference of Parties, are collectively inadequate 
to meet the desired goal of below 2°C. Many of the 
INDCs have conditions imposed, such as no action 
occurring without finance being forthcoming, or 
support for technology transfer, or, in New Zealand’s 
case, international acceptance of carbon markets and 
forest sinks. New Zealand has now signed the Paris 
Agreement on 22 April 2016, so the next step is to 
ratify it. 
The total emission reductions, as pledged in the 
INDCs, will together result in annual total GHG 
emissions increasing through to the period 2025  
to 2030 before possibly peaking soon after. This 
implies that parties will need to strengthen their 
mitigation targets over following decades so that 
GHG emissions will rapidly decline at unprecedented 
rates over the following decades (Box 2.2 and Figure 
2.2). Given the overall goal to optimise the social, 
environmental, and economic values of living with 
a GHG emission constraint in an uncertain world, 
a thorough understanding of the trade-offs and 
complexities is needed.
11 This was the outcome negotiated by the 195 countries that 
attended the UNFCCC 21st Conference of Parties held in Paris, 
France in December 2015. The proposed text, yet to be ratified, 
can be found at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/
eng/l09r01.pdf 
Given the financing constraints of concern for many 
developing countries and the complexities of the 
negotiations, the Paris Agreement was a major step 
forward. The range of INDC emission reductions 
submitted would limit the on-going increase in annual 
global emissions to 2.7–3oC12 This is below that 
based on pledges made in 2010 at COP 16 in Cancun, 
Mexico. However, much more needs to be achieved 
beyond 2030 if the world is to limit the increase  
in mean global temperature to below 2°C  
(or achieve the more ambitious 1.5oC target)13. 
This will entail reducing net CO2 emissions to 
zero, including the removal of CO2 directly from 
the atmosphere or seeking other forms of geo-
engineering, and accepting the costs and risks 
entailed. In essence, continuing with the current rate 
of reduction of global carbon intensity by 1.3% per 
year on average, as occurred from 2000–2014, will 
result in emitting the remaining 1000 Gt CO2 allowed 
to avoid exceeding 2 oC (Figure. 2.1) by around 203614. 
This decarbonisation rate will have to be increased 
five-fold, on average, for every year until 2100  
to avoid exceeding the 2 oC level (PWC, 2015).
12 Synthesis report on the aggregate effects on INDCs (though this 
presents emission levels rather than making judgements on 
temperature outcomes) http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/
items/9240.php
13 Towards a Workable and Effective Climate Regime http://www.
voxeu.org/sites/default/files/image/FromMay2014/Climate%20
change%20book%20for%20web.pdf 
14 To avoid exceeding 1.5oC, only around 500 Gt CO2 can be 
emitted which is likely to be rapidly used up given many major 
developing countries only intend to peak their GHG emissions 
by 2030 at the earliest.
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Two possible emission pathways to reach zero annual CO2 emissions at the same point of time in the 
future. The delayed mitigation pathway results in around double the total CO2 emissions over the 
period, and hence greater warming, than the early mitigation pathway, even though they both end 
up with zero emissions at the same time. 
Box 2.2 
Delaying CO2
 mitigation actions can result in 
higher overall societal costs and greater emissions 
to the atmosphere that cannot be compensated 
for by a more rapid reduction in the future. 
Climate change is related mainly to cumulative 
emissions of CO2, a gas with a relatively long-life, 
as a fraction of today’s emissions will remain in the 
atmosphere for between hundreds and thousands 
of years. This implies an unequivocal need for net 
annual global CO2 emissions to ultimately decline to 
zero15 if climate change is to be halted at any level. 
Both the time by when emissions decline to zero, and 
the pathway below the business as usual trajectory 
(BAU) taken to achieve this, will influence how much 
warming occurs. 
15 Note that many mitigation scenarios also highlight the need to 
reach below zero CO2 emissions before the end of this century 
by, for example, pulling CO2 out of the atmosphere through 
bioenergy linked with CCS (IPCC, 2014b),
A delayed mitigation pathway that continues with 
high annual CO2 emissions for several years, followed 
by a rapid decline in the future to reach zero 
emissions, will contribute more warming than would 
an early mitigation pathway, with earlier peaking 
of emissions followed by a more gradual reduction 
over time, to reach zero emissions that same year.16 
In other words, a near-term delay in reducing 
annual CO2 emissions cannot be compensated for 
by more rapid reductions undertaken later unless 
the delayed mitigation pathway becomes so steep 
that zero emissions are achieved sooner.17 Hence, 
urgent mitigation actions at the global, national, 
local and personal levels would avoid higher future 
costs from more extreme weather impacts and 
adaptation. 
 
16 The total area beneath each of the two pathway curves 
depicts the total emissions over time, the rapid peaking 
option having around half of the total emissions of the later 
peaking continued high emissions pathway.
17 Note that this does not apply to the same degree to other 
GHGs with a much shorter lifetime than CO
2 such as 
methane (Section 5.5).
 Global context 35
Figure 2.2 Based on the submitted INDCs, the projected global GHG emission reduction ranges in 2025  
and 2030 (orange boxes) have medians lower than the national pledges made at COP 16 in Cancun in 2010  
(orange line), but are still insufficient to keep the temperature rise below 2oC target without a subsequent 
steep and rapid emission reduction (shown by the simplified blue and green pathways based on IPCC least 
cost scenarios). 
Source: Based on UNFCCC, 2015a.
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Decision 1.CO/21 set conditions to the adoption of the Paris climate Agreement (2015) that consists of  
29 Articles of which Articles 2 and 4 have direct impact on New Zealand’s policies and actions (Box 2.3).
Box 2.3: The Paris Agreement
The following statements, extracted from  
the Paris Agreement with minor editing,  
are compiled here to show the impact that the 
Agreement is likely to have on New Zealand’s 
policies and actions.
• This Agreement aims to strengthen the global 
response to the threat of climate change by 
holding the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit 
the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels, recognizing that this would 
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of 
climate change. (Article 2, 1a).
• In order to achieve this long-term temperature 
goal, Parties aim to reach global peaking 
of GHG emissions as soon as possible and 
to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in 
accordance with best available science, so as 
to achieve a balance between anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
of GHGs in the second half of this century, 
on the basis of equity, and in the context 
of sustainable development and efforts to 
eradicate poverty. (Article 4, 1).
• Requests those Parties whose INDC contains 
a time frame up to 2030 to communicate or 
update by 2020 these contributions and to 
do so every five years. (Decision 1./CP21, 24; 
Article 4, 9).
• Each Party shall prepare, communicate and 
maintain successive Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) that it intends to achieve. 
Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation 
measures, with the aim of achieving the 
objectives of such contributions. (Article 4, 2).
• Each Party’s successive NDC will represent  
a progression beyond the Party’s then current 
NDC and reflect its highest possible ambition, 
reflecting its common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities in 
the light of different national circumstances. 
(Article 4, 3).
• Invites Parties to communicate by 2020 their 
mid-century, long-term low GHG emission 
development strategies (in accordance with 
Article 4, 19) and requests the secretariat to 
publish on the UNFCCC website the Parties’ 
low GHG emission development strategies as 
communicated. (Decision 1./CP21, 36). 
• All Parties should strive to formulate and 
communicate long-term low GHG emission 
development strategies, mindful of Article 
2 taking into account their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, in the light of different national 
circumstances. (Article 4, 19).
• Decides to convene a facilitative dialogue 
among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the 
collective efforts of Parties in relation to 
progress towards the long-term goal (Article 
4, 1) and to inform the preparation of NDCs 
(Decision 1./CP21, 20).
• In communicating their NDCs, all Parties shall 
provide the information necessary for clarity, 
transparency and understanding in accordance 
with Decision 1./CP.21 and any relevant 
decisions of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties  
to the Paris Agreement. (Article 4, 8).
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Fossil fuel subsidy reforms were not included in 
the Paris Agreement but, nevertheless, are gaining 
international traction to remove both consumption 
and production subsidies. IEA analysis has identified 
the ‘absurd situation’ of opposite forces at work in 
the global energy economy: where subsidies for the 
use of fossil fuels are employed, globally they equate 
to an average of around US$110 /t C emitted whereas 
the carbon price in Europe to avoid emissions is 
approximately US$10 /t C18. At present, the G7 
countries19 plus Australia invest around forty times 
more in fossil fuel subsidies (approximately  
US$ 80 billion/yr) than their total contribution to  
the Green Climate Fund (GCF)20 (Turnbull, 2015).  
New Zealand presented a Friends of Fossil Fuel 
Subsidy Reform communiqué21 from 40 countries at 
the Paris COP 21 and also participated in an APEC peer 
review process of fossil fuel subsidy reform in March 
2015. It concluded that none of the four production 
subsidies or two consumption subsidies currently in 
place in New Zealand were ‘inefficient subsidies that 
encourage wasteful consumption of fossil fuels’22.
The GCF was established in 2009 with the aim for 
richer countries to help support poorer countries 
meet their mitigation and adaptation goals by 
committing US$100 billion per year by 2020.  
Before Paris, the GCF had funded its initial projects 
selected, but had only received commitments of 
around US$10 billion. Therefore, ‘financing’ was a key 
discussion point in the Paris negotiations, especially 
given that many of the INDCs are conditional on 
support from the GCF. Together INDCs will require 
a cumulative investment from 2015 until 2030 
of around US$13.5 trillion to support low carbon 
technologies, energy efficiency (IEA, 2015a) and 
adaptation actions. 
18 https://www.iisd.org/GSI/news/fossil-fuel-subsidy-reform-big-
climate-talks-and-agreement
19 The Group of 7 (G7) is a group consisting of Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.
20 New Zealand has contributed NZ$3 million to the GCF, far 
less than the approximately NZ$80 million NZ has invested to 
subsidise oil and gas exploration. The New Zealand contribution 
to the GCF equates to around US$0.37/capita compared with 
the UK contribution of US$18.47/capita and the US of  
US$9.41/capita. However, New Zealand has also committed 
NZ$50 M/yr for 4 years to support South Pacific countries. 
Together that equates to around US$7.40/capita.
21 http://fffsr.org/communique/ 
22 http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/sectors-industries/
energy/international-relationships/pdf-document-library/ 
peer-review-fossil-fuel-subsidy-reforms-nz.pdf 
Not explicitly covered in the Paris Agreement, 
although discussed at length during the negotiations 
and at various side-events, were emissions from 
international aviation and shipping. Steady progress 
has been made by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO)). Further work is being undertaken 
which, no doubt, will have impacts for New Zealand 
given our isolation, increasing tourism numbers 
(Section 4.6), and high-volume exports.
The Paris Agreement was opened for signature by 
Parties from 22 April 2016 with ratification any time 
after they sign23. An INDC will become a Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC) when the party 
ratifies. Strengthening an INDC before ratification is 
explicitly encouraged. The NDCs will cover the period 
2021–30, with most parties having specified either 
2025 or 2030 as their target year. The Agreement will 
come into force when 55 parties comprising at least 
55% of total global annual emissions have ratified. 
Under the Agreement, countries are obliged to 
declare, communicate and maintain targets although 
modalities of the compliance mechanism have yet to 
be negotiated. The Paris Agreement is therefore not 
so much a conclusion as the beginning of a new phase 
of international efforts that will engage New Zealand  
and other parties in cooperation and negotiation  
for a long time into the future. 
23 Parties that don’t sign before 21 April 2017 will not have  
the option of the “sign then later ratify” process and can  
only accede (having the same legal effect as ratifying).
38 Transition to a low-carbon economy for New Zealand  |  2016
 Global context 39
Section 3:  
New Zealand’s  
emissions and trends 
New Zealand’s total annual greenhouse gas emissions are 
projected to continue to steadily increase under business-
as-usual over the next one to two decades. On a per capita 
basis, our emissions are well above the global average. 
Around half the total emissions consist of CO
2
 from fossil 
fuel combustion with the other half being mainly methane 
and nitrous oxide from agriculture. Both energy intensity 
and emission intensity per unit of GDP have followed the 
global trend and declined since 1990.
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Key messages
• New Zealand’s net and gross emissions  
are increasing. 
• New Zealand produces an unusually large 
portion of CH4 and N2O emissions due to the 
significant role of agriculture in our economy. 
• Emissions of CO2 per capita are not high 
compared to other developed countries but 
have increased since 1990. Emissions of all 
GHGs per capita, however, are above the 
average for developed countries even though 
they have declined since 2005.
• Since 2008 New Zealand has its own 
emissions trading scheme, the NZ ETS, but its 
effectiveness to reduce GHG emissions to date 
has been limited.
• New Zealand has relied on buying international 
emissions trading units to meet emission 
reduction targets, as well as reducing domestic 
GHG emissions and removing CO2 through 
forests. Some of the trading units have 
historically had low credibility internationally. 
Currently the NZ ETS does not involve 
international units, but the government  
has indicated an intention to make use  
of them in the future. 
• Other measures include supporting research 
and providing consumers with information. 
• Few regulatory measures relating to reducing 
GHG emissions that are common overseas 
exist in New Zealand, such as motor vehicle 
fuel efficiency standards, mandatory biofuel 
requirements, or regulated priority for the  
use of renewable energy for heat and 
electricity supply.
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3.1 Historical trends 
New Zealand’s gross emissions have been on an 
upward trend and are projected to continue to 
increase (MƒE, 2015e). Between 1990 and 201324, 
gross emissions increased by 21.3% (14.4 Mt CO2-
eq) from 66.7 Mt CO2-eq to 81.0 Mt CO2-eq
25. Net 
emissions, when CO2 removals from forests  
are included, have increased by an even greater 
42.4%, from 38.0 to 54.2 Mt CO2-eq.
Net emissions are significantly lower than gross 
emissions because New Zealand on average has been 
converting some low-quality pasture and scrub land 
(which was mostly natural forests prior to arrival of 
the first human settlers) back into forests (mostly 
plantation forests for harvesting but some areas  
also into permanent forests). 
24 All emissions data are from the New Zealand national GHG 
emissions inventory, published annually by the Ministry for the 
Environment. The inventory is usually released in April covering 
emissions up to the end of the prior 16 months. Hence this 
report, which used the inventory published in April 2015, refers 
to emissions up to the end of the calendar year 2013 (http://
www.mƒe.govt.nz/publications/climate-change/new-zealands-
greenhouse-gas-inventory-1990-2013).
25 Comparisons of the emissions of different gases rely on a 
metric to translate emissions of CH
4 and N2O (which have 
different molecular weights, warming effects, and lifetimes 
in the atmosphere) into’CO2-equivalent’ emissions. Such a 
common metric enables the different warming impacts from 
the various GHGs to be added and contributions from different 
sectors, which may emit different gases, to be compared. The 
most commonly used metric is the Global Warming Potential 
(GWP). GWPs compare the amount of heat trapped in the 
atmosphere by the emission of 1 kg of a GHG other than CO
2 to 
the heat trapped by the emission of 1 kg of CO2. In this report, 
we use the 100 year GWP metric, as used in New Zealand’s 
reporting under the UNFCCC, which gives a weighting of 25 
to CH
4 and 298 to N2O. Note that there is an active debate in 
New Zealand and internationally about alternative metrics 
to compare non-CO2 gases with CO2, given the very different 
properties of different gases which mean that any ‘equivalence’ 
with CO2 applies only in some respects but not in others. Other 
metrics would assign less weight to gases with a relatively short 
atmospheric lifetime such as CH4, and some would assign a 
lower weight in the near term but increase this weight steadily 
over the next several decades. The choice of metric clearly is 
very important for NZ, given that an unusually large fraction of 
our total emissions (48%) comes from agriculture in the form 
of CH
4 and N2O. The most appropriate metric depends on value 
judgements and policy objectives. For this report, we will not 
enter into this discussion but instead adopt the metric that is 
used for reporting under the UNFCCC, namely the 100-year GWP.
On average, growing forests26 have offset 29.1 Mt  
CO2-eq which equates to more than one third of  
New Zealand’s annual average gross emissions  
during 1990–2013 (Section 5.6).
Most of the growth in gross GHG emissions from  
1990 to 2013 came from fossil-fuel combustion  
(7.7 Mt CO2-eq, equating to a 31.9% increase), 
agriculture (4.8 Mt CO2-eq, an increase of 14.1%),  
and industrial processes and product use  
(1.8 Mt CO2-eq, an increase of 54.8%) (Figure. 3.1). 
Most of the increase in fossil fuel-related emissions 
arose from an increase in transport emissions, with 
a smaller increase in emissions from electricity and 
heat generation (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). The direct 
emissions from industry arise from processes such  
as cement manufacture and product use (Section 5.4). 
Emissions from waste were almost constant and 
relatively low with policy mechanisms in place. 
Even though they are relatively high per capita on 
an international basis, and there may be further 
mitigation opportunities, they were not considered 
further in this report. 
Emissions of synthetic gases (HFCs, PFCs and SF
6
), 
used mostly in refrigeration and as solvents for 
cleaning processes, showed a significant increase  
but make only a very small contribution to total 
overall emissions so were also not further assessed 
here even though there are viable alternatives for 
HFCs under negotiation in the Montreal Protocol that 
could be considered. Removals of atmospheric CO2  
by growing forests showed cyclical variations between 
1990 and 2013, but no consistent long-term trend 
(Section 5.6). Removals by forests in 2013 of  
26.8 Mt CO2e were 6.6% less than those in 1990. 
26 ‘Kyoto’ forests removed 14.3 Mt CO2 per year on average 
from 2008 to 2012 (http://www.mƒe.govt.nz/climate-change/
reporting-greenhouse-gas-emissions/nzs-net-position-
under-kyoto-protocol/update-net). Primarily, only forests 
regenerated or planted into pasture or crop land after 1990 
qualify as a carbon sink under the rules of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Net emissions reported in the GHG Inventory under UNFCCC 
accounting rules include all emissions and removals from land-
use activities. Existing forests are largely factored out under a 
BAU accounting approach called a ‘reference level’, and New 
Zealand has elected to not include other land use categories.
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Figure 3.1 Gross GHG emissions in New Zealand from all sectors and removals by forests, 1990–2013. 
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Source: MƒE (2015a).
Emissions from electricity and heat generation can 
be allocated to the end-use sectors that use the heat 
or electricity (Figure 3.2). Buildings are important 
consumers of electricity and fossil fuels are commonly 
used for heating. Hence, the sector offers important 
abatement opportunities, even though their direct 
emissions are very small (Section 5.3). 
Industry is also a significant user of heat and power 
(Section 5.4). This report considers emissions both 
from a production perspective (i.e. opportunities 
to generate electricity and heat with lower carbon 
emissions) as well as a consumption perspective  
(i.e. reducing the demand for electricity and heat).
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Figure 3.2 Greenhouse gas emissions from each sector in 2013 showing allocations of emissions from the 
heat and electricity sector to the end-user sectors (transport, buildings, industry and agriculture).  
Source: MƒE (2015a).
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Global energy intensity (GJ/unit of GDP) is projected 
to fall three times faster out to 2030 than in the past 
decade (IEA, 2015a). As New Zealanders have also 
used energy more wisely and efficiently since 1990, 
particularly industry, our national energy intensity 
(MJ/$ GDP) has steadily declined (Figure. 3.3). 
However, this has been insufficient to fully offset the 
country’s growth in GDP over this period, so our total 
annual energy demand continues to grow as do  
our GHG emissions. 
However, the growth rate is slower than it would 
have been without energy efficiency measures being 
implemented across all sectors. Business NZ Energy 
Council (BEC, 2015) projected that the current energy 
intensity reduction of 1.7% per year will continue 
through to 2050 in its Kayak scenario. In the Waka 
scenario with heightened environmental awareness, 
energy intensity will decline faster by 2050 reaching 
2.0% per year.
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Figure 3.3 Energy intensity (MJ/$ GDP) of NZ sectors 1990-2014.
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Two other metrics often used in national accounting 
and international comparisons (Section 3.4) are a) 
GHG emissions per capita and b) GHG emissions per 
unit of GDP (Figure 3.4). 
a. Although New Zealand’s population has grown by 
around 30% since 1990 and total GHG emissions 
have increased, our per capita CO2-eq emissions 
fell by 7%, from 19.6 tCO2-eq / capita in 1990 to 
18.2 tCO2-eq /capita in 2013
27. This is higher than 
the approximately 15 tCO2e per capita emissions 
across the average of high income countries and 
much higher than the average in upper middle 
income countries, which doubled from just over 
4 tCO2eq per capita in 1990 to 8 tCO2eq in 2011. 
However, excluding agricultural non-CO2 gases,  
so looking at just CO2, per capita emissions 
increased slightly during this period, from 7.45 t 
CO2/capita in 1990 to 7.78 tCO2/capita in 2013. 
This is near the lower end of the 6 to 17 tCO2/
capita range in high income countries due to  
New Zealand’s high shares of renewable electricity 
(section 5.1) but is above the estimated global 
average of 4.6 tCO2/capita (excluding emissions 
from land-use change).
27 CAIT (2015) gives 17.37 t CO2-eq / capita for New Zealand  
in 2012
b. Emission intensity per unit of GDP has fallen  
in New Zealand, by 25% from 0.82 kg CO2-eq 
/$GDP in 1990 to 0.55 kg CO2-eq /$GDP in 
2013 (MBIE, 2015). This is a trend of almost all 
economies around the world (excluding short-term 
variations related to economic shocks or natural 
disasters). In New Zealand, it is partly overall 
energy efficiency improvements that saved 36 PJ 
of energy demand between 2001 and 2011 
(MBIE, 2015). Business NZ Energy Council  
(BEC, 2015) projected the present emissions 
intensity of 0.18 kg CO2 / $ GDP will drop to  
0.07 kg CO2/ $GDP by 2050 in its Kayak  
scenario and down to 0.05 kg CO2/ $ GDP  
in the Waka scenario.
Given New Zealand’s unusual emissions profile with 
a very high fraction of emissions of CH4 and N2O from 
agriculture, it is also worthwhile to compare trends  
in individual gases and sectors. Nominal CH4 emissions 
per capita declined by 18%, from 9.8 tCO2eq/capita  
in 1990 to 8.0 tCO2eq/capita in 2013, with a much 
lower fall of 4.8% in N2O emissions per capita  
(from 2.1 to 2.0 tCO2eq/capita) (Figure. 3.4).
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Figure 3.4 Trends in emissions per resident capita (for total CO2-eq and individual gases) and emissions per 
unit of GDP..
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3.2 Targets and policies 
New Zealand’s main approach to addressing GHG 
emissions currently consists of its emissions trading 
scheme (NZ ETS) (MƒE, 2013). While designed 
in principle to cover all sectors and all gases, the 
scheme, currently, places no obligations on biological 
emissions from agriculture; it only requires agricultural 
processors to report on emissions (Section 4.7).
New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emission targets
New Zealand has four national targets:28 
1. by 2020: unconditional target of 5% below  
1990 levels by 2020, announced in August 2013 
in lieu of joining the Kyoto Protocol second 
commitment period;29
28 http://www.mƒe.govt.nz/climate-change/reducing-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/emissions-reduction-targets
29 T Groser, press release, ‘New Zealand commits to 2020 climate 
change target’ 16 August 2013.
2. by 2020: conditional target range of 10–20%  
below 1990 levels by 2020, assuming there  
was a comprehensive global agreement, 
announced in 2009, at the 15th UNFCCC  
Conference of the Parties;30 
3. by 2030: provisional target of 30% below  
2005 levels by 2030, equivalent to 11.2%  
below 1990 levels, but subject to international 
agreement on accounting for the land sector and 
confirmation of access to carbon markets. This  
was New Zealand’s intended nationally determined 
contribution (INDC) advised for the Paris COP  
in 2015 (MƒE, 2015b); 
4. by 2050: aspirational long-term target  
of 50% below 1990 levels by 2050 (Figure 3.5).31 
30 The agreement assumed the world will set a pathway to limit 
temperature rise to not more than 2°C; developed countries 
make comparable efforts to those of New Zealand; advanced 
and major emitting developing countries will take action fully 
commensurate with their respective capabilities; there is an 
effective set of rules for LULUCF; there is full recourse to the 
international carbon market. Source: N Smith, N Groser, press 
release ‘2020 target balances economy & environment’ 10 
August 2009.
31 Climate Change Response (2050 Emissions Target) Notice 2011, 
NZ Gazette p 987, 31 March 2011, pursuant to s 224 of the 
Climate Change Response Act 2002. 
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Figure 3.5 New Zealand’s gross and net emissions from 1990 to 2013, future projections and national 
emission reduction targets for 2020, 2030 and 2050. 
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The 2030 INDC target may be adjusted with the 
provisional target probably being finalised in the  
near term as an NDC and the conditional 2020  
target range perhaps being regarded as superseded.  
All New Zealand’s targets are stated to be 
‘responsibility targets’ which can be met either by 
domestic emission reductions, including forest sinks, 
or by the Government or other actors purchasing 
emission credits abroad.
Infometrics (2015) and Landcare (2015) modelled 
the impacts of a potential New Zealand emissions 
target and showed heavy reliance on purchasing 
international carbon credits assuming they are 
available. The models were unable to simulate 
achievement of the target modelled without purchase 
of international carbon credits; the required price was 
too high. The studies assumed a decadal emissions 
reduction target of 260 Mt (equivalent to 10% below 
1990 levels by 2030) with a global carbon price that 
reaches $50/tonne. Agricultural non-CO2 emissions 
were included in New Zealand’s responsibilities but 
were excluded from carbon pricing. Under these 
assumptions, about four-fifths of the target would be 
met from international carbon credits, and only one-
fifth of the target would be met by the abatement 
of emissions in New Zealand. Based on these 
assumptions, the cost of purchasing international 
carbon credits to offset the share of annual  
projected emissions would equate to  
approximately $1.3 billion per year.
The INDC of 2015 made access to international 
credits one of the conditions for the commitment. 
The Ministry for the Environment in its NZ Emission 
Trading Scheme Review Discussion Document of 
2015 suggests the ETS is likely to accept international 
carbon credits in the future. Credits will be subject 
to new rules that will aim to ensure that units have 
environmental integrity and represent genuine 
reductions (Section 4.7). 
3.3 Future trends 
New Zealand’s 6th National Communication (NC6) to 
the UNFCCC (MƒE, 2013) provided New Zealand’s 
future emissions projections out to 2030 and trends 
across the economy. These projections were updated 
in the Second Biennial Report to the UNFCCC  
(MƒE, 2015e). Underpinning all future projections 
are the assumptions that New Zealand’s population 
will rise to 5.2 million by 2030 and GDP will rise by 
40% relative to 2015. The NC6 projections assumed 
an effective carbon price of only $5 /t CO2eq, which 
limits the effect of any price-based climate policies 
on emissions. Such a price assumption was not 
consistent with global scenarios that would succeed 
in limiting global GHG emissions to limit the global 
average temperature increase to 2oC relative to pre-
industrial levels. The amended projections (MƒE, 
2015e) assumed a carbon price rising in 2030 to the 
current $25 fixed price option under the ETS. This is 
consistent with UNFCCC guidelines that require the 
‘with measures’ scenario to apply current policies.  
By comparison, the two Business Energy Council  
(BEC, 2015) scenarios for New Zealand’s energy 
future, assumed carbon prices of $60/t CO2 (Kayak) 
and $115/t CO2 (Waka) in 2050 (BEC, 2015). Such 
carbon price levels are more consistent with carbon 
prices coming out of international modelling studies 
(Clarke et al, 2014).
Based on New Zealand’s second biennial update 
report to the UNFCCC (MƒE, 2015e) that supersedes 
the NC6, gross emissions are now estimated to 
increase to 29% above 1990 levels by 2030 in the 
absence of additional policy measures beyond those 
currently in place (Figure. 3.6). Notably, a significant 
decline in removals from forestry is expected over 
this period due to harvesting cycles resulting in net 
emissions increasing by 96% above net emissions  
in 1990. In absolute terms, using the same conversion 
factors for non-CO2 gases into CO2-equivalents as used 
in the most recent annual emissions inventory, gross 
emissions would increase by 2030 to 86.0 Mt CO2e 
and net emissions to 74.6 Mt CO2e. 
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Figure 3.6 Historical and projected future GHG emissions in New Zealand from all sectors, 1990 to 2030. 
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Since no official data are available for projected 
GHG emissions beyond 2030, possibly due to large 
uncertainties from future disruptive technologies, 
it has been challenging to assess the mitigation 
options, emissions pathways and policy options  
for New Zealand that could meet the gazetted  
2050 goal or any longer term target. 
This report therefore used long-term sector-specific 
projections where available, inferred future emissions 
levels based on other longer-term forecasts, or 
employed plausible assumptions based on expert 
judgement where justified and deemed necessary  
to provide useful order-of-magnitude information 
given this knowledge gap.
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3.4 New Zealand’s emissions and trends in a global context 
New Zealand’s overall GHG emissions are relatively 
small at around 0.15% of total global emissions, 
(reflecting our small economy and our population 
at about 0.06% of the global total). The 48% share 
of total emissions from direct agricultural emissions 
is the highest of all developed countries, being 
significantly higher than Ireland (31%), France (18%) 
and Australia (16%). In most developed countries 
agriculture constitutes less than 10% of total 
emissions. New Zealand’s emissions profile makes 
it more like many small developing countries with 
strong agricultural sectors such as Uruguay (75%), 
Ethiopia (52%) or Argentina (34%), although there are 
differences in the structure of the agriculture sector 
between New Zealand and some of these countries. 
The largest emitters in the developing world all tend 
to have a lower share of agriculture emissions than 
New Zealand, (e.g. Brazil, 30%; India, 20%; China, 
9%) mostly because of their rapidly growing (and 
often highly fossil-fuel dependent) energy sector and 
despite the importance of food security for those 
countries. New Zealand’s unusual emissions profile, 
along with the large fraction of emissions that are 
effectively exported through agricultural products, 
creates a challenge in how best to conceptualise 
its role and opportunities in contributing to global 
mitigation efforts (see Box 3.1).
Our geographical remoteness and economic reliance 
on exports of agricultural products and long-haul 
tourism imply that international perceptions of  
New Zealand as a source of products and services 
could play a role in shaping New Zealand’s future 
emission reductions (Section 4.6).
To limit the rise in global average temperatures to 
no more than 2°C, aggregate emission reductions 
across high income countries would need to amount 
to typically 80% or more below 2010 levels by 2050 
in order to give developing countries more breathing 
space to achieve sustainable development as they 
also decarbonise their economies (Clarke et al., 2014). 
New Zealand’s long-term goal of reducing emissions 
by 50% relative to 1990 levels by 2050 is significantly 
less ambitious. This could reflect New Zealand’s 
emissions profile, but no formal analyses of how  
the target was derived have been released, nor what 
the government would expect the relative emission 
reduction shares of different sectors of the economy 
to be if such a target were in fact achieved.
New Zealand can choose to make greater emission 
reductions than other developed countries or it can 
choose not to try and match what they aspire to.  
Such a choice inevitably (explicitly or implicitly) 
involves value judgements and other assumptions 
such as the attitudes of our trading partners. For this 
reason, this study aimed to evaluate what options 
exist for reductions in GHG emissions, as low as 
possible and as soon as feasible, for each sector  
of the economy and across the economy as a whole. 
A range of transparent assumptions were made about 
the cost and availability of current and future  
technologies and the rate of behavioural change. 
The long-term goal assumed for New Zealand is  
to reduce net emissions of long-lived CO2 to zero  
or below, consistent with findings by the IPCC  
and endorsed by the Paris Climate Agreement32.  
A separate mitigation goal could be considered for 
short-lived gases, in particular for methane, since 
these emissions do not have to decline to zero in 
order for the climate to stabilise and the GHG metrics 
currently used for methane, other short-lived gases, 
and black carbon are being reviewed (Harmsen et al., 
2016; see footnote 25 above). 
32 It is not a given that each individual country would have to 
achieve this, as long as excess emissions in one group of 
countries is balanced by active carbon removals in another 
group of countries; but without a transparent case for New 
Zealand taking a different role in the long term, we take a goal 
of carbon neutrality as a given for the purpose of this report.
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Box 3.1: Export component of emissions
Under reporting and accounting rules adopted 
by the UNFCCC, emissions are generally 
counted where they actually occur into the 
atmosphere. For some countries with large export 
components, this can result in a relatively higher 
emissions burden compared to countries with 
high levels of imports, especially of emissions 
intensive products. Examples include steel, 
cement and aluminium in the construction  
sector, or ruminant livestock products and  
rice in agriculture.
In a consumption-based approach, emissions 
assigned to high income countries would, on 
average, increase, while those assigned to upper 
and lower middle income countries would 
decrease, reflecting the fact that high income 
countries increasingly outsource production 
overseas, where labour is generally cheaper. 
However, most studies have only explored 
implications of different accounting approaches 
on CO2 emissions, not for non-CO2 emissions.
Since New Zealand exports more than 90%  
of its total livestock production, an alternative 
consumption-based perspective would assign 
livestock emissions to the countries where 
livestock products (mainly meat and milk) are 
consumed rather than to New Zealand. On the 
other hand, in a consumption based approach, 
New Zealand would become liable for emissions 
arising in other countries for products that it 
imports (such as cars, machinery, clothing, and 
electronics). An existing study (Peters et al., 
2011) indicates that New Zealand’s CO2 emissions 
based on a consumption approach would be 
higher than if based on a production approach 
which is consistent with the picture for most 
other developed countries. However, when 
taking into account the unusually large share of 
New Zealand’s non-CO2 agricultural emissions, 
our overall consumption-based emissions would 
likely be lower. This situation is exacerbated 
further if the export of wood products is taken 
into account, where New Zealand incurs the full 
emissions liability at the time a tree is harvested, 
even if the wood, and hence the embedded 
carbon, is exported. Based on recent trends, the 
difference between production and consumption-
based emissions has been reducing but no long-
term forecasts exist.
Fully accounting for emissions at the point where 
consumption occurs (including defining what 
constitutes a point of consumption or simply  
an intermediate point for further production) 
would be extremely complex. A consumption 
based approach would also make it more difficult, 
if not impossible in some cases, for the countries 
that are now responsible for those emissions to 
actually implement mitigation measures.
For these reasons, this report does not further 
explore implications of a consumption-based 
approach to emissions accounting, but notes 
that the production vs consumption perspective 
can be an important element for how national 
obligations and a ‘fair share’ are construed.
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Section 4: 
Taking action
All New Zealanders should understand the risks of climate 
change, accept that we have to change the way we currently 
behave, accept that there are benefits but that also trade-
offs have to be made, and become personally involved in 
implementing mitigation actions and changing our present 
‘carbon culture’. Policies can evolve to make it easier for 
people, communities, cities and businesses to reduce their 
carbon footprints.
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Key messages
• Reducing emissions to net zero and  
creating a low-carbon economy within  
the next 35–50 years will involve changes  
in the behaviours of all sectors of society,  
from individuals, families and communities  
to businesses and government. 
• The social and technological changes required 
are significant, but achievable if people and 
organisations are enabled so they can choose 
low-carbon options. 
• The tools, technologies and systems available 
to reduce emissions are likely to change 
dramatically over the next decades. To avoid 
being locked into high cost choices and pick up 
attractive new options quickly we can be open 
to and actively trial new options, evaluate our 
past choices and be prepared to admit failure, 
and make choices that open up future options 
rather than excluding them.
• One starting point for behaviour change is  
for people and organisations to understand  
their emissions profile with a range of tools 
available to provide personalised assessments  
of carbon footprints. 
• Behaviour is shaped by a comprehension of the 
climate change problem as well as by the wider 
context set by local and national government 
policies, and by infrastructure development. 
• Policies including emissions pricing, 
infrastructure and cultures need to evolve  
to make it easier for people and organisations 
to consistently make low-carbon choices.
• Climate change policy can be developed in 
a way that involves New Zealanders, our 
organisations and businesses. Implementation 
requires action from all of us so the procedures 
should be open, well-informed, systematic, 
efficient and equitable. 
• Being involved in the development of policy,  
or even just being informed, will influence  
our commitment to a low-carbon future. 
• When setting targets, careful analysis of actions 
and measures and early discussion with sector 
stakeholders could help ensure that targets can 
be reached and policy effectiveness can later 
be evaluated. 
• Public debate about climate change could be 
informed by provision of information about  
the strengths and weaknesses of different 
policy options.
• New procedures and institutions such as 
strategies, action plans, and independent 
monitoring and advisory committees may 
improve climate-change policy-making by 
making it more focussed, stable and accessible 
to the stakeholders.
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To avoid serious social, economic and environmental 
harm from climate change, all anthropogenic 
activities and processes that currently emit significant 
quantities of GHGs will need to change. Section 5 
focuses on the specifics of these changes, sector 
by sector. But change will not occur unless people, 
organisations and local, regional and national 
governments take action. 
This section focuses first on behaviour, and what will 
be needed to support widespread behaviour change 
to achieve a low-carbon future. It then addresses 
the government policy measures that can be used to 
mitigate climate change, and the framework in which 
climate change policy is made in New Zealand. 
Climate change calls for actions on different levels: 
personal, household, social circles, workplace 
and market, the wider economy, business, local 
government, regional, and national government  
and international interactions by New Zealanders.  
The focus on the actions that we can take through our 
individual and local actions is necessarily followed in 
this section by discussion of the actions that we can 
take in the public sphere led by governments.  
The myriad of actions that individual and businesses 
can take should not obscure the responsibility of 
central and local governments to provide leadership.
4.1 A socio-technical transition
It is an immense task to reduce annual emissions to 
net zero by the second half of the century, especially 
when linked to the need to rapidly reduce our present 
heavy reliance on fossil fuels and the aim for poorer 
countries to also achieve sustainable development. 
Transitioning to a low-carbon future involves changes 
that will affect everyday decisions and activities and 
impact almost all aspects of people’s lives, at work 
and at home. Changes will also be needed in the 
contexts that shape people’s choices, such as in policy 
and regulations, the provision and management  
of infrastructure, and the availability of low-carbon 
alternatives to fossil fuels. 
Fossil fuels are an integral part of systems of 
production and consumption. For example, for 
someone to own and drive a car in New Zealand,  
they are reliant on a complex chain of supply 
of vehicles and fuels that includes steel mills, 
car manufacturers, car importers, car sales and 
maintenance companies, oil producers, oil shippers, 
oil refineries, vehicle regulations, tax systems, building 
and maintaining roads, car magazines and websites, 
garages and service stations. A transition in such 
a system is complex, in part because there are so 
many players, from multi-national companies to local 
businesses, many with vested interests in maintaining 
things as they are. 
In addition, changing one part of a system inevitably 
involves changes in other parts as well. The scale 
of the changes are such that it will necessarily be a 
‘socio-technical transition’ (Verbong and Geels, 2010; 
Geels, 2012) – ‘transition’ meaning a fundamental 
change from one way of doing things to another, 
and ‘socio-technical’ meaning that the transition 
will require technological change as well as changes 
in human behaviour. The world has seen many 
socio-technical transitions in the past – such as 
the rapid transition from horses to cars in the early 
20th century, and the transition from film-based 
photography to digital in the late 20th century.  
Socio-technical transitions can be challenging, 
especially for ‘sunset industries’ (like blacksmiths 
and film developers and camera manufacturers), 
but they also open up new economic and societal 
opportunities as seen by the way information 
technology has revolutionised communication. 
The low-carbon transition is already under way. Many 
innovators, businesses, communities, cities, banks and 
financiers are already actively involved in many ways, 
including for example making massive investments in 
renewable energy (UNEP, 2015a). However, it might 
not happen quickly enough to stay within the global 
carbon budget (Figure 2.1) unless there is a concerted 
effort across all sectors and at all scales of action. 
Businesses, iwi, local governments, government,  
non-governmental organisations and community 
groups will all need to consider their role in the 
transition, and potentially change the ways that  
they have traditionally operated. 
4.2 Assessing emissions 
One of the first steps in changing behaviour to reduce 
emissions is to understand what it is that we do that 
produces them. Section 5 details the GHG emissions 
from sectors such as buildings, transport, and 
agriculture, but our lifestyles don’t differentiate in this 
way. Hence there is reason to also look at the sources 
of emissions from the perspective of important groups 
of decision-makers: households; businesses and 
organisations; and cities, towns and regions.
Households
Householders use appliances, drive cars, eat food, 
and carry out many other activities that produce 
emissions. To understand how to reduce GHG 
emissions, consumption-based assessments help 
reveal how everyday activity gives rise to them and 
how this differs between households. The three  
main sources of GHG emissions from the average  
New Zealand household are from food, transport  
and utilities (mainly energy supplies) (Figure. 4.1).
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Figure 4.1 Composition of average household emissions, 2012/13, based on an average household footprint 
of 17 t-CO2 eq.  
Food (nitrous oxide from 
livestock urine and fertiliser) 11%
Food (carbon dioxide from production, 
transport and processing) 8%
Beverages 2%
Transport 25%
Housing and Utilities 20%Other 15% 
Food (methane from livestock) 19% 
Source: Allan et al., 2015.
Housing and utilities such as electricity, gas, LPG and 
solid fuels account for around one fifth of an average 
carbon footprint of a household. Transport accounts 
for around one quarter, and food and beverages total 
around 40% of the emissions. Food-related emissions 
account for the GHGs produced in producing, 
processing, transporting, and retailing the food but 
most are from methane and nitrous oxide produced 
by farm livestock and nitrogenous fertiliser use 
(Section 5.5) (Allan et al., 2015).
The composition of household emissions varies  
with income. Lower-income households have a 
larger proportion of emissions from home energy 
use, while higher-income households have a larger 
proportion from transport, particularly from air travel. 
Emissions also differ between regions: for example, 
Auckland households have more transport emissions 
on average, while Wellington households have higher 
emissions from home energy use (Allan et al., 2015). 
Average household emissions decreased by  
4.6% between 2006 and 2012 (Allan et al., 2015).  
This represented a reduction of about 1 t-CO2-eq for  
a two-person household with around $80,000 of 
annual expenditure, and was in part due to a 10% 
decrease in emissions from household energy. 
Roughly half of this reduction was assessed as 
responses by the householders to increased power 
prices, which is consistent with an observed decline 
in total residential electricity consumption. The 
remainder of the reduction aligns with general 
improvements in energy efficiency in homes and 
appliances (with the emission factor held constant  
for electricity in spite of growing shares of renewables 
reducing it). 
As well as understanding the general sources of  
the emissions they create, householders may wish  
to calculate their own emissions profile. CarboNZero33 
offers New Zealand-specific web-based tools for 
households and travellers to assess their carbon 
footprints. Their Household Calculator allows 
individuals to estimate the amount of GHG emissions 
generated by their entire household through direct 
energy use and other activities.34 (See also Box 4.4 for 
Motu’s calculator). Their Travel and Tourism Calculator 
allows travellers to calculate GHG emissions for their 
domestic and overseas travel, and/or New Zealand-
specific accommodation and recreational activities35 
(also see Section 4.6)
33 http://www.landcareresearch.co.nz/resources/business/the-
carbonzero-programme 
34 https://www.carbonzero.co.nz/EmissionsCalc/login.aspx 
35 http://www.carbonzero.co.nz/EmissionsCalc/tourismeditor.aspx 
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Businesses and institutions
Emissions from businesses and institutions vary 
greatly depending on what they do. Many are 
already undertaking assessments of their emissions, 
sometimes as part of a wider commitment to 
sustainability, to inform their shareholders as part 
of ‘triple bottom line’ reporting’, or to track their 
progress towards their own carbon emissions 
reduction target.
Assessing emissions is a very complex exercise, and 
the International Organisation for Standardisation 
(ISO) has produced standards to ensure that this 
is done in a consistent way. For example, ISO/
TR 14069:2013 describes the principles, concepts 
and methods relating to the quantification and 
reporting of direct and indirect GHG emissions for an 
organisation. ISO 14065:2013 specifies principles and 
requirements for bodies that undertake validation or 
verification of GHG emissions36.
Enviro-Mark37, a subsidiary company of New Zealand’s 
Landcare Research crown research institute, 
provides tools and support for businesses and 
other organisations to implement an effective 
environmental management system (EMS). It has 
developed two forms of independent certification  
that are consistent with the ISO standards above to 
help a company prove it is taking creditable action  
for a better environment:
1) CEMARS (Certified Emissions Management And 
Reduction Scheme) certification enables emission 
reductions from products or services provided 
by businesses or councils to be measured and 
reduction claims verified (Box 4.1). This was the first 
GHG certification scheme in the world to achieve 
international accreditation. New Zealand businesses 
and organisations with CEMARS certification include 
Auckland Airport, NZ Post, The Warehouse Group, 
BMW Group and Kāpiti Coast District Council.
36 International Organisation for Standardisation http://www.iso.
org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=60168 
37 http://www.enviro-mark.com/home
Box 4.1: CEMARS certification  
case study
Kāpiti Coast District Council has been 
CEMARS certified since 2012. CEMARS 
certification tracks how they measure, 
manage and reduce their GHG emissions.  
The council aims to reduce its operational 
carbon footprint by 45% in 2014-15 
compared to its 2009-10 baseline year,  
and increasing to 80% reduction by 2021-22.
Projects planned to reduce emissions include 
reducing sewage sludge emissions, deploying 
LED streetlights, using woodchip fuel to 
provide heat at the wastewater treatment 
plant, and improving energy efficiency  
in vehicles and buildings.
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Box 4.2: CarboNZero certification  
case study
Yealands Family Wines was the world’s first 
zero-carbon winery to be certified under 
the carboNZero assessment process. An 
independent audit is undertaken annually 
which reviews the GHG emissions using 
a ‘cradle to grave’ approach, assessing all 
aspects of the winegrowing and winemaking 
process. All unavoidable emissions, such as 
the production of glass bottles, freight to 
market and business travel are offset through 
the purchase of certified carbon credits, which 
include from the regeneration of native forests 
and renewable energy generation.
CarboNZero also offers a carbon footprinting 
calculator to help New Zealand small 
businesses and schools to calculate their 
GHG emissions. There are many other carbon 
calculators available but inaccurate results 
are likely unless they are calibrated for New 
Zealand’s particular characteristics.
Over 200 New Zealand businesses have 
committed to becoming carbon neutral 
through the CarboNZero certification scheme, 
which involves measuring, reporting and 
acting to reduce carbon emissions. Disclosure 
statements of their emissions are publicly 
available (see https://www.carbonzero.co.nz/
members/cz_organisations_certified.asp).
2) CarboNZero certification is for organisations, 
products, services or events that want to be able  
to make a carbon neutrality claim (Box 4.2). 
In addition, Enviro-Mark works with the  
Energy Management Association of New Zealand  
to assist a business or organisation measure and 
manage its energy use and improve efficiency under 
its ‘Energy-Mark’ brand and offers businesses under 
its Enviro-Mark certification programme to measure 
and manage other environmental impacts. 
Shareholders are becoming quite influential in  
the carbon reduction actions of businesses, that 
globally and nationally are tending to adopt forms  
of integrated triple bottom line (environmental,  
social, and governance (ESG)) reporting to 
shareholders (Box 4.3). This takes into account their 
social and environmental costs and benefits as well  
as their financial outcomes. These include such 
factors as accounting for water use and impacts on 
biodiversity as well as their GHG emissions
A number of international bodies are involved in 
setting standards and methods for this kind of 
reporting. For example, the International Integrated 
Reporting Framework (‘<IR> framework’)38 was 
established to improve the quality of information 
available to providers of financial capital. The Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) produces sustainability 
reporting guidelines to assist companies and 
organisations to report their economic and ESG 
performance39. The Climate Disclosure Standards 
Board (CDSB) promotes climate change-related 
disclosure in mainstream reports through the 
development of a global framework for corporate 
reporting on climate change40. Most mainstream 
audit and financial advisory firms in New Zealand 
offer services that include these and other integrated 
reporting approaches.
38 International Integrated Reporting Council http://
integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/ 
39 Global Reporting Initiative www.globalreporting.org 
40 Climate Disclosure Standards Board http://www.cdsb.net/ 
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Box 4.3: GHG emission reporting  
in Annual Reports
Sanford is a New Zealand fishing company  
which harvests, farms, processes and markets 
seafood. The company owns around one 
quarter of New Zealand’s seafood quota.  
They use the <IR> Framework and GRI 
guidelines to illustrate the many ways in 
which the company creates value. Their 
2015 annual report (http://www.sanford.
co.nz/investors/reports-1/) explained that 
this includes protecting natural resources, 
engaging communities, innovating and 
building consumer trust as well as providing 
sustainable returns to shareholders.  
The report details Sanford’s environmental, 
social and economic performance including 
their direct, indirect and total GHG emissions 
over the past three years. 
Cities, towns and regions
Some councils have also established their own 
emissions reduction targets, usually as part of a 
broader environmental or sustainability strategy.  
For example, the Auckland Plan sets a target for that 
city to achieve a 40% reduction in GHG emissions  
by 2040 (based on 1990 levels). A number of councils 
have also undertaken analysis to identify the sources 
of emissions at a city or regional level. Dunedin, 
Kāpiti Coast and Wellington councils have undertaken 
CEMARS certification (Box 4.1).
A Dunedin study assessed the emissions arising  
from the direct use of energy as part of broader  
study assessing energy flows into the city from 
all sources for 2014 (Gabriel et al., 2015). For a 
population of around 120,000, the total energy  
inputs were approximately 10.5 PJ. Of this,  
58% was transport fuels, 31% electricity, 3% LPG,  
5% coal and 3% woody biomass. The combustion  
of these fuels gave rise to nearly 600 kt CO2 or around 
5t CO2 / capita. Three quarters of the emissions 
resulted from the use of transport fuels (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 Estimated GHG emissions associated with direct energy supplies to the wider population  
of Dunedin (including the rural hinterland) in 2014.  
Source: Gabriel et al., 2015.
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Wellington City Council commissioned the Wellington 
2050 Energy Calculator41, an interactive website 
to enable residents to explore how different 
combinations of actions could lead to lowering GHG 
emissions city-wide (Section 6.1). Options for action 
include changing energy supplies, reducing emissions 
from waste, investing in infrastructure, changing travel 
modes, household heating and cooling, and industrial 
efficiency – making it clear that reducing emissions to 
reach the city’s target levels will involve changes in the 
everyday activities in households, organisations and 
businesses throughout the city.
At the regional level, the Energy End Use database 
created by the Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Authority (EECA) enables estimates of GHGs from 
energy use42. Studies such as these can help identify 
where city, district and regional councils could best put 
effort into reducing emissions through infrastructure 
investment, asset management and policies.
4.3 Influences on behaviour 
Regardless of whether acting as individuals, part of 
a family, or part of an organisation, everyone can 
contribute to reducing their GHG emissions footprint 
through changes to their own lifestyles, providing 
support for others to make changes, and working with 
others to achieve change collectively. But how can 
people be inspired to make changes in the first place? 
Commonly-heard explanations include that people 
don’t change habits because they have insufficient 
knowledge, or that the costs of changing outweigh  
the benefits. But behaviour is very complicated,  
and is shaped by many different factors.
A review of international research concluded that 
behaviour change is more likely if people believe that 
climate change is real, but people’s view on this can 
fluctuate (Leining, 2015). Around 70% of residents in 
the United States now believe in the science behind 
global warming, an increase of 7 percentage points 
in the first six months of 2015 (Borick et al., 2015). 
Few studies in New Zealand ask the same questions 
repeatedly over time, but almost three-quarters of  
New Zealanders perceived climate change as an 
urgent or immediate problem in 2008, while only 
52.4% had this view in 2012 (Leining and White, 
2014). Nevertheless 68% supported more action on 
climate change by businesses; 64% considered citizens 
themselves should take more actions; 64% considered 
Parliament should take more action; and 63% felt all 
government officials should take more action. Another 
survey in 2014 found that 58% of respondents were 
concerned about the impact of climate change on 
41  http://climatecalculator.org.nz/
42  http://enduse.eeca.govt.nz/default.aspx
themselves, and 63% were concerned about  
the impacts on society in general (Leining and  
White, 2014).
People’s ideologies, world views and social norms 
strongly shape how they receive and respond to 
information about climate change. People’s values 
and beliefs can influence what kinds of information 
they consider to be reliable and convincing (Kahan 
et al., 2011). The way climate change is presented 
can also shape people’s willingness to take mitigation 
actions. There is evidence that people respond more 
constructively and positively to feelings of concern, 
interest and hope, than to fear. Fear can make 
people disengage, especially when impacts are seen 
as distant and outside of their control. Highlighting 
the co-benefits of climate action for the economy, 
environment, community resilience, culture and health 
can encourage people to get involved (Leining, 2015). 
Individuals and groups are also strongly influenced by 
what are seen to be widely-shared expectations and 
aspirations. A good example is the way in which it is 
now ‘normal’ not to smoke in most shared spaces, 
including public buildings and even grounds. This 
change occurred quite rapidly and was the result 
of a carefully developed programme to influence 
behaviour, involving changes in laws as well as public 
education and programmes to support smokers to 
give up. It is now almost inconceivable that anyone 
would condone smoking in a restaurant, and yet this 
social norm is relatively new. Changing behaviour 
to achieve a low-carbon future will similarly need to 
involve significant shifts in social norms relating to 
carbon emissions. 
Behaviour is also shaped by the wider world that 
people live in – things like infrastructure (e.g. are  
cycle lanes available?), services (e.g. is public transport 
available?), technologies (e.g. are there charging 
stations for my electric vehicle?), the cost of different 
options (e.g. electricity relative to petrol for vehicle 
fuel), and regulations (e.g. are houses required to be 
insulated?) (Darnton & Evans 2013). Even if people 
have knowledge and attitudes that support low-
carbon behaviour change, they may fail to make 
changes because of other factors outside their control. 
Personal capabilities, family situations, incomes, and 
other factors such as affordability, regulations, policies 
and infrastructure can make it very difficult or even 
impossible for people to make changes.
However, even if they are not driven by beliefs and 
attitudes about climate action, people can (and often 
do) make changes that will decrease their emissions, 
for different reasons. For example, they might choose 
to walk or cycle for health reasons; they may decide 
to put in a solar PV electric system at home because 
they want to reduce their power bills; or they may 
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buy an electric car because they like the acceleration 
potential. To achieve a widespread decrease in 
emissions, it is most important to make low-carbon 
choices easy, and to communicate the many  
co-benefits of these choices. Increasing knowledge 
and understanding about climate change is important, 
but is only part of the behaviour change solution.
4.4 Encouraging behaviour change
New Zealand already has a number of initiatives 
that aim to change behaviour that will result in 
reduced GHG emissions, some of which are discussed 
elsewhere in this report. Some initiatives operate at 
a national scale (e.g. the emissions trading scheme); 
some at a city scale (e.g. investment in bicycle 
infrastructure); some focus on businesses  
(e.g. the EECA business energy awards); and some 
focus on households. The Household Climate Action 
Tool for example showcases simple actions to reduce  
a household’s emissions (Box 4.4). 
of behavioural influences and to think more  
broadly about the design of effective interventions 
(Chatterton and Wilson 2014).
Behaviour change initiatives often just focus on 
changes that individuals and households can make. 
A review of initiatives for emissions reduction in 
Scotland found that most attempted to change 
behaviour at the individual level, rather than within 
a social or material context (Southerton et al., 2011). 
This report recommended that, to be successful, 
behaviour change initiatives should:
1. target social and material contexts, not just  
the individual by targeting moments of transition 
(moving home, having children, etc.) and using 
pressure points in infrastructural systems that 
represent opportunities for sustained behavioural 
change;
2. develop frameworks for coordinated initiatives 
across sectors or domains that provide an 
opportunity for otherwise individual, ‘single 
action’ schemes to complement one another 
when moving towards a common goal – and  
to reduce the possibility of them pulling in 
opposite directions; and
3. utilise less visible mechanisms and non-
environmental messages to effect change, for 
example by encouraging initiatives based on health 
and fitness, diet or even concerns about time 
pressure (e.g. by encouraging working from home) 
that have low-emissions co-benefits.
Southerton et al., (2011) also identified the needs  
for robust evaluation measures and for organisational/
governmental leadership in initiatives. They pointed 
out that most initiatives only aimed for modest 
improvements, but that achieving change at the scale 
required to reach emissions targets will require wide-
reaching system level changes that radically transform 
current consumption and production. Where capital 
investment is a barrier, the benefits could be offered 
as a service or the costs could be annualised to 
encourage adoption, for example where a council 
provides a loan for a solar hot water investment then 
adds an incremental repayment charge to the annual 
rates collected for the property.
Sometimes a small, well-planned change in a policy or 
process can ‘nudge’ people to change their behaviour, 
without them consciously intending to do so (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). However this has been shown to be 
only effective in limited circumstances, and behaviour 
change is more likely to be enduring where it involves 
a change in social identity and internalisation of new 
norms (Mols et al., 2015).
Box 4.4: Household Climate  
Action Tool
This simple information tool shows tangible, 
practical, and understandable ways to reduce 
a New Zealand household’s greenhouse gas 
emissions.
The data behind the tool is based on average 
emissions profiles and average spending 
patterns and is not designed to provide an 
accurate account of household emissions or 
the impacts of various actions for specific 
households. The tool is designed to be simple 
and easy to use so that people can get an idea 
of the actions they can take to reduce their 
emissions, and to get an idea of how big the 
impacts of these actions may be.
http://motu.nz/our-work/environment-and-
resources/emission-mitigation/shaping-new-
zealands-low-emissions-future/household-
climate-action-tool-2/ 
When considering interventions to help change 
behaviour, it is useful to consider the actor (who is 
enacting the behaviour?), the domain (what shapes 
or influences the behaviour?) the durability (how 
does the behaviour relate to time?) and the scope 
(how does the behaviour inter-relate with other 
behaviours?). Answering these questions can assist 
policy-makers to understand the many dimensions  
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The International Energy Agency’s implementing 
agreement Demand-side management (Task 24, 
Behavioural Change43) is another source of insights 
about behaviour change initiatives, particularly relating 
to energy efficiency44. New Zealand is a partner in this 
programme. The most recent report from New Zealand 
(Rotmann, 2015)45 identified that New Zealand’s 
main intervention programmes to increase efficiency 
were centred around the provision of information 
(particularly the ‘Energy Spot’ TV campaign); product 
information (minimum energy performance standards 
and labelling), business information, grants and audits; 
a voluntary commercial building ratings scheme 
(NABERSNZ); transport efficiency (particularly around 
heavy vehicle driver efficiency, biofuels and vehicle fuel 
consumption labelling) and the Warm Up New Zealand 
insulation and clean heat subsidy programmes. 
43 http://www.ieadsmtask24wiki.info/wiki/Main_Page
44 http://www.ieadsm.org/task/task-24-phase-1/ 
45 Rotmann, S. (2015). Closing the Loop – behaviour 
change in DSM – from theory to practice. Guidelines and 
recommendations for New Zealand. International Energy 
Agency Demand-Side Management Task XXIV http://www.
ieadsm.org/task/task-24-phase-1/#section-8 
The report concluded that ‘behaviour changers’ should 
be more aware of theories of behaviour change, as well 
as prior studies that help show what works and what 
doesn’t, so as to minimise the chance of failure.  
Better collaboration is needed between organisations 
that influence different aspect of behaviour, and also 
more effort should be put into evaluating the success 
(or otherwise) of behaviour change interventions.
4.5 Changing our ‘carbon cultures’
A useful way to bring together these different 
insights on behaviour is to use a ‘cultures’ framework 
(Figure 4.3). This is based on research into energy 
behaviour (Stephenson et al., 2015), mobility 
behaviour (Stephenson et al., 2014) and low-carbon 
behaviour (Young and Middlemiss, 2012). It is often 
said that a ‘culture change’ is needed to achieve  
a low-carbon future, and this approach helps  
depict what this might mean.
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Figure 4.3: The ‘cultures’ framework – an integrative model of drivers of behaviour.  
Source: adapted from Stephenson et al., 2015. 
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From a ‘cultures’ perspective, the patterns of 
behaviour of an individual, household, business 
or organisation arise from the inter-relationships 
between what they have, how they think, and what 
they do. More specifically, their ‘culture’ consists 
of the material objects they possess; their norms 
(particularly their expectations and aspirations);  
and their practices (their actions and activities).  
These three factors strongly influence each other 
to create habitual patterns of behaviour or ‘culture’. 
Applying this concept to carbon emissions, if a person 
has access to a car, and expects to get to the local 
shops quickly, then s/he will probably drive there, 
regardless of high emissions. The ‘cultures’ of people 
don’t necessarily relate to demographic factors 
(Lawson & Williams, 2012)46. For example, families 
with similar incomes can have very different levels of 
emissions due to different lifestyle practices (such as 
how often they travel by plane or how often they eat 
meat) (Allans et al., 2015). 
While people’s GHG emissions are affected by their 
carbon culture (what they have, think and do) they 
are not solely responsible for their emissions, as their 
choices are strongly shaped by influences outside of 
their control. These include the influences of friends 
and family; what knowledge and ideas they have 
gleaned from education and the media; what goods  
or services are available for purchase; the infrastructure 
available such as cycle lanes, public transport, and 
broadband; the regulations and policies of national and 
local government; and by the relative cost of optional 
technologies, products and activities. All of these things 
influence peoples’ ‘carbon culture’ (indicated by the 
arrows in Figure 4.3). To change someone’s carbon 
culture involves change to at least one of the three 
factors inside the circle, but this might require change 
to external influences in order to happen. Conversely, 
in changing their carbon cultures, individuals may come 
together with others to influence policy makers and 
other actors who create the external influences and 
thereby change these limiting structures (Young and 
Middlemiss 2012). 
46 Lawson R, Williams J. (2012). Understanding energy cultures. 
Presented at the annual conference of the Australia and  
New Zealand Academy of Marketing, December 2012, 
Adelaide. www.otago.ac.nz/csafe/research/otago055641.pdf 
Accessed 25.1.16
The ‘cultures’ framework helps focus on what external 
influences might need to change in order to create 
the conditions in which it is easier to make low-carbon 
choices. For example, a national household survey 
(Wooliscroft, 2014) showed that over half of New 
Zealanders say they would use public transport if 
it was available to them, and over half would cycle 
if there were safer routes. If people have these 
aspirations, then what changes can be made to 
external influences on behaviour in order to make 
it easier for them to adopt these new behaviours?
Organisations also have ‘carbon cultures’ which 
influence their emissions both from their 
organisational practices and also embedded in the 
goods and services they provide. For a business, 
for example, the combination of physical assets, 
business practices, and organisational norms, create 
a ‘culture’ that might result in a high or low level of 
emissions. Research has shown that businesses that 
have become more energy efficient may start with a 
change in a physical asset (such as a new technology), 
a change in practices (such as running a process in 
a more efficient way), or a change in organisational 
norms (such as deciding to change the business 
values). Once some aspect of a businesses’ culture 
has changed, it can lead to change in other aspects 
(Walton, 2015). 
Behaviour change can start in many ways. It can 
result from different choices being made as a result 
of personal choice. It can be stimulated by intentional 
changes in factors that shape the decisions made 
by people and organisations, such as provision of 
infrastructure, or a price on carbon. And change 
can also occur as a result of many factors all coming 
together in unintended ways, such as the changes  
in Generation Y’s driving habits (Box 4.5). 
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Box 4.5: Generation Y –  
a changing mobility culture
Young people are driving less than they used 
to, and this is occurring internationally as 
well as in New Zealand. This is not happening 
because of any particular policy programmes, 
and it has important implications for reducing 
carbon emissions from car use in future, if this 
trend continues. 
Research with young Kiwis has shown that it 
is the result of a number of factors, some of 
them to do with personal choices, and some 
to do with external influences. 
Young people who choose not to drive 
typically think that they have more freedom 
without a car. They don’t like the expense 
and hassle of car ownership, and they’d 
rather spend money on an overseas trip or 
buying a house. They tend to live in cities 
and use public transport, walking and/or 
cycling, although they also share lifts with 
other people and use Uber taxis. They use the 
internet for shopping and connecting with 
friends, but it doesn’t replace getting out and 
meeting up socially. Environmental concerns 
are often part of the reason for not driving, 
but they are not the only reason. 
The views of young people on driving are  
a good example of how a shift to low-carbon 
living often involves many causal factors 
working together. For policy makers it gives  
an important message about the importance 
of ensuring policy and infrastructure is in  
place to support people’s aspirations to 
shift to low-carbon transport (Hopkins and 
Stephenson, 2014).
In other cases, interventions may be needed to 
change our carbon culture, because even if people 
think a change is a good idea, it can take a very long 
time for the changes to reach a level of uptake and 
scale to have a real impact on emissions. A good 
example is electric vehicles (Box 4.6). 
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Box 4.6: Stimulating uptake of electric vehicles (EVs)
EVs could play a part in reducing New Zealand’s 
transport emissions (Section 5.2). Although there 
were only just over 1000 EVs in New Zealand 
as of February 201647, the global predictions 
are that the falling cost of EVs together with 
technological advancements (including improving 
battery storage) will lead to exponential uptake 
internationally over the next couple of decades48. 
However, modelling undertaken in New Zealand 
varies with some showing that uptake is likely to 
be slow due to the characteristics of New Zealand 
market, supply chains and policy environment.  
A further barrier is the tendency of New 
Zealanders’ to hold on to their cars for a long time, 
and then often buy second-hand. These ‘cultural’ 
factors mean that EVs are likely to be slow to come 
into the fleet, although uptake could be hastened 
if commercial fleet owners invest significantly in 
EVs, such as Air New Zealand has recently done49. 
How could uptake be increased? We already know 
that New Zealanders like the idea of EVs. Survey 
work has shown that 60% of Kiwis feel fairly 
positive or very positive about driving EVs; and 
75% would be willing to drive them in the future. 
Nearly 30% said they were already thinking about 
purchase, and 6% felt ready or nearly ready to 
purchase (Ford et al., 2015). 
47 http://www.transport.govt.nz/research/
newzealandvehiclefleetstatistics/ 
48 http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2015/03/electric-vehicle-
batteries-already-cheaper-than-2020-projections/ 
49 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_
id=3&objectid=11606460 
The main barriers to purchase were upfront cost, 
charge time and range. Technology improvements, 
lower prices and establishing a network of charging 
stations will assist with these barriers.
A recent report (Barton and Schütte, 2015) 
identified five measures that could help hasten  
the uptake of EVs in New Zealand:
• a ‘fee-bate’ scheme for imported vehicles, 
providing a price benefit or charge on the  
basis of the carbon emissions of the vehicle;
• measures to improve public awareness, 
perceptions and knowledge of EVs as an option;
• measures to encourage the growth of  
a public charging infrastructure;
• demonstrating a clear policy intent; and 
• a sufficiently high carbon price through  
the ETS to encourage behaviour change.
From a ‘cultures’ perspective, these are all external 
influences that can help turn New Zealanders’ 
interest in EVs into a faster rate of uptake.  
To date, incentives to change behaviour have  
not been offered in New Zealand other than EVs  
being exempted road-user charges until 2020.
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4.6 Tourism emissions
Tourism accounts for 5% of total global carbon 
emissions (Peeters & Dubois, 2010). Air travel 
accounted for 51% of all global international 
passenger arrivals in 2011 (IPCC, 2015) and 17%  
of all tourist travel in 2005 (UNWTO and UNEP, 2008). 
International aviation has been excluded from  
Kyoto Protocol obligations (Becken, 2007) and  
remains outside national emissions inventories due  
to questions of national accountability. In 2011, 
aviation accounted for 43% of global tourism 
transport CO2 emissions, and this figure is expected  
to exceed 50% by 2035 (Pratt et al., 2011). 
This projected growth poses a particularly acute 
challenge for New Zealand, being a geographically 
isolated island nation with a tourism economy that 
now exceeds 3 million international visitors per 
annum, most of whom are long-haul travellers.  
New Zealand’s global marketing brand, 100% Pure 
New Zealand, has come under increasing scrutiny as 
a result of the energy intensive nature of the industry 
(Smith & Rodger, 2009). 
The GHG emissions attributed to the air travel of 
international tourists travelling to New Zealand was 
calculated by Smith and Rodger (2009) to be 7.89 
Mt CO2-eq in 2005. Tourist aviation emissions are 
linked to visitor origin (Becken, 2002). New Zealand’s 
European markets comprise 18% of total international 
visitor numbers, and account for 43% of the emissions 
associated with international visitor air travel (Smith 
& Rodger, 2009). Indeed, one return journey from 
Europe to New Zealand by a single traveller equates 
to approximately half of the average annual total per 
capita domestic CO2 emissions of a European citizen 
(Smith & Rodger, 2009). This does not account for the 
fact that aviation emissions are greater than those  
of CO2 alone (Penner et al., 1999), requiring an 
aviation impact multiplier in the range of 1.5–4.0 
(Brand & Boardman, 2008). In contrast, visitors  
from Australia represent 37% of total in-bound  
visitors to New Zealand, and 13% of tourism related 
CO2 emissions. 
The position of the aviation industry is that the 
environmental impacts of flying can be resolved 
through technology, alternative fuels and operational 
innovations (Sustainable Aviation, 2011). However  
the extended design life of aircraft commits society  
to the most current technology for a period of  
30–50 years (Bows & Anderson, 2007). Furthermore, 
emissions from increased demand for air travel 
continues to far exceed marginal fuel efficiency 
improvements in aircraft and engine designs plus 
operational gains in flight paths and airport logistics 
(Mayor & Tol, 2010). Without a global market-based 
mechanism for aviation, the onus of responsibility 
for reducing personal transport emissions through 
behaviour change has effectively been devolved to 
individuals (Barr et al., 2010). Relying on voluntary 
behaviour change in the public’s demand for air 
travel raises its own issues and challenges (Lassen, 
2010). Although there is evidence of public concern 
over the climate impacts of air travel in sections of 
some societies (Higham et al., 2016), there is strong 
evidence of a dissonance between awareness and 
actual behavioural change (Hibbert et al., 2013; 
Kroesen, 2013; Miller et al., 2010). This ‘value-action’ 
gap (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002) is compounded 
by observations of a particularly entrenched gap 
between ‘home’ and ‘away’, insofar that consumers 
who engage in pro-environmental behaviour at home 
tend to suppress, reduce or abandon completely their 
climate concern when engaging in tourism practices 
(Barr et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2013).
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Low-carbon tourism transitions
Little traction has been gained in achieving emissions 
reductions in tourist air travel practices through 
voluntary consumer-led responses (Miller et al., 2010; 
Mair, 2011). A variety of options are theoretically 
available, ranging from encouraging behaviour 
change via social marketing campaigns and/or 
‘nudge’ initiatives, to the development of restrictive 
policies based, for instance, on taxation, caps on CO2 
emissions, and/or rationing. A change in consumer 
demand is required to fundamentally change the 
nature of tourism demand, in the form of a shift away 
from frequent, fast travel over long distances for short 
stays. The New Zealand government may foster low-
carbon transitions through market-based, command-
and-control and soft policy measures. International 
aviation emissions, and even maritime emissions 
from cruise liners, will need to be accounted for in 
the future (Smith & Rodger, 2009) while fuel taxes/
subsidies may facilitate modal shifts to low-carbon 
transport (Ryley et al., 2010; Sterner, 2007). 
International tourism marketing efforts by  
Tourism New Zealand, focusing on regional 
Asia-Pacific markets, could be combined with a 
renewed commitment to encourage domestic 
tourism to both reduce distance (and therefore 
aviation emissions) and, simultaneously, reduce the 
current loss of tourist expenditure resulting from 
out-bound tourists50. The New Zealand Tourism 
Industry Association (NZTIA) has an important role 
to play in encouraging a transition to low-carbon 
tourism business practices including fostering the 
uptake of EVs and other more sustainable forms 
of surface travel. The development of cycle trails 
provides an example of transition to active transport 
and to encourage low-carbon visitor experiences. 
Another area of focus is in assisting Regional 
Tourism Organisations and tourism businesses to 
identify and overcome the potential for negative 
rebound effects (Aall, 2011) and climate change 
mal-adaption (Hopkins, 2014; Espiner & Becken, 
2014). Understanding and responding to the energy 
consumption patterns of tourism attractions and 
activities in New Zealand remains both a challenge 
and an opportunity (Becken & Simmons, 2002). 
50 http://www.eco-business.com/news/eco-tourism- 
better-for-the-planet-better-for-you/?utm_medium= 
email&utm_campaign=Feb%2024%20newsletter&utm_
content=Feb%2024%20newsletter+Version+A+CID_ 
07c3926f446fd65af59290ad773f2140&utm_source= 
Campaign%20Monitor&utm_term=Read%20now]
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4.7 Policy measures to mitigate climate change 
There is considerable experience with climate change 
policies and measures internationally, and some 
countries have had such actions in place for many 
years, sometimes to address related problems such 
as energy efficiency or air pollution. The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) provides a simple classification of 
climate change policy measures (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: International Energy Agency classification of climate change related policy measures51
Policy Type Examples
Economic instruments Direct investment, fiscal/financial incentives, subsidies, market-based instruments
Information and education Advice / aid in implementation, information provision, performance labelling, 
professional training and qualifications
Policy support Institutional creation, strategic planning
Regulatory instruments Auditing, codes and standards, monitoring, obligation schemes, other mandatory 
requirements
Research, development and 
deployment 
Demonstration projects, research programmes
Voluntary approaches Negotiated public-private sector agreements, public voluntary schemes, unilateral 
private sector commitments
51  www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/climatechange
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There is abundant evidence internationally that well-
framed laws, policies, and regulation are effective and 
cost effective for many aspects of climate change, 
and for energy efficiency in particular (Geller et 
al, 2006). The IEA (2014) identified four key global 
actions that together have zero net GDP cost and, 
given appropriate policies, would deliver 80% of the 
reductions needed to reach an economically optimal  
2oC scenario: 
• An energy efficiency package. 
• Reduction of inefficient coal-fired power 
generation. 
• Phase down of fossil fuel subsidies. 
• Reduced methane venting and flaring in  
upstream oil and gas production. 
For New Zealand, this set of key actions needs some 
re-interpretation but the principles still apply. 
History of New Zealand’s climate policy approaches
After signing the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, 
New Zealand began developing climate policy, 
particularly on energy efficiency activities, information 
measures, and negotiated GHG agreements (Cameron 
(2011). Signing the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 accelerated 
policy development in order to comply with meeting 
the UNFCCC obligations for the first commitment 
period from 2008–2012. Energy efficiency, and 
information and awareness, continued to be favoured 
as non-price measures, but work was undertaken to 
develop a low-level carbon charge or tax. The Climate 
Change Response Act 2002 (CCRA), initially set up a 
registry for emissions credits, provided powers for the 
Crown to manage credits, and provided for inventory 
and the making of regulations. Its enactment enabled 
the government to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which 
came into force on 16 February 2005. In 2002, the 
government announced a policy package with a 
carbon charge at its centre. It was accompanied in 
2003 and 2004 by negotiated ‘projects to reduce 
emissions’ where projects such as wind farms received 
internationally-tradable joint implementation credits. 
The proposal for a carbon charge attracted opposition, 
and, in addition, technical analysis showed that it 
would have shortcomings in reaching its objectives. 
Therefore, in 2007, the Labour government decided 
to proceed with an emissions trading scheme (ETS) 
instead (Leining and Kerr, 2016; also see below). 
It introduced an amendment to the Act for that 
purpose, which was passed in September 2008.  
The new National government came to power shortly 
afterwards, carried out a review, and amended 
the scheme to make a set of mainly short-term 
concessions including deferral of the inclusion  
of agriculture, reduction of the obligations of  
the transport, energy and industrial sectors by 50%, 
putting a cap on prices of $25 /t CO2, and indexing 
allocation of free units to production for industrial  
and agricultural participants. On this basis the  
New Zealand ETS came into effect for transport, 
energy and industrial sectors on 1 July 2010.  
Forestry had entered as of 1 January 2008.  
Further amendments were made in 2012 after 
another review converted most of the short-term 
concessions of 2009 into indefinite ones. A number 
of other countries and regions have established 
emissions trading schemes; the European Union 
Emissions Trading System is the largest, that of 
California is another example, and China also has 
commenced a scheme in selected regions. 
In 2012, New Zealand announced that it would 
not take a commitment under the second Kyoto 
commitment period from 2012 to 2020, but would 
work towards a different kind of international 
agreement, while setting an emissions target as 
part of UNFCCC obligations. That curtailed access 
to international Kyoto units. However, New Zealand 
remains a party to the Kyoto Protocol and ratified the 
Doha Amendment to the Protocol prior to the Paris 
COP 21, but still without taking a commitment.  
New Zealand produced its ‘intended nationally 
determined contribution’ (INDC) in preparation 
for the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Paris 
in December 2015, and joined the international 
consensus that emerged in the Paris Agreement 
(Section 2.2).
New Zealand’s Climate change policies
The policy actions that have direct and  
indirect climate change implications in effect in  
New Zealand are described at length in the Sixth 
National Communication to the UNFCCC (MƒE 2013a) 
and the First Biennial Report (MƒE, 2013b)52 and  
can be summarized as follows.
• New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ 
ETS) under the Climate Change Response Act 
2002. The New Zealand ETS is the principal policy 
response for reducing domestic emissions and 
the primary mechanism to meet international 
emissions reduction commitments. (MƒE, 2013a; 
MƒE, 2015b). It is an economic instrument that 
produces a price on carbon dioxide and other  
GHG emissions. 
• Renewable energy support: research funding  
(e.g. for biofuels and renewable heat); National 
Policy Statement under the Resource Management 
52 The 2nd Biennial report was published at the end of 2015 
(MƒE, 2015e)
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Act 1991 to facilitate environmental approval of 
renewable electricity projects; setting a target 
of 90% renewable sources of electricity by 2025 
subject to maintaining security of supply. 
• Energy efficiency: minimum energy performance 
standards under the Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Act 2000; compulsory product 
labelling; voluntary product labelling; Warm Up 
New Zealand house insulation retrofit subsidies; 
business assistance for energy management; 
government agency leadership; government 
procurement; EnergyWise information provision.
• Transport: vehicle fuel economy labelling; 
commercial fleet advice and driver education; 
regulations to allow larger trucks; exemption 
of electric vehicles from road user charges; 
Auckland rail electrification; Model Communities 
Programme; investment in public transport and 
public transport subsidies; investment in active 
transport such as urban and national cycle ways. 
• Industry: funding CCS research.
• Agriculture: funding research into reduction  
of ruminant and other GHG emissions, and  
into sustainable land management.
• Forestry: Permanent Forest Sinks Initiative; 
East Coast Forestry Project (subsidies); the 
Afforestation Grant Scheme.
• Waste: Waste Minimisation Act 2008, Waste 
Minimisation Fund; Resource Management 
(National Environmental Standards for Air Quality) 
Regulations 2004 to control landfill gas.
A number of these policies are part of higher-level 
strategies such as the New Zealand Energy Strategy 
(2011)53 , National Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Strategy (2011)54 , Connecting New Zealand (2011)55 ,  
and Business Growth Agenda (2012)56. 
To this list can be added a variety of actions that are 
‘decentred’ and not entirely government initiatives. 
They are still in the public sphere however, being in the 
hands of industry associations, corporations, and non-
governmental organizations. Examples are the CEMARS 
certification scheme (developed by a Crown research 
institute and used by businesses; Box 4.1) and the 
Household Climate Action Tool (from Motu,  
an independent policy research institute; Box 4.4). 
53 http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/sectors-industries/
energy/energy-strategies/documents-image-library/nz-energy-
strategy-lr.pdf
54 See previous footnote
55 http://www.transport.govt.nz/ourwork/keystrategiesandplans/
connectingnewzealand/
56 http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/business-
growth-agenda
Also important in the list of policy measures are 
the actions of local bodies. Globally, cities and 
municipalities are becoming very active in working 
to reduce emissions. There are a number of global 
initiatives that promote good practice and create 
opportunities for urban leaders to share knowledge 
and aspirations. 
Members of ICLEI (Local Governments for 
Sustainability) govern more than 20% of the world’s 
urban population. They aim to make their cities and 
regions ‘sustainable, low-carbon, resilient, ecomobile, 
biodiverse, resource-efficient and productive, 
healthy and happy, with a green economy and smart 
infrastructure’. The Compact of Mayors has the sole 
aim of addressing climate change and is the world’s 
largest coalition of city leaders, representing over 450 
cities. Under the Compact, cities pledge to reduce their 
GHG emissions, track their progress and prepare for the 
impacts of climate change. 
A third global initiative is C4057, a recently established 
network of the world’s megacities committed to 
addressing climate change. C40 supports cities to 
collaborate effectively, share knowledge and drive 
meaningful, measurable and sustainable action on 
climate change. Auckland Council is a member of C40 
and Wellington is one of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
100 Resilient Cities.58
Within New Zealand, local bodies have important 
roles in relation to transport, urban form, housing  
and their own activities, even though they do not 
regulate GHG emissions directly.59
They also have important roles in relation to 
adaptation. Local government leaders from across 
New Zealand launched the Local Government 
Leaders Climate Change Declaration in October 2015. 
The declaration calls for urgent action to address 
climate change for the benefit of future generations, 
and outlines key commitments by the councils in 
responding to the opportunities and risks posed by 
climate change. Individual councils are also developing 
strategies and actions to reduce emissions, such as 
Wellington City Council’s Climate Change Action  
Plan 2013. 
57 http://www.c40.org/
58 http://www.100resilientcities.org/
59 Resource Management Act 1991 ss 70A and 104E as 
interpreted in West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd [2013]  
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The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme
The NZ ETS is the country’s primary policy measure for 
reducing GHG emissions and encouraging removals or 
sequestration. It is an economic instrument or market-
based instrument that changes behaviour by putting 
a price on the negative externality of GHG emissions 
that harm the climate. 
The NZ ETS was established after much debate 
in 2008, under the Climate Change Response 
Act 2002 (Cameron, 2011). It was designed to be 
comprehensive: ‘all sectors, all gases’ with a staged 
entry of different sectors. Forestry entered in 2008, 
while the entry of other sectors was deferred for a 
period, but liquid fossil fuels, electricity production, 
industrial processes, synthetic gases and waste 
are now included. Only biological emissions from 
agriculture remain outside the Scheme. There have 
been two reviews of the Scheme. Leining and Kerr 
(2016) provided a detailed history of the ETS and 
discussed some of the key lessons learned.
A company that is a ‘point of obligation’ must report 
estimates of emissions associated with its activity 
and surrender emissions units to the government. 
Emissions units of different kinds can be bought and 
sold, and can be valued depending on market demand 
and supply. A company can therefore deal with its 
emissions obligations either by buying emissions 
units, or by reducing emissions. The forestry sector is 
encouraged by being able to earn and sell units, while 
also facing responsibility for emissions from harvest 
and deforestation, and future technologies such as 
carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) have similar 
prospects of earning units. The businesses directly 
affected in the energy sector are generally upstream, 
in particular the companies importing or producing 
oil, natural gas, or coal but some large fossil fuel users 
such as power companies and airlines also choose 
to participate directly. Industrial emitters, such as 
cement and steel producers, are direct participants  
as are forestry businesses (some voluntarily and some 
compulsorily for deforestation). Most costs are passed 
on to users, such as when they purchase petrol, 
diesel, gas or electricity. 
The government may issue New Zealand units (NZUs) 
by direction to the Registrar under section 68 of 
the Climate Change Response Act after a procedure 
that provides notice and public information. Free 
allocations are made under sections 80-86E to 
companies in emissions-intensive trade-exposed 
industries such as the production of steel, aluminium, 
pulp and paper, and greenhouse growers of 
capsicums, cucumbers and roses. These companies 
are competing internationally with manufacturers 
who do not face a price on carbon. One-off free 
allocations were also made to the holders of fishing 
quota and of pre-1990 forests to compensate for loss 
in asset values from the introduction of the NZ ETS. 
Scheme participants may also claim NZUs for removal 
activities, mainly via forests, under section 64.
The NZ ETS has a number of strengths in its 
conception and design being a market-based 
economy-wide system of imposing price pressure, 
but at the same time safeguarding flexibility and 
encouraging innovation. However the current settings 
mean that its efficacy is extremely limited.
Price fluctuations under the NZ ETS have been greater 
than many expected. Carbon prices were as high as 
$20/t CO2 in 2010/2011, then dropped to around 
$0.20 in 2013/14 (MƒE, 2015c), but in April 2016  
had risen to around $12 /t CO2-eq
60. Even these 
current values have long been regarded as too low 
to influence behaviour. For example, the NZ ETS 
component of the price of diesel is currently around 
1.13 cents per litre, and of petrol 0.98 cents (MBIE, 
2016a). This small charge, together with uncertainty 
about future prices, is unlikely to change transport 
behaviour or reduce emissions. Official recognition 
of the problem came in analysis that showed that, 
outside the forestry sector, the NZ ETS has provided 
no incentive to look at how to reduce emissions, 
and has had no significant influence on domestic 
emissions or business decisions (MƒE 2016). 
In November 2015, a third review of the ETS was 
initiated (MƒE, 2015c) after government accepted 
that, on present projections, current policy measures 
will have little impact on gross GHG emissions in the 
future if current settings continue. It puts several 
important and contentious aspects of the Scheme 
up for debate. However, the continuing exclusion 
of agriculture from the Scheme is not open for 
review. One key question in the review is how long 
to continue the 50% reduction of obligations and 
the $25 price cap. Another is how to allocate fresh 
units, especially under the system of free allocations 
for companies facing international competition. The 
review will consider whether emitters should still be 
allowed to use international units, assuming that they 
become available again in the 2020s. The past use of 
cheap international units caused prices to collapse 
and for companies to purchase credits off-shore and 
bank several years’ supply of NZUs. In accepting that 
the price signal of the ETS on its own will not drive 
New Zealand towards a low-emissions economy 
because other market failures and market barriers 
may prevent the uptake of opportunities to reduce 
emissions, the review will consider what role the 
government should play in addressing them. 
Using international units
60 https://www.commtrade.co.nz/ viewed mid-April 2016.
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One of the most important settings in the NZ ETS, 
until it was modified on 1 June 2015, was the 
rule that allowed New Zealand companies to use 
international units to meet their obligations under 
the Scheme with no quantitative limit. The unit that 
particularly influenced carbon prices under the NZ 
ETS was the Emission Reduction Unit (ERU) under 
Kyoto Protocol Joint Implementation (JI) projects. 
Most of those units purchased and used as offsets by 
New Zealand participants (over 90%) came from the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine. In 2014, New Zealand 
participants relied on ERUs for 73.87% of the total 
units that they surrendered. They relied on Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs), another international 
unit, for a further 21.70%. Together these total 
95.57% of the total units surrendered (EPA, 2015).
Few of these units were environmentally credible 
as most of them did not really represent emission 
reductions anywhere in the world. A thorough study 
by the Stockholm Environment Institute has recently 
investigated ERUs in detail, analyzing a random 
sample of 60 JI projects and a number of other 
sources of information (Kollmus et al, 2015).  
It inquired particularly whether ERU projects provided 
a genuine reduction in emissions that was additional 
to the emissions that would otherwise have occurred 
in countries with a surplus of assigned amount 
units. This ‘additionality’ is central to the claim that 
ERUs actually represent emission reductions. The 
study found that the claims for additionality were 
not plausible for 73% of the ERUs issued and were 
questionable for another 12%. Most (80%) ERUs 
came from JI project types of questionable or low 
environmental integrity, and 90% came from Russia 
and Ukraine61 where the environmental integrity 
of units is at its lowest. Auditor organizations 
were not performing their duties properly and 
national authorities had few incentives to ensure 
environmental integrity. The study concluded, 
inevitably, that crediting mechanisms in general, 
including for units like ERUs need to be designed  
very carefully to ensure environmental integrity. 
Because of this problem, from 2013 the European 
Union tightly restricted the use of ERUs in its EU 
ETS (Woerdman, 2015). In contrast, New Zealand 
continued to accept them in the NZ ETS until it was 
prevented from doing so because of its decision for 
the period 2013–2020 not to enter into the Kyoto 
Protocol 2 obligation. New Zealand companies have 
not been able to surrender ERUs since 31 May 2015. 
The rush to use ERUs meant that companies could 
‘bank’ their NZUs, so there is several years’ supply 
overhanging the New Zealand market. The past use 
of ERUs therefore could continue to depress New 
61 Forthcoming report from Morgan Foundation
Zealand carbon prices for a significant period, and 
their use unfortunately meant that New Zealand 
showed compliance with its international obligations 
by relying on units that had no real environmental 
integrity. Nevertheless, the New Zealand government 
has declared that it intends to meet its future 
emission reduction targets through a mix of the 
removal of carbon dioxide by forests, domestic 
emission reductions, and a return to some degree  
of reliance on international carbon markets units.  
For example, modelling commissioned by the Ministry 
for the Environment on how to cost-effectively 
meet the INDC target suggests that, based on the 
assumptions made, the reliance on international units 
could meet four-fifths of the emissions reduction 
target (Infometrics, 2015).
The New Zealand government made a provisional 
intended contribution in its INDC in mid-2015, with 
one of the conditions being ‘Unrestricted access to 
global carbon markets that enable trading and use of 
a wide variety of units that meet reasonable standards 
and guidelines to: ensure the environmental integrity 
of units/credits generated or purchased; guard 
against double-claiming/double counting, and ensure 
transparency in accounting.’ The Paris Agreement 
in Article 6 agreed to the use of ‘internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes’ (ITMOs) subject to 
a process of elaboration of rules. The rules about the 
environmental integrity of future units are yet to be 
determined and will be important for the operation 
and credibility of the NZ ETS. Several processes for 
funding and assigning credit for credible international 
mitigation are being developed in parallel. It is 
likely that more than one mechanism will operate 
simultaneously. Trading may happen bi-laterally 
or in ‘clubs’. New Zealand could contribute to the 
development of effective approaches.
Free allocation of units
Another significant policy setting in the NZ ETS,  
as noted above, is the provision by the government 
of free NZUs to companies producing internationally-
traded manufactured goods that are emissions-
intensive and with trade-exposed activities. These 
companies are competing internationally with 
manufacturers who do not face a price on carbon 
and who either import goods into New Zealand or 
compete with our exporters. The free allocation of 
‘industrial allocation’ NZUs made periodically by the 
government, maintains the competitiveness of these 
companies by reducing emissions cost of additional 
production under the NZ ETS. They do not affect 
incentives for companies to improve the emissions 
efficiency of their activities. In 2014, 4.4 million NZUs 
were allocated to businesses, compared to a total of 
29.8 million units surrendered. The allocations are 
intended to be a temporary measure that will enable 
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industries to adjust over time. The ETS review that  
is under way has asked what future conditions would 
warrant reducing the rates of free allocation, and 
when that may be (MfE, 2015d).
NZ ETS carbon price working with other  
policy measures 
The carbon price that is established by the NZ ETS is 
central to its success as a mitigation policy, but that 
price will be more effective in combination with other 
policy measures that operate in different sectors. 
New Zealand’s approach to climate change policy 
tools needs to take into account the many different 
social and economic dimensions that are involved in 
mitigation; GHG emissions are fundamental to our 
society and economy. Recognizing this complexity 
implies not relying entirely on the price signal of 
the ETS. To achieve effective and efficient change, 
other policy tools are also likely to be needed. In fact, 
internationally, broad economy-wide policies such as 
carbon pricing are not usually implemented without 
other sector-specific policies being implemented 
as well (regulation in particular). In many countries 
regulatory approaches and information measures are 
widely used, and are often effective (IPCC, 2014b). 
A carbon price is generally considered necessary for 
enabling least-cost emissions reductions, and should 
be the cornerstone element of a climate policy 
package, but on its own it is not sufficient (Hood, 
2013). Certainly, carbon prices across the economy 
can change behaviour if they are high enough. But 
there are non-price barriers (such as split incentives, 
lack of information, lack of capital, adversity to risk) 
which is why some carbon abatement actions have a 
negative cost. Non-price barriers can affect behaviour 
and prevent prices from being effectual. 
Such non-price barriers are especially evident 
in energy efficiency, where good potential for 
decarbonisation is to be found. The difference 
between the actual level of energy efficiency and  
the higher level that would be cost-effective from  
the point of view of an individual or firm is described 
as the ‘energy efficiency gap’62. Carbon pricing is a 
pre-requisite for least-cost action to help reduce 
this gap, but it is not enough to overcome all the 
barriers to cost-effective actions (Ryan et al., 2011). 
In other words, barriers include information costs, 
high discount rates and lack of access to capital. 
Market failure barriers include imperfect information, 
principal-agent relationships, and split-incentive 
situations. Within an organisation, decisions about 
energy and carbon matters may be associated with 
people with low power and status, so given little 
attention. In addition, as discussed in Section 4.3, 
62 Sanstad et. al. (2006); IEA (200b); Sorrell (2004)
behavioural science identifies other barriers, such as 
the form and framing of information, the credibility of 
informants, inertia, and values. 
A different situation where carbon pricing is unlikely 
to be enough is around novel technologies, such as 
advanced biofuels from waste wood, carbon dioxide 
capture and storage, deep geothermal energy, ocean 
energy63, or hydrogen fuel. Many such innovative 
technologies remain very costly ways to reduce GHG 
emissions while they are still evolving and we are 
learning how to use them most efficiently. Even if the 
NZ ETS produced a very high carbon price, it might not 
be sufficient to give those technologies an economic 
advantage. However, in the long term they may 
provide important options for decarbonisation. In the 
mean time they need financial and regulatory support 
measures to promote research, development and 
early deployment. 
In other situations, different policy instruments 
sometimes need to be directed at different aspects 
of behaviour in a sector. For example, making electric 
vehicles cheaper with a grant or subsidy reduces their 
up-front capital cost (which can help facilitate early 
adoption and hence learning and network building), 
while the emission price increases the running costs 
of an internal combustion vehicle and hence brings 
forward decisions about retiring an inefficient one. 
In addition, some measures can provide multiple 
co-benefits; for example, a measure to encourage 
public transport and non-motorised active transport 
is likely to address objectives in public health, air 
quality, and congestion as much as climate change 
objectives. Furthermore, existing policies and laws 
should be reviewed in order to identify provisions that 
may inadvertently encourage high carbon emissions. 
‘Silver bullet’ policy-making is not realistic. Policy 
complexity is necessary and inevitable, and requires 
careful crafting to ensure an integrated and synergistic 
policy landscape. So a broad conclusion is that 
multiple policy measures must be brought to bear, 
and that additional policies must be carefully designed 
to address market failures relating to innovation and 
technology diffusion (IPCC, 2014a Chapter 13).
In summary, the carbon price created by an economic 
instrument such as the NZ ETS is important, and with 
suitable settings, can be a very effective means of 
modifying behaviour and reduce emissions. But it often 
needs to be accompanied by measures targeted to 
particular problems. Even with a carbon price, market 
barriers and other market failures prevent cost-effective 
actions such as installing insulation. Different policy 
instruments all have different roles to play. 
63 http://www.awatea.org.nz/ and http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/
report/IPCC_SRREN_Ch06.pdf
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4.8 Enabling policy development 
It is important to consider the overall national 
framework for the making of climate change policy. 
The framework for policy-making shapes the way 
that individual policy options and implementation 
are considered in order to support widespread GHG 
reductions. A sound over-arching policy framework 
is all the more necessary because climate change 
pervades so many different aspects of society and 
the economy. Public policy of any kind should be 
formulated in ways that are open, well-informed, 
systematic, effective, efficient and equitable  
(Scott and Baehler, 2010). Good policy-making entails 
gathering relevant information, identifying problems, 
setting objectives, choosing policy instruments to 
reach the objectives, implementation, and then 
monitoring to see if the policy instruments are 
working. Climate change policy arrangements  
can be considered in the light of such criteria.
Present climate change policy arrangements 
The present institutional arrangements for climate 
change are relatively conventional. The Ministry for 
the Environment (MƒE) is the lead agency for climate 
change policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (MFAT) is the lead agency for international 
negotiations, both agencies being responsible in these 
respects to the Minister for Climate Change Issues. 
The NZ ETS is administered by the MƒE (MƒE, 2015e), 
working alongside the Environmental Protection 
Authority and Ministry of Primary Industries.  
A number of other departments and agencies 
are necessarily involved with respect to the many 
ramifications of climate change, in the economy 
and in the energy, (including efficiency), transport, 
agriculture and forestry sectors. Climate change 
presents an enormous problem of coordination of 
the work of the multiple agencies involved. Several 
ministers have important roles alongside the Minister 
for Climate Change Issues. The Climate Change 
Response Act 2002, the primary legislation on the 
issue, has detailed provisions for the establishment 
and operation of the NZ ETS, but in respect of other 
aspects of climate change policy it is less detailed. 
It is important that policy-making provides individuals 
and businesses with a reasonably clear picture of 
the nature and evolution of policy far enough into 
the future to provide confidence over investment 
horizons. Concerns about regulatory certainty 
around the NZ ETS were highlighted by Richter and 
Chambers (2014) and by a survey of personnel from 
different sectors who agreed there needed to be 
long-term signals of stability and surety in the policy 
settings around the NZ ETS for it to influence business 
decisions (MƒE, 2016). 
Another issue is how climate targets are set and 
how measures are put in place to achieve them. 
At present, there is not a strong linkage between 
emissions targets and the policy actions that will allow 
them to be achieved. The INDC Discussion Document 
(MƒE 2015d) took the position that domestic policies 
and measures to achieve the target were a separate 
matter from the setting of the INDC target for the 
Paris negotiations in 2015. The target was therefore 
not accompanied by the indication of any suite of 
measures that would ensure that it could be reached. 
The Climate Change Response Act 2002 provides 
for the setting of a target but it says very little about 
its purpose or effect, or about the process in which 
targets are to be set. Only one of New Zealand’s 
targets has been set through the statutory procedure. 
The Act does not require a target to be accompanied 
by the development of projections, carbon budgets, 
strategies, or plans that will lead to achievement 
of the target64. The Climate Change Response 
Act requires certain reporting and monitoring to 
occur, but it is aimed primarily at international 
responsibilities rather than national ones, and there 
may be room to improve its support for sound 
national policy development. Similarly, the Act 
provides for reviews of the NZ ETS, but not of climate 
change policy generally, and not on any particular 
schedule. It is arguable that policy coherence can be 
improved (Macey, 2014). 
International expert review teams under the  
UNFCCC have reported on related shortcomings in 
New Zealand’s projections, policies and measure 
(PaMs), and monitoring. The review by the UNFCCC 
(2014) of our First Biennial Report noted that New 
Zealand had not reported the mitigation actions it 
planned in order to reach the conditional target of 
2020; did not explain how progress with PaMs is to  
be monitored; and did not provide a quantified 
estimate of the impacts of most individual PaMs.  
The team recommended that New Zealand provide  
a full list of the individual PaMs that are in effect, and 
encouraged New Zealand to provide a projections 
scenario showing the pathway to its 2020 and 2050 
targets, linked to a set of additional planned mitigation 
actions for meeting those targets. This concern with 
the lack of information about PaMs, quantitative 
estimates of their impacts, their monitoring and 
evaluation, and institutional arrangements echoed the 
earlier report of the In-Depth Review of New Zealand’s 
Fifth National Communication (UNFCCC, 2011). Issues 
of this kind indicate that there are opportunities for 
improvement in how we make climate change policy 
in New Zealand. 
64 Allocation plans are authorised under s 70, but only in relation 
to forestry and fishery activities.
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On the other hand, the more recent Second Biennial 
Report (MƒE, 2015e) provided quantified estimates  
of the effects of some specific PaMs. It also stated 
New Zealand is likely to meet our unconditional 2020 
target of 5% below 1990 emission levels without 
additional mitigation actions65 (largely based on 
forest removals and carry-over NZUs). Issues of this 
kind indicate that there may be opportunities for 
improvement in how climate change policy can be 
developed in New Zealand.
Comparisons 
Insights about improvements in the framework 
for climate change policy can be obtained from 
comparisons, firstly with other fields in New Zealand, 
and secondly with climate change policy frameworks 
of other countries. 
Other New Zealand Policy Processes
One interesting comparison is how New Zealand 
develops policy for public finances. The budgetary 
cycle is a field where policy making is subject to a 
well-defined set of actions under the general rubric 
of fiscal responsibility. Ministers and departments 
proceed through established processes for 
information disclosure, reporting, statements, and 
decision-making. In the Budget Policy Statement, 
usually published in November or December, the 
government must indicate the high-level financial 
and policy priorities that will guide the preparation 
of the Budget that will appear some months later. 
This reduces the likelihood of surprises and improves 
investment confidence. The main requirements are 
set out in the statutory form of the Public Finance 
Act 1989 that provides stability and predictability 
and embodies social and political commitment while 
leaving the setting of the policy itself firmly under the 
control of the relevant department and minister. 
Environmental management also makes a useful 
comparison. The Resource Management Act 1991 
directs national, regional and territorial authorities 
to set objectives and make strategies, policies, and 
plans that are appropriate to achieve those objectives. 
This is a tighter connection than exists at present 
between climate change targets and PaMs since RMA 
authorities are required to develop an information 
base about issues before setting the objectives. There 
are ample opportunities for public participation and 
challenge of proposals, but within a framework that 
seeks to provide transparency along with effectiveness. 
In energy efficiency and renewable energy policy (a 
field related to climate change), there is a process of 
setting five-yearly strategies including policies and 
65  http://www.mfe.govt.nz/climate-change/reporting-
greenhouse-gas-emissions/latest-2020-net-position 
objectives, supported by targets that are ‘measurable, 
reasonable, practicable, and considered appropriate 
by the Minister’ as stipulated by the Energy Efficiency 
and Conservation Act 2000. The target is a clear 
statement of government intentions in the field, for 
which specific policies are designed. Decision-makers 
under other legislation such as the RMA are in some 
circumstances required to take the New Zealand 
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy into 
account in their work. 
Collaborative planning or governance may have some 
attraction as a template for climate change. The main 
New Zealand example, the Land and Water Forum, has 
had significant successes building social capital and 
establishing consensus between different stakeholders 
in the freshwater management sector (Sinner and 
Berkett, 2014). It has made recommendations 
that set the limits and paved the way for essential 
government action on water quality. However the 
relationship between the Forum and ministers and 
ministries has not always been easy. The idea of 
establishing a Climate Change Forum or similar body is 
under discussion. However collaborative governance 
has significant limitations, which would need to be 
considered carefully in making any proposal for a 
climate change collaborative governance forum. For 
example, whether the forum is to be purely advisory 
or would carry out actual governance would need 
to be determined, and so would its procedures such 
as in respect of confidentiality. Its role in relation to 
conventional governmental processes would need 
to be well thought out. Furthermore, it is not clear 
whether climate change is a sectoral issue with 
clearly identifiable stakeholders; it may be too spread 
through society and the economy for collaborative 
governance to work well. 
Climate Change Policy Processes Overseas
Two overseas comparisons illustrate possibilities for 
improving climate change policy processes. 
1. United Kingdom. 
The Climate Change Act 2008 sets the national 
target for 2050, but it allows for amendments by 
the Minister if justified as a result of significant 
developments in scientific knowledge about climate 
change or in European or international law or policy. 
The Act requires the Minister to set carbon budgets 
for five-year periods that will lead to achievement 
of that 2050 target. This process of setting carbon 
budgets supports the long-range target by clarifying 
what needs to be done, in what time period and what 
will be the sector contributions, thereby making the 
target-setting a more meaningful exercise.
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• The timing and procedure for budgeting  
(and for amending the 2050 target) are set  
out in the statute, ensuring that the process  
is predictable and open.
• The matters that the Minister must take into 
account in making a budget are carefully specified.
• The Minister must report an indicative annual 
range for the net UK carbon account for each  
year in the budget period.
• Critically, the Minister must prepare proposals and 
policies that will enable the carbon budgets that 
have been set under the Act to be met, and must 
report to Parliament on their carbon budget and 
economic effects;
• The Minister must report emissions annually 
against budgets, and must produce periodical 
reports on the impact of climate change and  
on progress in adaptation to that impact.
The UK Act 2008 established the Committee on 
Climate Change66 to provide evidence-based expert 
advice to the government and Parliament. The Act 
gives the Committee considerable independence and 
the Minister is obliged to obtain the Committee’s 
advice, and take that advice into account when 
setting carbon budgets, revising targets, and impact 
reporting. The Committee operates openly and its 
advice is made public. It reports on progress towards 
meeting budgets, carries out its own research and 
analysis, and engages with a range of organizations 
and people. 
The UK Act was a major institutional innovation, 
intended to promote political commitment and 
investor confidence, and to give policy reform a  
better chance of enduring. It has survived a change  
of government and has ensured that the process  
of setting carbon targets and budgets continues,  
even if sometimes surrounded by controversy  
(Lockwood, 2013). 
2. California 
The state has been active for decades on air pollution, 
GHG mitigation, energy policy and energy efficiency, 
but in 2006 the State Legislature enacted umbrella 
legislation, the Global Warming Solutions Act that 
prescribed the procedure for setting a target for 
2020 GHG emissions, and authorized regulations to 
be made for a wide range of emissions reduction 
measures. It authorized the California Cap and Trade 
Regulations and designated the Air Resources Board 
as the agency primarily responsible, directing it to
66 https://www.theccc.org.uk/
 develop a Scoping Plan, which is the state’s main 
strategy for action on climate change and updated 
every five years. New targets for emissions reductions 
by 2030 and 2050 have been set by executive order 
and are reflected in the updating of the Scoping Plan. 
The Air Resources Board works with the California 
Energy Commission (CEC), California Transportation 
Agency, California Public Utilities Commission, 
and other agencies that provide support through 
sophisticated planning and regulatory processes, 
such as the Integrated Energy Policy Report of the 
CEC. Again, this example shows how the processes of 
developing climate change policy can be institutionally 
embedded in legislation, promoting stability, 
commitment, and investor confidence. 
Options for Climate Change Policy Development
While every country has a unique set of 
circumstances, the comparisons above suggest that 
there are a number of options used in different 
jurisdictions that apparently improve policy-making 
and implementation and that could be applied in  
New Zealand. For example:
• providing clearly-defined processes, such as in 
legislation, to promote systematic cycles of climate 
change policy making;
• making arrangements stable and predictable to 
improve confidence in the regulatory system and 
to improve investment certainty;
• linking the setting of targets, caps, pathways 
and corridors for emissions more directly to the 
selection and analysis of the policies and measures 
that will enable them to be achieved or followed;
• aligning the NZ ETS better with other national and 
local policies and measures;
• coordinating climate change policy among the 
many national and local authorities involved; and
• making climate change policy in a way that 
best promotes understanding, participation, 
acceptance and support by the public in order  
that ambitious targets can be set. 
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Greenhouse gases (GHGs) can be practically 
reduced in each sector in the short to medium 
terms based on current technology development 
and the existing limited knowledge of 
comparative costs and behavioural change. 
The overall goal is to eventually reduce GHGs 
to zero for each sector. Due to a dearth of 
literature on uncertainties, risks, cultural 
aspirations and costs for most sectors, it was 
not possible to undertake detailed analyses, 
advocate a least cost pathway, or assess how we 
might optimise priorities for action within the 
future constraint of reducing GHG emissions. 
Removal of CO
2
 from the atmosphere by forests 
could be increased by both additional planting 
and enabling regeneration of natural forests.
Section 5:  
Sectoral mitigation options 
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5.1 Heat and power supply
Key messages
• Around 80% of New Zealand’s electricity  
is generated from renewable sources  
(primarily hydropower). 
• This can be further increased, cost effectively, 
to reach 90% by 2025 – New Zealand’s 
renewable electricity target.
• Technically renewables in the mix could achieve 
close to 100% without reducing the reliability 
and security of the power grid. However, very 
high penetration that includes high shares of 
variable renewable energy systems would need 
a more flexible grid, energy storage, and back-
up generation (possibly thermal plant) to meet 
seasonal peaks, especially in dry years when 
hydro is constrained. 
• Even 100% renewable electricity would not  
be zero-carbon since some subterranean CO
2 
 is released during geothermal generation.
• Distributed generation systems and ’smart 
grids’ are expected to become more common 
by overcoming technology integration issues, 
though the rate of deployment could be 
constrained by the structure of our  
electricity market.
• Cost effective options in the heat sector to 
reduce or prevent GHG emissions, including 
the greater uptake of biomass, solar and 
geothermal resources to displace coal and 
natural gas, are not being fully realised. 
• Heat accounts for 28% of consumer end-use 
energy yet is generally ignored in energy policy 
that has been dominated by electricity (with 
lower total end-use energy).
• The co-benefits from installation and operation 
of renewable energy plants are often significant 
and should be included in decision making 
alongside the energy cost evaluation.
• An increased uptake of renewable energy 
projects would probably be the outcome of an 
increased carbon price ($ /t CO
2
) being placed 
on emissions from thermal generation of heat 
and electricity.
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The term ‘energy supply’ embraces all fuels and 
energy carriers used by all sectors. However, this 
section covers mainly heat and electricity supply  
with energy for transport discussed in Section 5.2. 
Since the heat and electricity is consumed by other 
sectors, mainly buildings and industry, allocation of 
the GHGs has to be made (see Figure 3.2).
Sources of GHG emissions 
Where does our electricity and heat come from?
Fossil fuels continue to dominate New Zealand’s 
energy supply with approximately 60% of primary 
energy coming from coal, oil and gas and the 
remaining 40% from renewable energy sources.67 
When natural gas and coal are combusted they 
produce heat which can be used directly in buildings 
or for process heat for industry, or used to raise steam 
that drives steam-turbines for generating electricity. 
Renewable energy already has a high share of total 
electricity generation but lower shares of the heat 
markets (Figure 5.1).
Demand for consumer energy grew steadily from 
1990 to 2005, since when it has levelled off, but the 
consumer energy supply mix has changed relatively 
little (Figure 5.2). Total electricity demand has also 
stabilised, growing by around 0.2% per year, on 
average, in the past decade, although the shares of 
renewable energy generation have recently grown, 
partly displacing coal-fired and natural gas-fired 
thermal power plants. Buildings use around 56% of 
total electricity generated, industry 37% including  
17 percentage points by basic metal processors, 
including the Tiwai Point aluminium smelter, and 
7 percentage points by wood processors. Energy 
efficiency improvements across all end-use sectors 
saved New Zealand around 10 TWh of electricity  
from 2001 to 2011 (MBIE, 2015).
For heating for use by industry and for space heating 
of buildings, the main sources have been from the 
combustion of natural gas, coal and biomass, plus 
a little geothermal (Figure 5.2). (Oil dominates 
consumer energy demand being used mainly for 
transport of people and freight, domestically and 
internationally; Section 5.2). The combustion of 
biomass has increased 70% since 1990 with  
12% of dwellings now burning some firewood  
and 20% of installed heat plant capacity in the 
commercial and industrial sectors being fuelled 
by biomass. Geothermal direct heat is used for 
greenhouse heating, shellfish farming, kiln drying of 
timber, and with the wood pulping plant at Kawerau 
being the largest industrial user of geothermal heat  
in the world. 
67 Includes geothermal at ~10% efficiency (200 PJ primary energy 
gives 20 PJ consumer electricity). Hence, quoting primary 
energy levels can be misleading as it varies with the accounting 
method employed (IPCC, 2011 Annex 2).
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Figure 5.1 Renewables had around an 80% share of electricity in New Zealand in 2013 with consumer heat 
energy demand being met mainly by fossil fuel combustion together with some renewable bioenergy 
(including domestic firewood), solar and geothermal sources.
Source: MBIE (2014). 
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Figure 5.2 New Zealand consumer energy demand by fuel from 1990 to 2014. 
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In 2014, New Zealand had almost an 80% share  
of electricity generation from renewables  
(Figure 5.3), one of the highest in the world. This 
share has grown from around 60% in 2005 without 
any external incentives or direct government 
subsidies68. Around 9,400 MW
e
 of total electricity 
generating capacity was installed and actively 
generating in 2014 (MBIE, 2015). A further 5,000 MW
e
 
or more of renewable electricity generation capacity  
is either planned or consented (MBIE, 2016a).
In 2014, the national peak power demand was 
approximately 45% higher than the average electricity 
demand. Lowering this peak can help reduce the need 
to invest in additional generation capacity, make it 
easier to reach the 90% renewable electricity target, 
lower the needs for future investment in distribution 
line capacity, and help make electricity cheaper to 
generate overall. In addition, the uptake of electric 
vehicles (EVs including E-cars, E-buses and E-cycles) 
could affect the peak. These will require regular 
recharging, often at off-peak times, so could help 
flatten the demand curve which could help improve 
the overall efficiency of operating the New Zealand 
electricity system. This could be coupled with solar  
PV generating systems and demand-side management 
of appliances operating in a ‘smart-grid’ (SGF, 2015) 
although issues of meeting seasonal peaks, especially 
in dry hydro years will have to be addressed  
(see opposite).
The average 2014 domestic electricity tariff at  
~$0.29 /kWh was 10th lowest in the OECD countries 
and the average industrial tariff at ~$0.08 /kWh was 
4th lowest. Included in these tariffs are line charges 
imposed by both Transpower, for high-voltage 
transmission, and by the 29 line companies to meet 
local, low-voltage distribution costs. Fixed line charges 
are typically around 40% of a total domestic account. 
Based on these domestic tariffs, the cost of recharging 
an electric vehicle equates to a gasoline fuel price  
for travelling the same distance of around  
$0.30–0.40 per litre equivalent69 (assuming the  
crude oil price is around USD 50–60/ barrel (bbl)).
68 In past decades the main hydro power plants and the Wairakei 
geothermal plant were developed by the government of the 
time using public funding.
69 https://www.energywise.govt.nz/on-the-road/electric-vehicles/ 
To meet the total 170 PJ heat demand in 2014, 
around 100 PJ came from natural gas. New Zealand’s 
remaining reserves of natural gas and LPG were 
around 8900 PJ in 1990 but had declined to around 
2900 PJ by 2015 (MBIE, 2015). Around 30% of 
the total annual LPG production of around 10PJ is 
exported. The production profile from existing gas 
fields has been forecast out to 2050 (Figure 5.4) 
although the production-to-reserves ratio changes 
over time due to new extraction technologies and 
exploration successes70.
For every 100 PJ of natural gas combusted, whether 
for electricity generation or direct heat, approximately 
6.4 Mt CO
2
 is emitted. Displacing natural gas (or coal) 
by using more renewables for heat generation will 
reduce these emissions. In 2013, over 65 PJ (38%)  
of heat demand was met by renewable sources 
(Figure 5.1), mainly biomass residues used by the 
wood processing industry on-site. Also, domestic 
heating with firewood was employed as one method 
of space heating in over one third of New Zealand 
households. Biomass resources, together with 
solar thermal and geothermal resources could be 
utilised to meet the total heat demand. For example, 
Miraka’s milk drying plant buys heat from the nearby 
Mokai geothermal field to provide direct ultra-high 
temperature process heat71. Also, Christchurch 
International Airport is heated and cooled using 
a ground source heat pump system that could be 
replicated in many other buildings throughout  
New Zealand since a direct geothermal heat source  
is not required72.
Industry is the main heat and electricity consuming 
sector in New Zealand, accounting for around  
60% of total end-use demand in 2014 (Section 5.4), 
with around 18% used in residential buildings,  
15% in commercial buildings (Section 5.3), 6–7% in  
the primary production sector (Section 5.5), and a 
small amount of electricity used for rail, trolley buses 
in Wellington, and a growing demand for electric  
road vehicles (Section 5.2) (MBIE, 2015). 
70 http://gasindustry.co.nz/work-programmes/gas-transmission-
investment-programme/supply-and-demand/long-term-gas-
supply-and-demand-scenarios/
71 http://www.tuaropaki.com/our-business/dairy-processing/
72 http://www.irhace.org.nz/
uploads/2015ConferencePresentations/Graeme%20Wills%20
-%20Justin%20Hill%20PDF.pdf 
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Figure 5.3 Shares of electricity from renewables in 2014 (42,231 GWh) increased from 2013 as coal  
and gas generation shares both declined. 
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Figure 5.4 Production profiles as forecast for natural gas and LPG from existing fields between 2015 and 2050.
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Global GHG emission trends for the sector
Where do most global GHG emissions come from?
Globally, 63% of total GHG emissions are produced 
by the energy sector (including energy for transport), 
mainly as CO
2
 emitted during the combustion of fossil 
fuels. By way of comparison, New Zealand’s emissions 
from energy supply (including energy for transport) 
account for around 44% of total GHG emissions 
(Section 3).
To avoid a future average global temperature rise 
of more than 2oC, decarbonisation of the global 
electricity sector is needed by 2050, which will be 
easier to achieve than decarbonising the heat or 
transport sectors (IPCC, 2014c). This is especially so  
if carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) eventually 
proves to be successful and economic (Box 5.1).
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Box 5.1: Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) and links with bioenergy (BECCS)
Large, single point sources of CO
2
 emissions offer 
CCS opportunities for new power plants or by 
converting existing coal-fired and gas-fired power 
plants to be CCS compliant. At present, only one 
coal-fired power plant exists with CCS73 but, being 
the first, it is fairly expensive. CCS can also be 
applied to industry applications (Section 5.4).
If CCS technology can ultimately be proven to 
be economically feasible with reduced energy 
input, and also be applied in association with the 
combustion of biomass for electricity generation 
(using any forest or crop biomass to supply the  
fuel but ensuring it is replanted soon after harvest), 
then the combination of coupling bioenergy with 
CCS (known as BECCS) may offer the most likely 
route to producing negative emissions before the 
end of this century (Figure 5.5). 
Atmospheric carbon dioxide
Carbon dioxide 
capture
Carbon dioxide 
transport
CO2 sequestration
Biological CO2 sequestration Bioenergy conversion 
plant to provide, heat, 
power, hydrogen etc.
Depleted petroleum 
reservoirs, saline 
aquifers, etc.
Woody 
Biomass
Forests replanted after harvesting  
so more CO
2
 is removed from  
the atmosphere
Also can sequester 
some extra carbon into 
the soil as “bio-char”
Figure 5.5 Bioenergy linked with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS). Capturing the CO2 
produced from biomass combustion and sequestering it can lower atmospheric concentrations  
but only if the biomass used is regrown.
73  The Boundary Dam plant in Canada http://saskpowerccs.
com/ccs-projects/boundary-dam-carbon-capture-project/
Many integrated assessment models show this 
is necessary in order to keep global temperature 
rise below 2oC unless more ambitious immediate 
reductions can be implemented. 
If successfully implemented, BECCS could provide 
a means to relax the overall requirement to 
reach zero GHG emissions on sectors that are 
more difficult and costly to decarbonise. (Note 
the potential for biological carbon sequestration 
through soil biochar is discussed in Section 5.5).
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GHG emissions profile and baseline trends  
in New Zealand
What amount of greenhouse gas arises from the 
supply of heat and electricity?
In 2014, electricity generation in New Zealand  
from non-renewable generation produced  
~7 Mt CO
2
 emissions. Together with the generation  
of heat from fossil fuel combustion, this accounted for 
around 40% of the 35 Mt of total CO
2
emissions.  
The remainder came mainly from transport fuels, 
cement manufacture and deforestation (MƒE, 2015a). 
Total GHG emissions from electricity generation 
have declined in recent years as greater shares of 
renewable energy generation have appeared in the 
electricity mix and demand has remained flat. Annual 
emissions from the generation of electricity vary 
with the amount of fossil fuels combusted in thermal 
power plants. This can be higher in dry years when 
generation from hydro-power plants is constrained 
and thermal plants are run more often. Other than 
methane emissions from natural gas leaks in pipelines 
etc., leakage of fugitive CO
2
 emissions have tended 
to increase (Figure 5.6), mainly as a result of more 
geothermal plants becoming operational, since these 
release some CO
2
 during extraction of the hot brine 
from below the ground.
GHG mitigation options
How can we reduce GHG emissions in the heat  
and electricity sector?
Examples of the many technical and operational 
options that exist for reducing GHG emissions in 
this sector are based mainly on improving energy 
efficiency of the generation plants and end-uses of 
the heat and electricity, using a range of measures: 
switching natural gas for coal (as an interim solution); 
substituting renewable energy for fossil fuels; and 
modifying consumer behaviour to reduce heat and 
electricity demand. 
Possible GHG mitigation options (although the 
amount of emission reductions for some options will 
depend on the specific circumstances), include:
For everyone:
• Improved energy efficiency measures.
For individuals:
• Individual decisions by householders to invest 
in solar PV (possibly linked with electric vehicle 
recharging), pellet stoves, ground source heat 
pumps, etc.
Figure 5.6 Emissions of CO2 by the heat and electricity sector from 1990 to 2014. 
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For businesses:
• Improving efficiency of existing wind turbines.
• Expanding uptake of bioenergy (wood, biogas etc) 
and geothermal to displace coal and gas.
• Using electro-technologies from a high-share 
renewable grid for process heat.
• Using solar water heating and air-to-water  
or geothermal (ground source) heat pumps.
For local and regional government:
• Utilising organic waste in landfills and sewage 
treatment plants to produce biogas. 
• Utilisation of renewable energy heat solutions in 
municipal facilities such as community halls and 
swimming pools.
• Supporting electric vehicle (EV) rechargers in 
municipal areas.
• Community actions to become more sustainable 
including reducing GHG emissions.
• Cities taking a greater leadership role in reducing 
emissions by, for example, investment in 
renewable energy generation.
For national government:
• Increase share of renewables to meet 2025 target.
• Further increasing shares of renewables  
towards 100%.
• Encouraging and managing the uptake of  
smart-grids and local distributed generation.
• Undertake R, D &D investment to demonstrate 
the potential for promising future low-carbon 
technologies such as carbon dioxide capture  
and storage (CCS) and ocean energy.
EECA manages the OPENZ modelling tool that 
can be used across all sectors to compare present 
technologies with new technologies that optimise  
the supply of end-use consumer electricity or heat  
in terms of energy efficiency, costs and emissions  
out to 2050. A marginal abatement cost curve is  
also being developed (Section 6.1).
Electricity
In spite of the high shares of renewable electricity, 
New Zealand has only around 39% of total energy 
demand being met by renewable energy. Therefore, 
there remain good opportunities for further uptake, 
particularly for heating. The IPCC Special Report on 
Renewable Energy (IPCC, 2011) outlined the issues 
and solutions, and also confirmed that globally, 
the technical potential74 of renewable energy 
technologies, based on the renewable resources 
available, exceeds the current energy demand by a 
considerable amount. Less than 3% of the globally 
available technical potential for renewable resources 
is presently used, confirming that the availability 
of renewable sources will not be a limiting factor. 
The technical potential for renewables has also 
been assessed for New Zealand (Sims et al., 2005) 
with similar conclusions. However, accelerating the 
deployment of cost-competitive renewable energy 
systems could present new technological and 
institutional challenges when integrating them into 
existing energy supply systems and end-use sectors. 
The current target to achieve 90% renewable 
electricity by 2025 is achievable and could be even 
more ambitious given the number of renewable 
energy power plants that have already received 
consents but are not yet under construction (MBIE, 
2016a). A higher share of renewables can be achieved 
if either electricity demand grows, (such as to meet 
demand for recharging EVs, more electric rail, or 
thermo-electric process heating), or old thermal 
plants are retired. Integration of higher shares of 
variable wind and solar PV generation systems is 
feasible by making the national grid more flexible. 
There would need to be an accompanying programme 
to reduce peak loads so they are closer to the mean 
loads and for significant system operation issues to  
be addressed in order to achieve a very high 
renewable percentage. 
Because of the way in which the New Zealand 
electricity wholesale market functions, the over-
capacity and degree of wastage that could result 
when moving closer to 100% renewables would 
have additional cost implications. Assuming wind 
and solar are ‘must-run’ generation and geothermal 
and bioenergy are ‘baseload’, hydro, being easily 
dispatchable, would probably then be used to meet 
fluctuating demands. In winter months, storage lakes 
decline as a lot of the hydro generating capacity is 
74 The technical potential of a technology or system ignores 
any cost constraints but considers and current practical 
limits to uptake, based on climate, engineering, competition 
for resources such as land. It can increase over time when 
technologies using an available resource become operational  
in future years after the socio-economic conditions change, 
given certain economic and operating conditions.
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locked up as snow. Therefore, additional geothermal, 
wind and solar capacity would be needed to cover 
peak seasonal demands. (Demand-side management 
options can only shift loads for short periods.)  
In summer, surplus capacity of hydro, geothermal, 
wind and solar would necessitate spilling resources. 
The lower load factors of the generation plants as a 
consequence will result in increased generation costs. 
Adding storage systems such as batteries or 
capacitor banks into the system, possibly at the 
local distribution level, is another option to maintain 
frequency control and system stability. This is being 
considered elsewhere75 but every grid is unique so 
lessons to be learned are limited, and storage is  
often relatively more costly compared with making 
the grid more flexible (IPCC, 2011, chapter 8).  
The potential for developing smart-grids (linked 
with small local generation systems, smart-meters, 
intelligent appliances with fast response times etc.)  
is being evaluated to assess their reliability and 
potential contribution and uptake (SGF, 2015). 
Single-cycle gas turbines could be used as back-
up to overcome seasonal and diurnal peaks and 
hence reduce overall system operation costs, but 
unless the gas comes from landfill or biogas sources, 
achieving 100% renewable electricity may not then 
be economically or technically viable. To achieve a 
high level of security for dry years, having suitable 
back-up generation capacity installed (likely to be 
at least in part fossil-fuelled but only to be used in 
extreme dry years) will also increase overall system 
costs. To achieve a high renewable share, it may 
prove necessary for the owner of the back-up power 
capacity to be paid sufficiently to only offer to run 
it in dry years or at times when supply security is at 
high risk of brown-outs or black-outs. To reach close 
to 100% renewable electricity overall, there may even 
be a need to consider government ownership of the 
back-up plant since, in theory, it would exist solely  
for security of supply.
75 See for example, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
smart-power-a-national-infrastructure-commission-report
The recent lower investment costs for solar PV panels 
has created an increased number of residential 
and commercial installations that in 2015 totalled 
around 25 MW
e
 installed capacity (Miller et al., 2015). 
The costs of batteries for energy storage are also 
declining, from around US$1300–1500 / kWh in 2005 
to around US$400-500 / kWh a decade later (Nykvist 
and Nilsson, 2015). New Zealand’s deregulated 
electricity industry, with corporate ownership of 
generation plant and many distribution line assets, 
could choose to either constrain the further uptake 
of grid-connected solar PV systems and smart grids, 
or drive it. In countries where the electricity system 
is more closely regulated, government interventions 
encourage smart-grid developments to provide future 
benefits, including reduced GHG emissions.  
However, since electricity generation is already  
around 80% renewables in New Zealand, investment 
in solar PV by householders and small businesses 
could result in lower reductions in GHG emissions  
($/t CO
2
 avoided) than if making a similar investment 
in an EV that would directly displace gasoline or diesel 
fuels (Concept, 2016). 
Heat
EECA has a ‘Regional Renewable Heat’ programme 
of work to promote the switching on industrial 
process heat to renewable energy. In the South Island 
with no natural gas distribution, there have been 
few options other than coal, but the 3-year ‘Wood 
Energy South’ programme is encouraging a switch 
to woody biomass76. EECA is assisting businesses 
to invest in bioenergy heat plant by co-investing in 
feasibility studies to provide information on costs and 
savings over the lifetime. The supply of both high and 
low temperature heat can be decarbonised by the 
increased use of electro-technologies for industry; 
the substitution of fossil fuels by biomass, geothermal 
and solar thermal systems; the uptake of heat pumps 
including ground source (ideally using renewable 
electricity); co-generation of heat and power; and 
district heating and cooling systems (UNEP, 2015b). 
Several of these heat supply technologies appear  
to have good realisable potential but further analysis 
is required to assess their costs and potentials under 
New Zealand conditions. An attempt was made 
to provide an overview of estimated mitigation 
potentials, costs, and possible priority sequencing 
of mitigation actions across all sectors (Annex 1) 
although data is limited.
76  http://www.woodenergysouth.co.nz/ 
86 Transition to a low-carbon economy for New Zealand  |  2016
What opportunities and barriers exist around  
GHG mitigation options?
There are a number of enablers for GHG  
mitigation options:
• The cost competitiveness of many renewable 
energy conversion technologies against fossil  
fuel technologies is increasing.
• Co-benefits have been identified, such as lower 
local air pollution.
• Electro-technologies for providing heat and 
mobility services are becoming cheaper for some 
applications (such as medium to high temperature 
heat pumps with high efficiency), and easier  
to implement.
• Biomass when combusted in stoves, boilers  
and furnaces, and geothermal heat systems,  
can displace coal and natural gas. 
• An increasing carbon price would be a  
strong driver.
Existing barriers include:
• Renewable energy tending to have high capital 
costs (but low operating costs) which can put it at 
a disadvantage with North Island gas-fired power 
plants which, with low capital but higher operating 
costs, can affect investment decision-making and 
needs comparisons of the options using full life-
cycle assessments. 
• Little recognition given to the opportunities to 
reduce GHG emissions within the heat market 
despite its accounting for around 28% of New 
Zealand’s consumer energy use, whereas 
electricity equates to only 23% in energy terms.
• The heat market is distributed with many small 
players and so does not have the power and 
wealth of the electricity or petroleum companies. 
• Resistance by consumers to behavioural change.
• Cheap fossil fuel prices, such as coal for heat in  
the South Island, due to over-supply and/or 
unpriced externalities. 
• Electricity wholesale market participants not fully 
engaging in low-carbon options. 
• Resistance to change by incumbents in the market.
• Knowledge gaps.
Influence of long term ambitions on near term 
actions and pathways
What are the pathways and potentials for reducing 
emissions from heat and power generation?
To help achieve the transition to a low-carbon 
economy in New Zealand that contributes to  
the global goal of maintaining temperature rise  
below 2 oC, there is high technical potential for 
emission reductions in this sector over the next  
20-30 years. However, future deployment of low-
carbon technologies and systems will depend on 
comparative costs and any policy interventions. 
The market potential would be increased if a higher 
carbon price on fossil fuels resulted under the ETS 
(Section 4.8). 
Further decarbonisation of the electricity sector to 
exceed the current target of 90% renewable electricity 
by 2025 is technically possible and probably cost-
effective. For example, default values and assumptions 
used in the Interactive Electricity Generation Cost 
Model – 2015 (MBIE, 2016) confirm that renewable 
electricity generation, particularly from wind and 
geothermal, is cost-competitive with combined cycle 
gas turbine plants delivering gas baseload. This tool 
could also be used to assess whether 100% renewable 
electricity has technical potential, as shown by early 
modelling confirming supply reliability could be 
maintained even in a dry year (Mason et al., 2013). 
However, integration of higher shares of variable 
renewables (IPCC, 2011, Chapter 8), would still  
need further evaluation. 
Expanding the current share of renewable heat is also 
technically possible. Considerable experience could be 
gleaned from other countries (IEA, 2007a; IPCC, 2011) 
with the opportunities well understood by the various 
industry associations77. 
77 Bioenergy Association of NZ www.bioenergy.org.nz; Solar 
Association of NZ www.solarassociation.org.nz; NZ Geothermal 
Association, www.nzgeothermal.org.nz 
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Co-benefits
What other benefits exist when reducing GHG 
emissions in the heat and power sector?
• The skilled and semi-skilled employment 
opportunities for labour needed for developing, 
installing and maintaining renewable energy  
heat and power systems is well documented.  
For bioenergy plants, labour is also required to 
provide and deliver the biomass resource.
• Biomass in the form of waste organic matter, such 
as municipal solid waste, animal manure, sewage 
sludge, cereal straw, and forest residues, can be 
used as feedstocks for heat and power plants 
with many examples already in place around the 
world. The utilisation of these biomass feedstocks 
on-site through anaerobic digestion, combustion, 
gasification or pyrolysis can avoid costly waste 
treatment, transport and disposal as well as avoid 
emissions of methane and nitrous oxides. The CO
2
 
produced during their conversion is reabsorbed by 
future crops so is carbon neutral. 
• The future energy security of New Zealand will  
be enhanced if local energy resources can be 
utilised to reduce dependence on imported  
energy sources.
• Increased business resilience will occur because  
of diversity.
• Improved human health can result from reduced 
local air pollution where renewable energy 
systems displace coal-fired or diesel-engine 
powered heat and electricity plants.
• Cost savings can result from a change to low-
carbon technologies, both from improved  
energy efficiency of generation plants as well  
as from savings on fuel costs. The levelised costs 
of renewable energy can compare well with 
conventional fossil fuel costs, especially where 
good renewable resources exist (IPCC, 2011, 
Chapter 10) such as wind and geothermal in  
New Zealand.
Insights on enabling policies 
Would policy interventions be useful to encourage 
more rapid technology deployment?
Local experience has confirmed that the share of 
large-scale renewable electricity generation projects 
can continue to increase in New Zealand without 
government intervention, although increasing carbon 
prices would encourage more rapid displacement 
of thermal generation. The need for policies to 
encourage development of small- and mini-generation 
projects by small businesses and householders is 
currently being assessed by the Smart Grid Forum 
(SGF, 2015).
For supporting the greater deployment of  
renewable heat projects in buildings and industry, 
the Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme, 
set up by the UK Government in 2011 to encourage 
the uptake of renewable heat technologies amongst 
householders, communities and businesses through 
financial incentives, is a good model to study. Various 
amendments have been made by the regulator since 
it was introduced (OFGEM, 2015). Similar policies 
could be applied in New Zealand.
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Knowledge gaps
What else would be useful to know in order to 
increase the uptake of low-carbon technologies?
The electricity and heat sector is mature in  
New Zealand and well understood. However, the 
potential for the uptake of renewable heating systems 
is not clear. The number of boilers and their capacity is 
available on a heat database, but the amount of useful 
heat produced is not usually metered so any seasonal 
variations in demand are not known. The opportunity 
to convert them to biomass, including having reliable 
local supplies of feedstock, could be assessed. 
Geothermal direct use databases complement 
the heat plant database but the NZ Geothermal 
Association advocates for user surveys at all scales.
Costs of low-carbon technologies need detailed 
evaluation, not just the current investment costs but 
also the operational, maintenance, management and 
life cycle costs including for plant decommissioning. 
To accurately assess the realistic potential for the 
many low-carbon opportunities in the heat and 
electricity sector when taking into account the costs, 
risks, but also the many co-benefits, detailed analyses 
are required. Demonstration projects with wide 
dissemination of costs and benefits would  
help promote businesses utilising renewable  
energy since many similar enterprises may be 
unaware of the opportunities.
Case studies
Are there good examples that others  
might follow?
• Large scale renewable electricity projects 
are widespread throughout New Zealand. 
Around 7000 small-scale solar PV systems 
have been installed ranging from less 
than 1kW on houses to over 100 kW by 
Palmerston North City Council. Many 
autonomous buildings also exist without 
connection to the electricity grid.
• There is a growing interest by small  
communities to invest in their own 
electricity generation plant, the foremost 
being Blueskin Bay north of Dunedin78, 
Parihaka in Taranaki,  
and several others.
• Industrial renewable heat projects have 
been common for many years, for example 
the combined heat and power plant at 
Kinleith pulp mill using bark peelings and 
forest residues79 and the Wairakei prawn 
farm using low temperature geothermal 
heat since 198780.
• The Christchurch City rebuild, linked with 
feasibility study grants and rapid and 
favourable resource consent approvals,  
has produced an uptake of geothermal 
(ground source) heat pumps for 
interconnected heating and cooling 
schemes. More recently, K&L Nurseries, 
flower growers from Christchurch, moved 
away from coal and invested in a biomass 
boiler fuelled by their own cut flower crop 
residues. The project received the EECA 
2014 Supreme Award81. The Bioenergy 
Association of New Zealand provides many 
case studies of other heat applications from 
woody biomass combustion82. 
78 www.brct.org.nz/
79 www.mynoke.co.nz/vdb/document/11 
80 www.gns.cri.nz/Home/Search?cx=000739735540594
332840%3A7p51qeexgyk&cof=FORID%3A9%3BNB%
3A1&ie=UTF-8&q=prawn&sa=Search For other case 
studies see http://www.gns.cri.nz/Home/Learning/
Science-Topics/Earth-Energy
81 www.eeca.govt.nz/about-eeca/eeca-awards/past-
awards/eeca-awards-2014/bioenergy-trailblazer-k-
and-l-nurseries-wins-2014-eeca-supreme-award/ 
82 www.bioenergy.org.nz/bioenergy-case-studies 
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5.2 Transport
Key messages
• Our transport sector is 99% dependent on  
fossil fuels, so mitigation actions are possible  
by individuals, communities, businesses and 
local governments. 
• New Zealand’s GHG emissions from road 
transport could reduce by at least 60% by 
2050 if large-scale uptake of low emissions 
technologies such as electric vehicles (EVs) 
occurs; fuel efficiency standards and other 
measures are introduced; and fuel retail  
prices increase as a result of high oil and  
carbon prices. 
• Unless the purchase price of zero emission 
electric or hydrogen fuelled vehicles declines, 
in spite of their lower running and maintenance 
costs, large-scale rapid adoption in the short 
term will require the use of policy instruments. 
• Rail has significantly lower emissions than 
road per kilometre for carrying a given 
volume of freight. At the present level of rail 
electrification, the transport of freight by rail on 
average per tonne kilometre typically produces 
only around a third of the emissions compared 
with transporting freight by road. 
• Domestic biofuels based on food processing 
by-products (from whey, used cooking oils, 
tallow and biogas from organic wastes) don’t 
compete for land use and can be competitive 
with petroleum products. However, available 
feedstock volumes limit them to around  
3-5% of road transport fuels.
• Production of bio-ethanol and other drop-in 
biofuels from ligno-cellulosic feedstocks are 
emerging technologies but remain costly so 
require lower feedstock prices that will be 
challenging to meet in New Zealand.
• The use of private vehicles can be substantially 
reduced through: 
• urban design that prioritises walking  
and cycling;
• accessible and timely low emission public 
transport, especially rail; and
• early adoption of smart transport 
technologies and possibly driverless 
vehicles, though the benefits are uncertain.
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Sources of transport fuels
Where do our petroleum based transport fuels come 
from and who uses them?
Over 99.9% of New Zealand’s transport fuels are 
derived from crude oil (Figure 5.7) (MBIE, 2015).
In 2014 New Zealand was about 35% self-sufficient 
in oil. It exported 98% of the crude oil it produced as 
its low density and low sulphur content give it a high 
value on the international market. Over 80% of New 
Zealand’s oil product imports came from refineries in 
Singapore and South Korea in 2014, with 8% from the 
USA (MBIE, 2015).
How much fuel do we use?
In 2014, the domestic transport sector was 
responsible for approximately 36% of New Zealand’s 
total consumer energy demand,only exceeded by the 
industrial sector at around a 38% share (Figure 5.8) 
(MBIE, 2015).
The combined domestic and international transport 
fuel use in New Zealand in 2014 was 255.6 PJ.  
This had increased 56.5% since 1990 (Figure 5.9). 
During this period the proportion of total fuel demand 
used in international transport remained relatively 
stable. Since 2007 both domestic and international 
transport energy consumption has remained almost 
static due to the improving fuel economy of new and 
imported vehicles and lower per capita annual road 
travel (MBIE, 2015; MoT, 2014a). 
The sharp reduction demand for liquid fuels between 
2008 and 2009 coincided with the global financial 
crisis and the associated slowdown in domestic 
economic activity. Diesel fuel consumption increased 
34% between 2000 and 2013 (MBIE, 2016a) driven by 
both fleet growth of 29% and increased shares  
of diesel vehicles in the light duty vehicle (LDV)  
fleets over the same period of 43% (to 17% of the 
total fleet) and heavy duty vehicles (HDVs) of  
5% (to 98% of the total fleet) (MoT, 2014a).  
Transport fuel use in 2014 was dominated by petrol 
(41% of total transport fuel energy demand at 52,100 
barrels /day), diesel (33% at 54,000 barrels /day), and 
international aviation fuel (15%) (Figure 5.10)  
(MBIE, 2015).
How much biofuel do we consume?
Liquid biofuels accounted for less than 0.1% of  
New Zealand transport fuel consumption in 2014 
with ethanol (produced by fermenting whey locally 
plus volumes imported from sustainably produced 
sugar cane feedstocks) accounting for 78% by volume 
and biodiesel the remainder. A typical fuel blend is 
10% ethanol/90% gasoline which results in a 5–6.5% 
reduction in GHG emissions per litre compared with 
regular gasoline (MBIE, 2015).
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Figure 5.7 Oil product annual flows for transport fuels and other uses in New Zealand. 
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Figure 5.8 New Zealand consumer energy demand by sector, 1990–2014.
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Figure 5.9 Liquid fuels energy consumption shares in the New Zealand transport sector from 1990 to 2014.
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Figure 5.10 Share of liquid fuels transport fuel consumption in New Zealand in 2014. 
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Figure 5.11 Energy GHG emissions by sector in 2013 and shares from various fuels. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 
0  10  20  30  40
Gas 
Liquid fuels 
Coal 
Geothermal 
Biomass
Percentage %
Emissions (Mt CO2-e)
Transport
Manufacturing
Electricity
Fugitive
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing
Transformation 
Commercial
Residential
Source: MBIE (2014b).
94 Transition to a low-carbon economy for New Zealand  |  2016
Figure 5.12 Domestic transport GHG emissions per capita for selected countries and years.
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Greenhouse gas emissions
How much GHG is emitted by the transport sector?
In 2013 the domestic transport sector, including 
aviation and shipping, produced 14.1 Mt CO
2
-eq 
(MBIE, 2014b) representing 17.4% of New Zealand’s 
total gross annual GHG emissions of 80.9 Mt CO
2
-eq 
(MƒE, 2015a) and 44% of energy sector emissions 
(Figure 5.11).
New Zealand has the second highest private car 
ownership rate in the OECD at 604 cars per thousand 
people in 2013. GHG emissions from the New Zealand 
domestic transport sector in 2012 were 3.13 tCO
2
-eq/
capita that was about average for developed countries 
(Figure 5.12). The average age of the light vehicle fleet 
was 13.2 years in 2012, compared with 11.4 years  
for the USA and 10.0 years for Australia. Over the  
past ten years, freight transport in New Zealand has 
moved away from rail and coastal shipping, and is now 
predominantly carried by road truck, which is a more 
energy and emissions intensive mode (MBIE, 2014b).
Road transport emissions (excluding domestic rail, 
aviation and marine) from gasoline, diesel, LPG and 
CNG were 12.7 Mt CO
2
-eq in 2013 and made up  
40.1% of all energy sector emissions. Emissions  
were up 69% over 1990 levels of 7.5 Mt CO
2
-eq  
(Table 5.1) although the trend has been flatter since 
about 2007 due to lower transport demand and 
improving vehicle fuel efficiency83. New Zealand road 
transport emissions in 2013 were dominated by the 
light duty fleet at 64.8%, heavy duty fleet 21.5%,  
light commercial fleet 15.8%, and motorbikes 0.4% 
(MoT, 2014a).
83 http://www.transport.govt.nz/ourwork/tmif/
freighttransportindustry/ft008/
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Table 5.1: Transport emissions (Mt CO2-eq) by mode and shares of total energy-related CO2  
emissions in 2013.
Calendar Year Road Rail Domestic 
Aviation
Marine Total
1990 7.49 0.08 0.95 0.26 8.78
2000 10.54 0.25 1.18 0.38 12.36
2008 12.57 0.16 1.09 0.29 14.11
2009 12.43 0.17 1.04 0.30 13.93
2010 12.68 0.15 1.01 0.26 14.09
2011 12.68 0.15 0.97 0.29 14.09
2012 12.58 0.16 0.83 0.30 13.86
2013 12.69 0.15 0.86 0.38 14.07
Increase 1990/2013 69.4% 87.8% -9.9% 49.6% 60.4%
Annual increase 1990/2013. 2.3% 2.8% -0.5% 1.8% 2.1%
Increase 2012/2013 0.9% -3.9% 3.6% 28.7% 1.6%
% of total 2013 energy CO2-eq emissions 40.1% 0.5% 2.7% 1.2% 44.5%
Source: MBIE (2014b).
The transport of freight by rail per tonne kilometre 
produces only about a third of the GHG emissions 
than if transported by road, and about half of the GHG 
emissions if transported by sea (MoT, 2014c) (Table 
5.2). In 2012, about 16% of New Zealand domestic 
freight (t-kms) was carried by rail, 14% by sea and  
70% by road (MoT, 2014d) (Table 5.2). International 
port facilities that can accommodate larger ships 
would decrease international shipping fuel costs 
and by implication, GHG emissions (MoT, 2014b). 
However, large capital investment to upgrade ports 
is difficult to justify as most (with the exception 
of Tauranga and Lyttelton) already have sufficient 
capacity to meet forecast volumes based on smaller 
ship sizes. 
Table 5.2: GHG emissions from freight transport by mode in 2014.
Rail Coastal shipping Road freight
GHG Emission 
(g-CO
2
-eq/t-km freight)
36 69 106
Annual freight movement 2014 
(million t-km/yr)
4492 3930* 23,301
GHG (Mt/yr) 0.16 0.27 2.47
* Estimate based on MoT 2014d
Source: based on MoT 2014c and 2014d.
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What are the health effects of emissions  
in the transport sector?
Vehicle emissions can produce harmful health 
effects in addition to contributing to global warming. 
Around 6% of annual lung cancer deaths in the U.S. 
and Europe may be due to diesel emission exposure 
(Vermeulen et al. 2014). The most noxious emissions 
are black carbon particulates of less than 2.5 microns 
predominantly from diesel vehicles. Black carbon is 
also a short-lived radiative pollutant that can increase 
the rate of global warming (Sims et al. 2015).  
Thus reducing its emissions can both improve human 
health and offer some mitigation co-benefits. In New 
Zealand, black carbon emissions are estimated to 
annually cause 235 premature deaths from respiratory 
and cardiac illnesses, 133 extra hospital admissions 
and 327,000 restricted activity days. The total social 
costs were estimated to be $940 million per year 
(2010 dollars) (Kuschel et al. 2012). 
By 2030, more efficient direct injection spark ignition 
engines could start replacing conventional port-
injected engines and direct injection compression 
ignition diesel engines. These new engine designs 
emit less CO
2
, but unless the effective emission 
control systems are well-maintained, they can emit 
10 to 40 times more particulates than conventional 
engines (EUFTE, 2013). 
Mitigating actions
What actions can we take to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from the domestic transport sector?
Mitigation actions can be organized under the 
headings ‘Avoid-Shift-Improve’ putting the emphasis 
on avoiding unnecessary travel (for example by 
reducing journey lengths through urban planning), 
then shifting modes (for example from cars to 
public transport), and then improving the emissions 
performance of various modes (German Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). GHG 
emissions in the transport sector can be reduced as 
follows (Sims et al., 2014; IEA-RETD, 2015):
Avoid
• Minimising the use of private vehicles by using
public transport, walking or cycling84.
• Journey avoidance by encouraging greater
access to, and use of, video conferencing
technology, internet shopping, pre-planning
and combining trips.
84 In June 2015, Government announced a $128M investment in 
cycleways plus $105M from local government.
Shift
• Switching to biofuels, LPG or natural gas in
conventional vehicles or adopting advanced
technology low emission vehicles such hybrids,
plug-in hybrids, battery electric vehicles or
renewable-hydrogen electric fuel cell vehicles.
• Switching freight from road to rail or coastal
shipping where practicable.
• Increasing the proportion of renewables in the
electricity system to minimize emissions from
recharging battery electric vehicles or producing
renewable hydrogen.
• Introducing policy initiatives that encourage
uptake of low emission technologies and
encourage installation of supporting infrastructure.
• Promoting ride-sharing to lower the vehicle
kilometres per passenger-kilometre.
• Facilitating behavioural change to adopt low
emission practices through policy initiatives
and education.
Improve
• Adopting more compact urban design that is
pedestrian and cycle friendly.;
• Improving freight logistics by road, rail, sea and air.
• Use of intelligent transport management
techniques and logistics control systems to
maintain traffic flows, reduce local air quality
and global emissions such as the New Zealand
government’s ‘ITS Technology Action Plan’ 85.
• Supporting research on low-emission vehicle
and fuel technologies.
Reducing the use of petroleum fuels in transport 
vehicles has a number of flow-on benefits such as:
• Reduced air and noise pollution and therefore
a healthier population.
• Increased personal activity and health through
physical activity replacing vehicle use via walkways
and cycleways.
• Improved energy security due to a lower
dependence on imported oil.
• Improved road safety due to lower
vehicle numbers.
• Improved employment opportunities in domestic
businesses associated with supplying equipment
for low-emission transport systems.
85 http://www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Our-Work/
Documents/ITS-technology-action-plan-2014.pdf
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This list of mitigation actions and benefits does not 
take into account maximising the economic, social 
and environmental well-being for New Zealanders 
including providing affordable mobility for all.  
Further work is required in this regard. The potential 
co-benefits and adverse side effects of main mitigation 
measures that could be adopted in New Zealand 
require careful evaluation not conducted to date and 
are summarised in Tables 5.3 and 5.4.
Table 5.3: Potential co-benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation measures in the transport sector.
Mitigation 
measures
Effect on additional objectives/concerns
Economic Social (including health) Environmental
Reduction of fuel 
carbon intensity: 
electricity, hydrogen, 
CNG, biofuels, and 
other fuels
Energy security  
(diversification, reduced oil 
dependence and exposure  
to oil price volatility) .
Technological spillovers  
(e. g., battery technologies  
for consumer electronics) 
Health impact via urban air 
pollution by CNG, biofuels: net 
effect unclear
Electricity, hydrogen: reducing 
most pollutants 
Shift to diesel: potentially 
increasing pollution  
Health impact via reduced noise  
(electricity and fuel cell LDVs)
Road safety  
(silent EVs at low speed)
Ecosystem impact 
of electricity and 
hydrogen via:
 – urban air 
pollution 
 – material use 
(unsustainable 
resource mining) 
Ecosystem impact 
of biofuels 
Reduction of energy 
intensity
i.e. GJ/GDP
Energy security  
(reduced oil dependence and 
exposure to oil price volatility)
Health impact via reduced urban 
air pollution 
Road safety (crash-worthiness 
depending on the design of  
the standards) 
Ecosystem and 
biodiversity impact 
via reduced urban 
air pollution 
Compact urban 
form and improved 
transport 
infrastructure
Modal shift
Energy security  
(reduced oil dependence and 
exposure to oil price volatility) 
Productivity  
(reduced urban congestion and 
travel times, affordable and 
accessible transport) 
Employment opportunities  
in the public transport sector  
vs. car manufacturing jobs 
Health impact for non-motorized 
modes via Increased physical 
activity 
Potentially higher exposure to air 
pollution 
Noise (modal shift and travel 
reduction) 
Equitable mobility access to 
employment opportunities, 
particularly in developing 
countries 
Road safety (via modal shift and/or 
infrastructure for pedestrians  
and cyclists) 
Ecosystem  
impact via
 – urban air 
pollution 
 – land-use 
competition
Journey distance 
reduction and 
avoidance
Energy security  
(reduced oil dependence and 
exposure to oil price volatility)
Productivity  
(reduced urban congestion,  
travel times, walking) 
Health impact (for non-motorized 
transport modes) 
Ecosystem  
impact via
 – urban air 
pollution 
 – new/shorter 
shipping routes 
 – Land-use 
competition 
from transport 
infrastructure 
Source: Sims et al., 2014.
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Table 5.4: Transport technologies and practices with potential for GHG reduction and the related barriers and 
opportunities
Transport 
technology or 
practice
Short-term 
possibilities
Long-term 
possibilities
Barriers Opportunities
BEVs and PHEVs 
based on renewable 
electricity.
Over the life cycle, 
BEVs have 60% lower 
GHG emissions than 
gasoline vehicles.
Rapid increase in use 
likely over next decade 
from a small base, so 
only a small impact 
likely in short-term.
Significant 
replacement of CE-
powered LDVs.
EV and battery costs 
reducing but still high.
Lack of infrastructure, 
and recharging 
standards not uniform.
Vehicle range anxiety.
Lack of capital and 
electricity in some 
least developed 
countries.
Universal standards 
adopted for 
EV rechargers. 
Demonstration in 
green city areas with 
plug-in infrastructure.
Decarbonized 
electricity. Smart grids 
based on renewables.
EV subsidies.
New business models, 
such as community car 
sharing.
CNG, LNG, CBG 
and LBG displacing 
gasoline in LDVs and 
diesel in HDVs.
Infrastructure available 
in some cities so can 
allow a quick ramp–up 
of gas vehicles in  
these cities.
Significant 
replacement of HDV 
diesel use depends 
on ease of engine 
conversion, fuel 
prices and extent of 
infrastructure.
Insufficient 
government 
programmes, 
conversion subsidies 
and local gas 
infrastructure and 
markets. Leakage  
of gas.
Demonstration 
gas conversion 
programmes that 
show cost and health 
co-benefits. Fixing gas 
leakage in general.
Biofuels displacing 
gasoline, diesel and 
aviation fuel.
Niche markets 
continue for first 
generation biofuels 
(3% of liquid fuel 
market, small biogas 
niche markets).
Advanced and drop-
in biofuels likely to 
be adopted around 
2020–2030, mainly  
for aviation.
Some biofuels can be 
relatively expensive, 
environmentally poor 
and cause inequalities 
by inducing increases 
in food prices.
Drop-in fuels attractive 
for all vehicles.
Biofuels and bio-
electricity can be 
produced together,
e.g., sugarcane 
ethanol and CHP  
from bagasse.
New biofuel options 
need to be further 
tested, particularly for 
aviation applications.
Improved internal 
combustion engine 
(ICE) technologies and 
on-board information 
and communication 
technologies (ICT) 
in fuel – efficient 
vehicles.
Continuing 
fuel efficiency 
improvements across 
new vehicles of all 
types can show large, 
low-cost, near-term 
reductions in  
fuel demand.
Likely to be a 
significant source of 
reduction. Behavioural 
issues (e.g., rebound 
effect). Consumer 
choices can  
reduce vehicle 
efficiency gains.
Insufficient regulatory 
support for vehicle 
emissions standards.
On-road performance 
deteriorates compared 
with laboratory tests.
Creative regulations 
that enable quick 
changes to occur 
without excessive 
costs on emissions 
standards. China and 
most OECD countries 
have implemented 
standards.
Reduced registration 
tax can be 
implemented for  
low-carbon vehicles.
Source: Sims et al., 2014.
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Transport 
technology or 
practice
Short-term 
possibilities
Long-term 
possibilities
Barriers Opportunities
Modal shift by public 
transport displacing 
private motor vehicle 
use.
Rapid short-term 
growth already 
happening.
Significant 
displacement only 
where quality system 
infrastructure and 
services are provided.
Availability of rail, bus, 
ferry, and other quality 
transit options.
Density of people to 
allow more access 
to services. Levels of 
services.
Time barriers on roads 
without right of way 
Public perceptions.
Investment in quality 
transit infrastructure, 
density of adjacent 
land use, and high 
level of services using 
innovative financing 
that builds in these 
features. Multiple 
co-benefits especially 
where walkability 
health benefits are  
a focus.
Modal shift by cycling 
displacing private 
motor vehicle use.
Rapid short-term 
growth already 
happening in  
many cities.
Significant 
displacement only 
where quality system 
infrastructure is 
provided.
Cultural barriers and 
lack of safe cycling 
infrastructure and 
regulations.  
Harsh climate.
Demonstrations 
of quality cycling 
infrastructure 
including cultural 
programmes and bike-
sharing schemes.
Modal shift by walking 
displacing private 
motor vehicle use.
Some growth but 
depends on urban 
planning and design 
policies being 
implemented.
Significant 
displacement where 
large-scale adoption 
of polycentric city 
policies and walkable 
urban designs are 
implemented.
Planning and design 
policies can work 
against walkability of 
a city by too easily 
allowing cars into 
walking city areas. 
Lack of density and 
integration with 
transit.
Culture of 
“walkability”.
Large-scale adoption 
of polycentric city 
policies and walkable 
urban designs creating 
walking city in historic 
centres and new ones. 
Cultural programmes.
Urban planning by 
reducing the distances 
to travel within urban 
areas.
Immediate impacts 
where dense transit-
oriented development 
(TOD) centres are 
built.
Significant reductions 
where widespread 
polycentric city 
policies are 
implemented.
Urban development 
does not always favour 
dense TOD centres 
being built. TODs need 
quality transit at their 
base. Integration of 
professional areas 
required.
Widespread 
polycentric city 
policies implemented 
with green TODs, 
backed by quality 
transit. Multiple 
co-benefits in sprawl 
costs avoided and 
health gains.
Urban planning by 
reducing private 
motor vehicle use 
through parking and 
traffic restraint.
Immediate impacts 
on traffic density 
observed.
Significant reductions 
only where quality 
transport alternatives 
are available.
Political barriers 
due to perceived 
public opposition 
to increased costs, 
traffic and parking 
restrictions. Parking 
codes too prescriptive 
for areas suited to 
walking and transit.
Demonstrations of 
better transport 
outcomes from 
combinations of traffic 
restraint, parking 
and new transit/
walking infrastructure 
investment.
Modal shift by 
displacing aircraft 
and LDV trips through 
high-speed rail 
alternatives.
Immediate impacts 
after building rail 
infrastructure.
Continued growth but 
only short-medium 
distance trips suitable.
High-speed rail 
infrastructure 
expensive.
Demonstrations 
of how to build 
quality fast-rail using 
innovative finance.
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Transport 
technology or 
practice
Short-term 
possibilities
Long-term 
possibilities
Barriers Opportunities
Modal shift of freight 
by displacing HDV 
demand with rail 
and preservation of 
existing rail electric rail 
freight services.
Suitable immediately 
for medium – and 
long-distance freight 
and port traffic.
Substantial 
displacement only if 
large rail infrastructure 
improvements made, 
the external costs 
of freight transport 
are fully internalised, 
and the quality of rail 
services are enhanced. 
EU target to have 30 
% of freight tonne-km 
moving more than 300 
km to go by rail (or 
water) by 2030.
Inadequacies in rail 
infrastructure and 
service quality. Much 
freight moved over 
distances that are too 
short for rail to be 
competitive.
Upgrading of inter-
modal facilities. 
Electrification  
of rail freight services. 
Worsening traffic 
congestion on road 
networks and higher 
fuel cost will  
favour rail.
Modal shift by 
displacing truck and 
car use through 
waterborne transport.
Niche options 
already available. 
EU ‘Motorways of 
the Sea’ programme 
demonstrates 
potential to expand 
short-sea shipping 
share of freight 
market.
Potential to develop 
beyond current niches, 
though will require 
significant investment 
in new vessels and 
port facilities.
Lack of vision for water 
transport options 
and land – locked 
population centres. 
Long transit times. 
Tightening controls 
on dirty bunker fuel 
and SOx and NOx 
emissions raising cost 
and reducing modal 
competitiveness.
Demonstrations of 
quality waterborne 
transport that can be 
faster and with
lower carbon 
emissions than 
alternatives.
System optimisation 
by improved road 
systems, freight 
logistics and efficiency 
at airports and ports.
Continuing 
improvements 
showing immediate 
impacts.
Insufficient in long 
term to significantly 
reduce carbon 
emissions without 
changing mode, 
reducing mobility, or 
reducing fuel carbon 
intensity.
Insufficient regulatory 
support and key 
performance 
indicators (KPIs) 
covering logistics and 
efficiency.
Creative regulations 
and KPIs that enable 
change to occur 
rapidly without 
excessive costs.
Mobility service 
substitution by 
reducing the 
need to travel 
through enhanced 
communications.
Niche markets growing 
and ICT improving in 
quality and reliability.
Significant reductions 
possible after faster 
broadband and quality 
images available, 
though ICT may 
increase the need for 
some trips.
Technological barriers 
due to insufficient 
broadband in some 
regions.
Demonstrations  
of improved video-
conferencing system 
quality.
Behavioural change 
from reducing private 
motor vehicle use 
through pricing 
policies, e.g, network 
charges and parking 
fees.
Immediate impacts 
on traffic density 
observed.
Significant reductions 
only where quality 
transport alternatives 
are available.
Political barriers 
due to perceived 
public opposition 
to increased 
pricing costs. Lack 
of administrative 
integration between 
transport, land-use 
and environment 
departments in city 
municipalities.
Demonstrations  
of better transport 
outcomes from 
combinations of 
pricing, traffic 
restraint, parking and 
new infrastructure 
investment from the 
revenue. Removing 
subsidies to fossil fuels 
important for many 
co-benefits.
Behavioural 
change resulting 
from education to 
encourage gaining 
benefits of less motor 
vehicle use.
Immediate impacts of 
10–15% reduction of 
LDV use are possible.
Significant reductions 
only where quality 
transport alternatives 
are available.
Lack of belief by 
politicians and 
professionals in the 
value of educational 
behaviour change 
programmes.
Demonstrations 
of ‘travel smart’ 
programmes linked 
to improvements in 
sustainable transport 
infrastructure.
Cost effective and 
multiple co-benefits.
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Mitigation costs ($/t-CO
2
-eq) are uncertain and range 
from negative values for efficiency improvements in 
conventional road vehicles, aircraft and ships to more 
than USD100/tCO
2
-eq for some new EVs and aircraft. 
Technology improvements have significant potential to 
reduce emissions 20–50 % relative to 2010 depending 
on mode and vehicle type (Figure 5.13) although 
reductions for aircraft are expected to be slower to 
deploy due to longer life and limited options for fuel 
switching, apart from biofuels (Sims et al., 2014).
Figure 5.13 Indicative fuel consumption reduction potential ranges for a number of LDV technology  
drive-train and fuel options in 2010 and 2030, compared with a base-line gasoline internal combustion  
engine (ICE) vehicle consuming 8 l/100km in 2010. 
Gasoline ICE
Diesel ICE
Gasoline hybrid
Gasoline PHEV
BEV
FCEV
2010
0%
Gasoline ICE
Diesel ICE
Gasoline hybrid
Gasoline PHEV
BEV
FCEV
0  20 40 60 80 100
0  20 40 60 80 100
2030
% Reduction in energy  
use per vehicle km
% Reduction in energy  
use per vehicle km
Note: ICE – Internal Combustion Engine; PHEV – Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle;  
BEV – Battery Electric Vehicle; FCEV – Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle (H
2
).
Source: Sims et al., 2014.
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Biofuel potential for the future
What is the potential for using biofuels in the vehicle 
fleet of the future?
Traditional biofuels technologies use either 
fermentation of sugars and starch to produce ethanol 
or the esterification of natural vegetable oils or animal 
fats to produce biodiesel. Bioethanol is produced in 
New Zealand from whey and yeast slurry that are by-
products of cheese and beer production respectively. 
However, volumes are limited. Biodiesel production 
is currently produced mostly from recycled cooking 
oils, however, late in 2016 a new plant with a capacity 
of 20 million litres per year, or about 2% of total 
transport diesel demand, will be producing bio-
diesel from tallow, a by-product of the meat industry 
(Z-Energy, 2015). It has been estimated that, based 
on current sheep and beef numbers, New Zealand 
produces sufficient low-grade inedible tallow to meet 
about 5% of the country’s diesel fuel demand  
(MoT, 2013).
New advanced biofuel technologies are now 
becoming commercialised to convert ligno-cellulosic 
feedstocks (such as wood or agricultural wastes) 
into liquid fuels. Zhao et al., (2014) found that, from 
a financial analysis, the cheapest of eight methods 
for such advanced ethanol production in the United 
States, could be technically feasible for a breakeven 
fuel price of around US$0.82/litre of gasoline 
equivalent, using fast pyrolysis and hydro-processing 
of residual corn stover as feedstock. The breakeven 
price in New Zealand would be heavily dependent 
on the delivered feedstock price. Hall (2013) showed 
that around 1.8 million hectares of new plantation 
forest stands could supply more than 80% of New 
Zealand’s liquid fuel demand. The resulting annual 
production of 7 billion litres of drop-in biofuels would 
result in an annual GHG reduction of 15.5 Mt CO
2
-eq. 
Assuming an exchange rate of US$ 0.65 / NZ$ 1.00, an 
average feedstock price of NZ$85 /m3, and the same 
government revenue policy on all fuels, the price of 
oil would need to reach over US$200/bbl (or around 
US$100/bbl if a carbon tax of around NZ$130/t CO
2
-eq 
was in place ) to make biofuels competitive for the 
majority of the vehicle fleet (Hall, 2013). Utilisation of 
organic solids or sewage waste for the production of 
liquid biofuels or biogas has a significant benefit  
in that collection is already a sunk cost and  
municipal authorities are focused on reducing  
disposal to landfill.
The energy consumption of petroleum fuels 
consumed for shipping and aviation in New Zealand 
is small compared to diesel used for land transport 
(Figure 5.14). However, potential exists for the 
reduction and displacement of fossil fuels in shipping 
(Zahedia et al., 2014) and in aviation (NASA, 2016; 
Dumas et al., 2014) (Box 5.2). 
Figure 5.14 Annual energy consumption of diesel for land transport compared with domestic  
and international aviation and shipping fuels. 
Diesel (Domestic land)
Fuel oil (Domestic shipping)
Kerosene (Domestic aviation)
Diesel (International shipping)
Fuel oil (International shipping)
Kerosene (International aviation)
Energy (PI) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source: MBIE (2016c).
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Progress is being made in the production of biofuels 
for aviation and shipping however the economic 
viability is still uncertain. Overseas Companies such as 
Dynamic Fuels, Diamond Green Diesel and Neste Oil 
have commercial facilities producing biofuel by hydro-
isomerization of lipids while KiOR Technology is using 
commercial scale pyrolysis (Milbrandt et al., 2013).  
A study of production of jet fuel production by 
advanced fermentation (AF) from perennial grasses 
showed that, in 2030, a carbon tax of US$ 42 /t-CO
2
-
eq to US$ 652 /t-CO
2
-eq will be required to make 
the biofuel competitive with conventional fuels 
(Winchester et al., 2015). 
Air New Zealand flew one of the aviation industry’s 
first biofuel test flights back in 2008, using a jatropha-
derived second generation biofuel, which proved  
the technical feasibility of using alternative fuels  
(Rye et al, 2010). The test flight also provided 
supporting data to the subsequent ASTM certification 
of plant based biofuels for commercial airline 
operations. The development of standards in aviation 
both for the quality of biofuel mixtures (ASTM D7566) 
and for emissions (ICAO, 2016) will assist in lowering 
the barriers for biofuel uptake.
Box 5.2: How can we reduce 
emissions from international  
aviation and shipping?
In 2013 international aviation and shipping 
in New Zealand emitted 2.5 Mt-CO2-eq and 
0.97 Mt-CO2-eq respectively representing 
17.9% and 6.9% of annual domestic transport 
emissions (MBIE, 2014b). INDC’s do not 
have to include emissions from international 
aviation and shipping (UNFCCC, 2015a). 
However, given that New Zealand is the 
responsible party for these emissions, and 
the likelihood that they could be included 
in a future revision of NDC inventory 
requirements, it is important that efforts  
are made to minimise international  
transport emissions.
Fields of action include:
• Avoiding unnecessary international air 
travel by greater use of advanced on-line 
video-conferencing technologies.
• Using biofuels and/or renewable  
hydrogen to displace fossil fuels  
for ships and aircraft.
• Optimising the size of ships and aircraft so 
that near 100% capacity of passengers and 
freight can be maintained and our ports 
and airports can accommodate them.
• Maximising fuel saving technologies and 
performance efficiency in the design of 
ships and aircraft such as using lightweight 
materials, installing solar and wind power 
systems on ships, utilising airships  
for freight86.
• Considering, under a worst case scenario, 
shorter trade routes by favouring nearest 
neighbours to become our principal trading 
partners to minimise the travel distance for 
exports, imports and tourists (Section 4.6).
86 See for example http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/home-news/92m-long-aircraft-to-fly-in-uk-skies-for-
the-first-time-a6862546.html
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Transport fleet of the future
What will the future of the road transport fleet  
look like?
• The penetration of new vehicle technologies  
into the conventional fleet depends on:
• Technology cost.
• Consumer choice behaviour.
• Policy environment.
• Infrastructure availability.
• Lifecycle emissions.
• Environmental, health and other externality costs.
There are major uncertainties when projecting 
the rate of future uptake of rapidly developing 
technologies and concepts (Wadud et al., 2016). 
These will have a significant impact on the future 
of mobility in New Zealand and include driverless 
vehicles, vehicle asset sharing, inductive electric 
charging, electric grid-vehicle interactions, aviation 
biofuels, renewable hydrogen production, and 
enhanced, smart, digital transport and logistics 
control systems. Significant policy inertia may be 
required to be overcome to move the vehicle fleet 
to low emission mode. However, the fuel efficiency 
of conventional vehicles is improving and their retail 
price is coming down. Zhao et al., (2015) found that 
EVs would not be economically competitive with 
internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) in the 
Chinese market until at least 2031. So one view is that 
new technologies such as EVs may not easily compete, 
whereas other views predict a very different future87. 
“We now face an uncertain future. We cannot be 
certain demand will return to pre-2005 levels of 
growth nor can we be certain it will remain flat. 
This means we can no longer rely on traditional 
forecasting”. 
This statement is from the ‘Future Demand’ project 
of the Ministry of Transport88 that explored the 
uncertainty of future personnel travel with the 
past growth of 3% per year flattening in 2005 and 
remaining at around 40 billion kms/yr since then.  
This equates to 77% of road journeys, the rest being 
for road freight. Attempts to model the future  
New Zealand fleet profiles have been undertaken  
by the industry advocacy organisation  
Business Energy Council (BEC, 2015) and by Unitec 
(Leaver et al., 2009). BEC modelled the entire 
economy using highly simplified, consumer preference 
decision making for retail vehicle purchase along with 
87  http://www.carbontracker.org/report/lost_in_transition/
88  http://www.transport.govt.nz/ourwork/keystrategiesandplans/
strategic-policy-programme/future-demand/ 
value limits to prevent occasional unrealistic fleet 
profiles being generated (BEC 2015; Loulou 2004). 
The Unitec model (Leaver et al., 2009; Shafiei et al., 
2014) used more realistic non-linear consumer choice 
behaviour (Train, 2008) without the need to use 
bounded logic. 
The BEC modelled two scenarios called ‘Waka’ and 
‘Kayak’ under the assumptions shown in Table 5.5. 
The Waka scenario has higher numbers of alternative 
vehicles by 2050 than the Kayak scenario principally  
as a result of the higher carbon tax assumed and 
a 20% subsidy on biofuels (Table 5.5: Scenario 
assumptions for assessing the number of electric  
and hydrogen light duty road vehicles (<3.5 t) in  
New Zealand in 2030 and 2050 from BEC 2050 and 
Unitec models.). The BEC Waka scenario assumptions 
were replicated in the Unitec Waka-S scenario.
Table 5.5: Scenario assumptions for assessing the 
number of electric and hydrogen light duty road 
vehicles (<3.5 t) in New Zealand in 2030 and 2050 
from BEC 2050 and Unitec models.
 2030 2050
Scenario
BEC 
Kayak
BEC 
Waka
Unitec 
Waka-S
BEC 
Kayak
BEC 
Waka
Unitec 
Waka-S
Oil Price  
(USD/bbl) NS* NS 120 NS NS 150
Carbon Price 
(USD/tCO
2
) 60 115 115 60 115 115
Consumer 
decision  
based on NPV NPV Choice NPV NPV Choice
**Annual 
alternative 
light duty 
vehicle  
growth rates
40% 57% 43% - - -
*NS=Not specified. **Assumes Dec 2014 base of 500 
alterative vehicles.
Note: The battery price in all scenarios was  
USD 104 /kWh in 2050 based on the US Department 
of Energy (DOE) projection of USD 125/kWh in  
2022 (Faguy, 2015). The fuel cell price projection of  
USD 35/kW in 2050 was based on DOE projections  
of USD 40/kW in 2020 and USD 30/kW in 2050
Source: Satyapai, 2015.
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The projected rate of adoption of new vehicle 
technologies to 2030 could be constrained to lower 
annual growth than the 40% to 57% growth predicted 
by the scenarios, given that a range of 32% to  
37% /year was the early period growth rates for 
Toyota Prius (Toyota Motor Corporation, 2015), 
Nissan Leaf battery electric vehicles (Nissan Motor 
Corporation 2013), and Ford cars from 1903 to  
early 1920s (excluding 1914-1918) (Kruger and  
Leaver, 2010). 
The Waka-s scenario showed that in 2050, the light 
duty vehicle (LDV) fleet share will be 58% for carbon 
free (hydrogen internal combustion engine vehicle, 
hydrogen fuel cell vehicle, battery electric vehicle) 
plus near-carbon free (internal combustion engine 
vehicle with 85% ethanol and 15% petrol, plug-in 
hybrid electric vehicle) vehicles (Figure 5.15). By 
comparison, Unitec scenarios gave a 46% share with 
the difference due primarily to exclusion of biofuels by 
the BEC 2050 model on the assumption they would be 
uneconomic, and also the different consumer-choice 
algorithms used.
In the heavy duty vehicle (HDV) fleet over 3.5 tonnes, 
the Unitec model (Figure 5.15 (d)) predicted 20% of 
the fleet would be powered by carbon free hydrogen 
in 2050 with no uptake of electric trucks due to the 
high cost and heavy weight of batteries reducing a 
portion of the payload.
The average vehicle numbers in 2050 across  
the Unitec and BEC scenarios was projected to be  
4.5 million LDVs and 160,000 HDVs. These numbers 
could possibly be lowered given some form of 
government intervention such as subsidies for  
early adoption of new technologies and support  
for new infrastructure. 
More optimistic scenarios for EVs also exist including 
Mighty River Power projecting 0.5 million will be 
running in NZ by 2025 (Munro, 2014) and Bloomberg 
Business stating the costs of EVs by 2022 will equate 
to their ICE counterparts and will account for 35%  
of all new small vehicle sales globally by 2040 
(Randall, 2016).
What is the likely reduction in GHG emissions  
by 2050?
By 2050, New Zealand’s GHG emissions from the  
road transport sector have the potential to decline  
to around 60% of the 12.69 Mt CO
2
 emissions in 2013 
(MBIE, 2014b) based on Unitec modelling and the 
Waka scenario of BEC 2050 (Figure 5.17). 
How much extra electricity do we have to produce if 
30% of the light duty vehicle fleet was powered either 
by battery electric vehicles (BEV) or hydrogen fuel cell 
vehicles (HFCV)?
A typical BEV such as the Nissan Leaf has a rated fuel 
consumption of 0.188 kWh/km. A HFCV such as the 
Toyota Mirai has a fuel consumption of 106 km/kg-H2 
(U.S. EPA, 2015). Assuming 10% energy losses from 
the electricity source to either charge the battery 
or fill the hydrogen tank through high temperature 
electrolysis, New Zealand’s present annual electricity 
generation output would need to increase by 5.4% 
for EVs and 15% for HFCVs to fuel 30% of the 2013 
vehicle fleet. More electricity is required for HFCVs 
due to the electricity consumed during the extraction 
of hydrogen from water by electrolysis. Should most 
BEVs be recharged off-peak, or hydrogen produced 
from electrolysis off-peak then stored, the need for 
additional generation capacity could be avoided 
except during exceptionally dry years when longer 
term generation shortages could occur. In the future, 
hydrogen could be produced using solar PV systems 
either integrated into vehicles or installed at parking 
spaces including at households.
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Figure 5.15 New Zealand light duty and heavy duty road vehicle fleet profiles for 2030 and 2050 from BEC 2050 
and Unitec scenarios.
HFCV/H2ICEV
BEV
PHEV
HEV
B20/E85
ICEV
Percentage % 0 20 40 60 80 100
BEC Kayak
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Unitec 
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(A) Light Fleet 2030
Note: ICEV – internal combustion engine vehicle (petrol or diesel); HEV – hybrid electric vehicle;  
HFCV – hydrogen fuel cell vehicle; H
2
ICEV – hydrogen ICEV; BEV – battery electric vehicle; PHEV – plug-in HEV; 
B20 – ICEV with 20% biodiesel and 80% diesel; E85 – ICEV with 85% ethanol and 15% petrol.
Sources: BEC 2050; Leaver et al. 2009; Shafiei et al. 2014.
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National and regional mitigating actions and policies
What actions are being planned now?
The New Zealand government’s overall objective 
for transport is ‘an effective, efficient, safe, secure, 
accessible and resilient transport system that supports 
the growth of our country’s economy, in order to 
deliver greater prosperity, security and opportunities 
for all New Zealanders’ (MoT, 2011). One of the 
intended key government actions for road transport 
is continued reduction in emissions of CO
2
 from land 
transport over time. The government sees the sector 
as having an important role to play in New Zealand 
achieving its emission reduction target and wants  
an energy-efficient transport system by intending to:
• Focus on improving vehicle fuel efficiency.
• Improve modal choice in our main urban areas,  
so people can make greater use of public 
transport, walking and cycling, thereby  
reducing their emissions.
• Encourage the uptake of more efficient vehicles 
and low-carbon fuels and technologies, and other 
efficiency measures in the freight sector.
• Trial and introduce intelligent transport systems.
• Improve the efficiency and reliability of key  
freight corridors and metro passenger networks.
• Seek better integration of regional freight 
movement across road, rail, sea, and air.
Current policy actions include:
• Public funding of public transport.
• Greater provision of cycle ways.
• Proposed changes to allow larger, more efficient 
trucks on certain roads (MoT 2015);
• continued funding for advanced biofuel research 
(MƒE, 2015d).
• Fuel efficiency labelling requirements under the 
Energy Efficiency (Vehicle Fuel Economy Labelling) 
Regulations 2007.
• Exemption of EVs from road user charges until 
2020 (MoT, 2016).
Local governments can also play a role (Box 5.3).
Neither New Zealand nor Australia have fuel efficiency 
standards which are common in other countries. 
Fuel efficiency standards, whether regulations or 
equivalent fiscal policies, cover over 80% of passenger 
cars sold globally (Miller et al., 2014). A fee-bate 
system could provide the benefits of fuel efficiency 
standards suited to New Zealand’s circumstances. 
When a vehicle is imported into New Zealand it would 
be assessed for its emissions efficiency. Very efficient 
vehicles would get a tax credit and inefficient vehicles 
that produce more GHGs would have to pay a charge 
(Barton and Schütte, 2015).
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Box 5.3: How local governments can influence low-carbon transport options
The Auckland Plan (Auckland Council, 2015) aims 
for 45% of trips in the morning travel peak to be 
made by walking, cycling or public transport in 
2040 compared to 23% at present. Currently,  
85% of all trips in Auckland are by private car, 
with an additional 1.8% or 15,000 extra cars 
being added to Auckland’s roads every year. 
Inter-regional freight in the upper North Island 
is forecast to grow by 100% over the next 25 
years, with roads expected to account for 86% 
of transport movements. Transport currently 
accounts for 39.7% of Auckland’s GHG emissions. 
Reducing these emissions could be achieved by 
improved street design; integrated planning; 
cycleways and footpaths to complement the public 
transport network; improving the convenience 
of public transport; and introducing the single-
system approach to multi-mode journeys. Several 
specific actions have already been endorsed by the 
Auckland Council to achieve these ambitions:
• Implement a single-system approach in 
the planning, design, management and 
development of the transport system 
(including for motorways, state highways, 
arterial and local roads, freight, rail, bus and 
ferry services, walking and cycling, ports and 
airports).
• Implement travel demand management 
techniques, such as travel plans for schools, 
organisations and businesses, to manage the 
growth in demand for private vehicle travel 
and improve the way existing infrastructure 
networks operate, before providing additional 
capacity to the transport system.
• Achieve the appropriate balance between 
movement and place, considering capacity and 
environmental character.
• Ensure that long-term land use, accessibility, 
and activities drive long-term transport 
functionality and that transport investment 
aligns with growth as envisaged.
• Optimise existing and proposed transport 
investment.
• Reassess roading infrastructure based on 
movement and place, building on existing 
corridor management and network  
operating plans.
• Recognise existing community investment and 
the need to enable connectivity between and 
within communities.
• Embed sustainability in procurement and 
project design and management
• Align urban and rural community expectations 
with appropriate levels of service, and 
investigate the use of mobility on demand 
services, such as car-pooling, car ownership 
sharing, and UBER taxis.
• Ensure that transport is low emission and 
maximises use of renewable biofuels.
• Improve the capability of the transport system 
to withstand adverse events. 
• Develop walking, cycling, and public transport 
accessibility levels across the region including 
in greenfield and brownfield areas. 
• Achieve a balance between movement and 
place functions with pedestrians and cyclists 
given priority.
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Knowledge gaps
What other information do we need to move  
to a low emission transport sector?
A priority for research on low-carbon transport 
options in New Zealand includes the following  
areas (Sims et al., 2014):
• Evaluation of the costs of mitigation from the 
transport freight sector and to a lesser extent 
passenger modes. 
• Assessment of long-term costs and high energy 
density potential for on-board vehicle energy 
storage from batteries or hydrogen that influences 
vehicle range.
• Management of trade-offs for electric vehicles 
between performance, driving range and 
recharging time.
• Identification of exemplars of successful business 
models in the transport sector overseas.
• Behavioural analysis of the implications of norms, 
biases, and social learning in journey decision 
making, and of the relationship between transport 
and lifestyle. 
• Evaluation of costs and impact of infrastructure 
development for battery and hydrogen vehicles.
• Assessment of regulatory changes needed to 
encourage the introduction of driverless vehicles 
and community ownership that together have the 
potential to reduce traffic congestion.
An attempt was made to provide an overview of 
estimated mitigation potentials, costs, and possible 
priority sequencing of mitigation actions across all 
sectors (Annex 1).
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5.3 Buildings 
Key messages
• The buildings sector is responsible for around 
20% of New Zealand’s energy-related GHG 
emissions, mostly arising from the fossil fuels 
consumed to meet the demand for heating, 
cooling and electricity. The majority of 
buildings that will be in existence in 2050 have 
already been built so we need to concentrate 
on improving the performance of current 
building stock. 
• The energy efficiency performance of existing 
buildings can be largely determined by the 
original design but tools to help improve 
performance are currently unavailable for  
most building types. 
• Renewable heat options for buildings have 
high mitigation potential including wood pellet 
burners, ground source heat pumps, and 
passive solar systems.
• It is sensible to minimise the potential energy 
demand of new buildings at the design 
stage (such as orientation and solar system 
integration) otherwise they will have high 
energy demands for many years. 
• The New Zealand Building Code clause on 
energy efficiency provides a minimum bottom 
line, and instruments such as Greenstar and 
NABERSNZ can help encourage new building 
developers and owners to aim higher. 
• Government procurement policies are often a 
barrier to greater uptake of renewable energy 
technologies as they often do not consider 
choice based on a life cycle analysis.
• Appliances have shorter lives than buildings 
but can still be consuming energy 15 to 20 
years after purchase. The application of 
minimum energy performance standards 
(MEPS) can help by removing the least efficient 
appliance designs from the market. ‘Doing 
better’ labels, such as EnergyStar, can help 
encourage manufacturers to supply more 
efficient appliances. 
• Education and training for people designing, 
constructing, installing and using buildings and 
appliances is key to reducing GHG emissions 
over time.
• There is limited up-to-date knowledge on how 
energy is used in residential or commercial 
buildings in New Zealand so if this sector is to 
play a greater mitigation role, this knowledge 
gap needs to be addressed. 
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Sources of GHG emissions 
Where do GHG emissions from buildings come from?
The role of commercial and residential buildings 
in GHG emissions is mainly as a consumer of fossil 
fuels, leading to both direct emissions (e.g. burning 
of natural gas) and indirect emissions (e.g. GHG 
emissions from natural gas electricity generation).  
In some buildings, on-site use of renewable 
energy (e.g. solar water heating, solar PV, pellet 
stoves) is changing this situation, but the change 
is not occurring uniformly or quickly. Some on-site 
generation may have limited outputs, such as micro-
wind technologies, whereas the use of solar PV on 
building roofs for day-time recharging of electric 
vehicles (EV) could provide significant opportunities. 
Reducing energy use by improving thermal 
performance through greater levels of insulation, 
or improving energy efficiency of appliances and 
systems, is continuing, largely through  
EECA programmes.
Global GHG emission trends for the sector
In 2010 buildings accounted for 32% of total global 
final energy use, 19% of energy-related GHG 
emissions (including electricity-related), approximately 
one-third of black carbon emissions mainly from 
cook stoves, and various shares of F-gases (HFCs, 
PFCs, SF6). Global growth in future construction 
requirements is expected to provide increased shelter 
and energy access for billions of people in developing 
countries without adequate housing, electricity, and 
improved cooking facilities (Lucon et al. 2014).
What is influencing GHG emissions from buildings?
Globally, GHG emissions from the building sector have 
more than doubled since 1970 to reach over 9 GtCO
2
-
eq (Figure 5.16). This represented around one quarter 
of total GHG emissions excluding agriculture, forests, 
and land use. The high share of indirect emissions in 
the sector means that the overall emissions depend 
on emission factors from electricity generation and 
heat plants.
Without strong actions, global building sector 
emissions are likely to grow considerably and may 
even double by mid-century due to the construction 
of many new buildings, space conditioning (heating, 
cooling and fans), increased use of appliances, 
changing behaviours and lifestyles (Lucon et al. 2014).
Figure 5.16 Direct and indirect emissions (from electricity and heat production) in the global  
building sub-sectors.
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GHG emissions profile and baseline trends  
in New Zealand
What are New Zealand’s GHG emissions  
from buildings?
Unlike many other developed countries, New 
Zealand’s comparatively high levels of GHGs from 
agriculture have resulted in low importance being 
given to GHG emissions from buildings. They are not 
explicitly reported (MƒE 2015a), so it is necessary 
to use energy use as a surrogate. Although national 
electricity end-use data is published annually for  
the residential and commercial sector (MBIE 2016a), 
not all energy used in the commercial sector is used 
in ways directly related to a building (e.g. for water 
pumping). So overall there is a limited understanding 
of mitigation opportunities in this sector. For the 
purpose of this analysis, it was assumed that all the 
energy demand by the commercial sector relates 
specifically to buildings.
Total energy demand in New Zealand’s commercial 
sector is around 9% of total energy end-use, 
increasing by 50% from 34.5 PJ in 1990 to 51.8 PJ  
in 2014. Residential energy use has increased  
14% (from 55.2 PJ to 62.7 PJ) over the same period. 
The residential share of total energy end-use reduced 
from 14% in 1990 to 11% in 2014 (MBIE, 2016a) 
due to greater growth of energy demand by other 
sectors. The residential sector has shown a relatively 
slow compound annual growth in energy demand 
of 0.5% per year from 1990, due probably to the 
various energy efficiency improvements coupled 
with significant increases in the price of electricity 
(Bertram, 2015). Growth of the commercial building 
sector is higher at 1.7% /yr but still below transport 
(1.9%/yr) and agriculture, forestry and fishing (2.2%/yr).
The total use of electricity use in buildings continues 
to grow from 36.7PJ in 1990 to 44.9 PJ in 2014 with  
an annual compound growth of 0.8%. In the 
commercial building sector alone, electricity use  
was 19.4 PJ in 1990 increasing to 33.5 PJ in 2014 –  
a compound growth of 2.3%/yr. The use of coal for 
direct heating has decreased while the use of natural 
gas has increased in both the residential  
and commercial sectors. 
Although the total energy demand of the residential 
sector has grown as more dwellings have been 
constructed, the average energy use per dwelling has 
been falling since 2000 with the energy efficiency of 
the average dwelling expected to continue to improve 
out to 2030. The decline in energy use per house is 
being driven by a decline in the average use of wood 
and electricity most likely due to appliance efficiency 
improvements, changes in the technologies being 
used, and fuel switching (Energy Consult, 2015).  
In order for the total residential energy use to 
decline further, it will be necessary for the efficiency 
improvements to occur at a faster rate than the 
increase in total number of dwellings.
GHG mitigation options
How can we reduce GHG emissions in the  
building sector?
New residential and commercial buildings are already 
subject to thermal performance requirements in 
the energy efficiency clause of the New Zealand 
Building Code (MBIE 2014c). These include minimum 
requirements for the building envelope (roof, walls, 
floor and windows) and for the domestic hot water 
systems. In addition lighting power density limits are 
established for commercial buildings. However, to 
encourage new building developers and owners to 
strive for improved thermal and lighting performance 
levels through, for example, higher R-value glazing 
and insulation (Jaques, 2016), the current minimum 
energy efficiency requirements requirements of the 
Building Code should be made far more stringent than 
they are currently are, given that a new building will be 
consuming energy over its 50 year or more lifetime.
Research has been undertaken into the use of 
electricity and heat in houses and offices and 
shops but there has been little or no data collected 
on energy use in apartments, marae, communal 
residential buildings, communal non-residential 
buildings, industrial buildings or commercial buildings 
other than offices and shops. Two major projects have 
been published:
• Household Energy End-use Project (HEEP) dealt 
only with detached dwellings and was completed 
in 2007 with data collected from 1999 until 2005 
(Isaacs et al., 2010). 
• Building Energy End-use Study (BEES) dealt with 
office and retail building uses and was completed 
in 2013 with data collected mostly from 2009  
to 2012 (Amitrano et al., 2014). 
However, data from both of these projects has not 
been updated. Technology is changing, and many of 
the changes can have important impacts on energy 
use including the following:
• Government action to promote higher appliance 
efficiency through the use of ‘Energy Star™’ 
labelling for whiteware and home electronics.
• The Energy Star labelling being used for 
commercial electric light units, space and water 
heating, windows and lighting which all have a 
direct impact on a building’s energy demand 
(EECA, 2016).
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• The shift in lighting technology from incandescent 
lamps to halogen lamps to compact fluorescent 
lamps(CFLs) to light emitting diodes (LEDs) that 
has taken place over about 20 years and resulted 
in decreased energy use for similar (or even 
better) lighting quantity and quality. 
• Use of ‘smart meters’ that, as well as recording 
electricity use, have the potential to implement 
time-of-use tariffs and hence help to shave peak 
demand. This feature can be used to control the 
operation of appliances where time of operation 
may not be significant (e.g. clothes washing) or 
demands (e.g. hot water heating) which in turn 
can change the time and nature of peaks, and 
hence the need for grid investment  
(Jack et al., 2016).
While appliances have become more efficient, they 
have also tended to become larger and, as a result, 
consume more electricity, often called ‘take-back’ 
or ‘rebound effect’ (Galvin, 2015). For example, the 
shift from CRT (cathode ray tube) to plasma to LED 
flat screen televisions has led to lower energy use per 
unit screen area, but the energy savings have been 
offset by consumer demand for increased screen size. 
Coupled with reduced prices, the increasing numbers 
of large screen televisions have resulted in increased 
energy use in spite of the more efficient technology. 
Whereas households used to have only one television, 
many now have several. In the commercial sector, 
the use of a simple notice board has commonly 
been replaced by a monitor screen through a central 
computer system.
While some efficiency improvements will come from 
appliance manufacturers, local policies are also helpful 
to reduce energy consumption such as:
• Removal from the market of the most inefficient 
appliances through the use of MEPS minimum 
energy performance standards (MEPS). 
• Promotion of more efficient appliances through 
programmes such as EnergyStar. 
• Promotion of more efficient buildings through 
programmes such as Greenstar and NABERSNZ89. 
• Development of more stringent minimum building 
performance levels for implementation in the  
New Zealand Building Code. 
• Education and training for those involved in 
designing, constructing, manufacturing, installing 
and using buildings and their equipment. 
89 National Australian Built Environment System for NZ.
What opportunities and barriers exist around  
GHG mitigation options for buildings?
Opportunities may exist in the export of locally 
developed energy efficiency and energy management 
solutions for buildings. Barriers appear to be the  
lack of:
• Appropriate standards.
• Support to remove inefficient appliances  
and equipment from market.
• Up-to-date energy use data. 
• Stringent guidelines and regulations to improve 
designs and energy performance of new building 
and the retrofitting of existing buildings. 
Residential building energy use
How is energy used in residential buildings?
There are approximately 1.5 million occupied 
dwellings in New Zealand, with a total floor area  
of about 222 million m2, giving an average floor  
area of about 160 m2 per dwelling (including any 
internal garage). 
The average household mainly uses energy for  
heating of space and hot water with electricity being 
the main energy source (Figure 5.17) (Isaacs et al. 
2010). Based on a survey of 400 free-standing houses 
in the HEEP study of the early 2000s, it was apparent 
that the averages may not represent any individual 
household due to variations in comfort levels and 
number of residents.
Since this 2005 study, lighting and appliances have 
become more efficient, patterns of cooking and 
eating have changed with an increased use of factory-
prepared foods and electric air-to-air heat pumps have 
become increasingly popular forms of heating, adding 
a new cooling load in many dwellings. Increasingly, 
tighter environmental requirements on solid fuel 
space heating in some locations, have shifted more 
heating energy demand onto the electricity grid. 
Residential space heating globally is around 32%  
of total energy demand that is comparable to  
New Zealand’s demand of 34%. Domestic hot water  
in New Zealand at 24% compare to 29% globally  
(Figure 5.18). The greatest difference is for appliances 
with NZ at 13% of total energy demand compared  
to 29% internationally (Lucon et al. 2014).
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Figure 5.17 Average shares of energy end-use demand and sources of energy supply for New Zealand 
households from 1990 to 2005. 
Heating 34%
Hot Water 29%
Range 6%
Refrigeration 10%
Lights 8%
Other appliances 13%
Electricity 69%
Oil 0.1%
LPG 2%
Natural 
gas 9%
Solid fuel 20%
Energy end-uses Sources of 
 energy supply
Source: Isaacs et al., 2010.
Figure 5.18 World final energy consumption by end-use for buildings in 2010. 
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What are the sources of space heating  
in New Zealand dwellings?
Space heating is a high household energy use  
supplied by various fuel types (Figure 5.19).  
Different fuels are converted to heat at varying 
efficiencies, so to understand the household heating 
market it is necessary to take account of the appliance 
efficiencies. Space heating in 2005 was dominated 
by burning wood, coal, LPG or reticulated natural gas 
to give direct conversion to heat. Only about a third 
of space heating energy came from electricity, the 
majority being used to power conventional resistance 
heaters with low efficiency. 
Since the early 2000s, there has been large growth in 
use of efficient heat pumps which has increased the 
share of electricity demand and reduced solid fuels. 
While a resistance heater provides a single unit of 
heat for each unit of electricity (100%), a heat pump 
can provide 3 to 4 units (300-400%). Heat pumps can 
also be used for cooling on summer days and their 
rapid deployment is illustrated by the peak electricity 
demand in Auckland one hot day in the summer of 
2016 being 10% higher than a similar day in 201590.
90 http://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/76510817/aucklanders-suck-
up-power-in-hot-humid-weather 
Figure 5.19 Shares of space heating fuels used in New Zealand households in 2005.
Assumed appliance efficiencies in brackets.
Solid fuel [60%] 45%
Natural gas [80%] 15%
LPG [94%] 8%
Electricity [100%] 32%
Oil [83%] 0%
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Heat pumps have been actively promoted, not only 
due to their improved efficiency but also due to the 
increased emphasis on reducing local air pollution 
from the inefficient combustion of solid fuels in  
open fires or poor designs of solid fuel burners.  
The technology of solid fuel combustion has improved 
with well-designed enclosed stoves and computer 
controlled pellet burners, but there is still room for 
further improvements. Ground source heat pumps 
are being installed, especially in Christchurch, as a 
cost effective heating and cooling system for buildings. 
Direct use of woody biomass for space heating 
provides increased resilience in case of failure of 
electricity supply and has been argued can help  
to reduce peak winter power demand.
One quarter of the 400 houses surveyed in the 
HEEP study had living rooms with mean winter 
evening temperatures below the World Health 
Organisation recommended minimum of 16°C. 
Such low temperatures can lead to building fabric 
durability issues as well as poor health consequences 
which have been one of the drivers behind the 
Government’s promotion of improving the thermal 
performance of NZ houses by adding roof and  
floor insulation.
New houses can benefit from designs which 
incorporate not only thermal insulation but careful 
integration of glass and mass. Such passive solar 
designs make use of orientation to the sun coupled 
with the use of glass to allow entry of solar heat and 
the use of thermal mass to store this heat with good 
levels of thermal insulation to reduce its escape. 
Added control of air leakage, external shading and 
ventilation to reduce overheating and maintain indoor 
air quality, will give a house design which is cool in 
summer and warm in winter. Low, or even zero-heat 
energy houses are technically feasible in many parts  
of New Zealand (Donn and Thomas, 2010).  
More complex technology such as air-to-air or 
geothermal heat exchangers may also be used.
Water Heating
New Zealand has a high proportion of electric 
domestic hot water systems, with 69% of houses 
having only electric hot water cylinder(s) and another 
17% having electric plus some other form of water 
heating, normally a wet back supplementary heater 
powered by the solid fuel burner (Figure 5.20). 
With the shift away from solid fuel burners, this 
supplementary source of water heating is also being 
removed, thereby increasing the direct electricity 
requirement for hot water. Although electric air-to-
water cylinder heat pumps are available, they have a 
relatively high initial cost.
The different domestic hot water systems illustrate 
one aspect of the complexity of energy use in 
buildings. Energy can be consumed even when the 
appliance is switched off and on stand-by, and also 
while it is preparing for use or waiting to be used,  
in this example as stored heat. The ‘loss’ component 
(Figure 5.21) is due to the technical performance  
of the hot water generation. These ‘standing losses’ 
are due both to technology (e.g. inadequate cylinder 
insulation) and occupant requirements  
(e.g. maintaining a higher water temperature in order 
to ensure acceptable supply regardless of the size 
of the tank). The ‘hot water’ energy lifts the water 
temperature from the in-coming cold supply to an 
acceptable washing temperature but is, in turn, 
driven by the volume of hot water used. The volume 
is a function of the demand, but this can relate to 
behaviour such as the taking of a bath or a shower, 
and also user technology such as the installation 
of a low-flow shower head. Solar water heaters are 
commonly used to supplement gas or electricity 
heating, with typical substitution levels around  
30–50% per year depending on location and hot  
water use behaviour in the household. 
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Figure 5.20 Shares of domestic water heating system by type in New Zealand in 2005.
Electric + other 17%
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Gas instant 4%
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Figure 5.21 Domestic hot water energy use by fuel type and system.
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Commercial buildings’ energy use 
How is energy used in office and shop buildings?
In New Zealand there are over 41,000 commercial 
buildings containing offices and/or shops, with a total 
floor area of 39.93 million m2, giving an average floor 
area of approximately 970 m² per building. The size 
distribution is extremely skewed with around 27,000 
buildings under 650 m² floor area and around  
500 with over 9,000 m². Lighting consumes around 
19% of total energy demand, over double the share  
of residential buildings, with heating, ventilation  
and air conditioning most of the rest.
Complexity of use makes it difficult to provide 
simple energy saving solutions that apply across all 
commercial buildings. Residential buildings are used 
for a reasonably similar range of purposes (eating, 
sleeping, socialising, entertainment etc.) whereas 
offices and shop buildings can vary from low energy 
activities (e.g.an unheated garden centre) to being 
very energy intensive (e.g. a bread bakery). Similarly, 
while the very large majority of houses fit within a 
reasonably narrow band of floor area and number of 
storeys, commercial buildings come in a wide range of 
sizes and designs. To add further levels of complexity, 
there are differences in the use of space conditioning 
(larger office buildings are often heated and cooled); 
hours of use (houses tend to be used at night while 
commercial buildings can be used at any time); 
times of use (houses tend to be used every day while 
commercial buildings are usually only used during 
work days or even only once or twice a week); and 
ownership (many houses are owner occupied while 
commercial buildings can be a combination  
of owner or tenant occupied, with or without 
specialist energy managers). Neither office and  
shop tenants nor building owners can be treated  
as homogeneous groups. 
As is the case for residential buildings, the  
New Zealand Building Code establishes minimum 
performance requirements for new commercial 
buildings and Energy Star specifications exist for  
some appliances and electric light units. 
The BEES survey of over 100 building owners and 
property managers and over fifty owner-occupiers  
in a recent study (Amitrano et al., 2014) found that:
• Technical energy saving solutions need to be 
devised to provide both cost-effective new-builds 
and cost-effective retrofits.
• Cost-effective and easily-managed operational 
systems need to be developed and promoted.
• Considerable effort needs to be directed at 
creating awareness among building owners, 
property managers and tenants about innovative 
energy saving technologies, energy efficient 
building designs and carbon content  
of construction materials, as well as  
operational systems.
• Support is needed by promoting credible  
and tailored case studies that take into  
account the different imperatives that  
these stakeholders bring.
Each of the key groups surveyed (occupiers, 
constructors, developers and investors) reported 
interest in more environmentally efficient buildings, 
but each group felt unable to shift this interest into 
action (Figure 5.22). The EECA energy end-use survey 
includes the commercial building sector approximately 
every 4 years. 
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Figure 5.22 The challenge in generating stakeholder interest in efficient energy use in commercial buildings.
  
Occupiers
“We would like to have 
environmentally efficient buildings 
to fulfill our policy commitments, 
but there aren’t any”
Investors
“We would fund environmentally 
efficient buildings but there is no 
demand for them”
Constructors
“We can build environmentally 
efficient buildings but the 
developers don’t ask for them”
Developers
“We would ask for environmentally 
efficient buildings but the 
investors won’t pay for them”
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Influence of long term ambitions on near term 
actions and pathways
What are the pathways for reducing emissions  
from buildings?
A building can be thought of as having different layers, 
each with different longevity. Duffy (1990) divided 
the building costs for commercial office buildings 
into three layers: shell; services; and scenery. Brand 
(1997) developed this further by including a fourth 
category ‘set’, described as ‘all the things that twitch 
around daily to monthly’. Overarching these layers is 
society which establishes the conditions within which 
buildings exist. The New Zealand Building Code has 
a durability clause that expects the building shell to 
have a life of not less than 50 years, but accepts a 
lesser life for other layers.
Combining these expectations confirmed that change 
in the building sector takes a long time for some  
parts, but can be quicker for others (Table 5.6)  
(Isaacs 2015). Globally, it is expected that 
approximately 80% of energy use in buildings will be 
‘locked in’ by 2050 for decades to come, compared 
to a scenario where today’s best practice buildings 
become the standard in new building construction 
and existing building retrofit (Lucon et al. 2014).
Design or construction choices can result in  
poor performance of the shell and services layers,  
so internationally minimum performance 
requirements have been implemented through 
legislation, although voluntary programmes have 
also had success in lifting the top end of the market. 
Minimum performance in the scenery and set layers 
are most often managed through combinations of 
legislation and prestige-based activities.
An attempt was made to provide an overview of 
estimated mitigation potentials, costs, and possible 
priority sequencing of mitigation actions for buildings 
but limited data constrained this endeavour (Annex 1).
Co-benefits
What other benefits would result from mitigation 
options for buildings?
Almost all actions taken to improve energy efficiency 
in buildings have positive financial and social co-
benefits such as improved comfort. From a financial 
viewpoint, spending less on purchasing energy for 
buildings releases funding for use in more productive 
or desirable ways. Research has demonstrated that 
improved energy efficiency can result in improved 
productivity, improved comfort and health, improved 
building durability and hence increased asset value, 
improved individual and national energy security as 
reduced energy demands provide greater flexibility 
and disaster resilience, and reduced local air  
pollution as well as GHG emission reductions  
(Lucon et al. 2014).
Examples of co-benefits include:
• Experiences lead to positive attitudes  
to opportunities in other sectors.
• Improved comfort and potential health benefits.
• Potential for improved durability of building (e.g. 
through reduce disfiguring or destructive mould).
• Ability to direct financial savings to more  
profitable uses.
• Improved flexibility and disaster resilience.
Table 5.6: New Zealand house component expectations over time.
Layer Longevity
NZBC 
Clause B2
Example Description
Shell Life 50 yrs.
Structure and its 
components 
 – Sub-floor (piles), Floor, Wall, Fenestration, Roof 
 – Stone, Timber, Concrete, Steel, Glass
 – Fixings: nails, screws
Services 15 yrs. 15 yrs. Cabling, plumbing, etc. 
 – Sanitation: cold & hot water, sewerage, toilets, basins
 – Distribution: pipes, wiring 
 – Fuels: solid, gas, electricity, oil
Scenery 5-7 yrs. 5 yrs. Layout 
 – Finishes: Paint, wallpaper, decoration
 – Built-in heaters & lighting
Set Flexible Not covered Shifting of furniture 
 – Furniture, appliances, etc.
 – Space heating & cooling plant and equipment
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Case studies
Are there good examples that others might 
follow?
The Eco Design Advisor service is operated by  
a number of councils around New Zealand.  
It provides free advice to help achieve the best 
use of energy, water and materials on home 
building projects. Through the advisors and 
their website they provide a wide range of 
factsheets to assist in the design and  
renovation of housing91.
Existing home owners, landlords and tenants 
can receive assistance and advice from 
members of the Community Energy Network, 
a national network of community enterprises 
working to show leadership in the residential 
energy sector. As well as linking to recycling 
programmes, Environment Centres, skills 
and employment initiatives, their members 
operate Curtain Banks. They also provide 
certified Home Performance Advisors to 
undertake house inspections and report on 
opportunities to improve the performance of 
the home92.
• The award winning Te Wharehou O Tuhoe93 
located in Tāneatua is the first building in 
New Zealand built in accordance with the 
North American Living Building Challenge, 
the most stringent sustainability criterion 
that can be applied to buildings94.
It houses the Tribal offices, retail and 
meeting hall with a 37 kWe rooftop solar 
PV system. The building work in harmony 
with the ecosystem: the locally sourced 
timber structural systems, including 200 pine 
piles, were designed to minimize embodied 
energy and carbon emissions; roof water is 
collected and stormwater diverted to a pond 
with soakage hole; and treatment of the 
wastewater is through sedimentation pond, 
wetland and irrigated to land. 
91  http://www.ecodesignadvisor.org.nz/ 
92  http://www.communityenergy.org.nz/ 
93  http://www.ngaituhoe.iwi.nz/te-wharehou-o-tuhoe-
celebrated 
94  http://living-future.org/lbc/certification 
Knowledge gaps
What else would be useful to know?
The maxim ‘if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage 
it’ applies very strongly in this sector. The lack of 
timely data for all building sectors makes planning 
mitigation for buildings and urban development 
difficult. Until this knowledge is available, the efficacy 
of mitigation actions within the New Zealand building 
sector will remain unknown.
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5.4 Industry 
Key messages
• The industrial sector directly produces 6.3%  
of our gross emissions (5 Mt CO
2
eq), mainly 
from cement and steel manufacture and HFCs 
from solvents and refrigerants.
• A similar amount of indirect emissions comes 
from the electricity consumed by industry plus 
fossil fuel combustion to raise process heat 
(with around 45% of that coming from coal). 
• There are few technology barriers to the use 
of renewable heat energy in most instances 
and high potential to displace fossil fuels. 
For locations where biomass or geothermal 
resources are limited or costly, it may currently 
be uneconomic or there may be concerns over 
security of supply. Investment decisions require 
an evaluation of the long-term availability of 
the fuel required for the heat plant installed, 
even where biomass process residues and 
wastes are produced on-site. 
• Industries which have large single point 
sources of emissions have the opportunity  
to consider carbon dioxide capture and storage 
(CCS) measures in the future if and when they 
become cost effective under a high carbon 
price. Potentially on-site bio-energy generation 
liked with carbon dioxide capture and storage 
(BECCS) could physically remove CO
2
 from  
the atmosphere.
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Sources of GHG emissions 
Where do industrial GHG emissions come from?
Globally, industry’s main contribution to total GHG 
emissions is dominated by the energy consumed in 
the manufacture of products, particularly fossil fuel 
combustion to provide process heat. Manufacturing  
is responsible for 98% of the total direct emissions 
from the industry sector (IEA, 2012a). 
GHG emissions from the industrial process and 
product use sector are almost exclusively CO
2
 
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels, 
although CO
2
 is also produced when heating 
limestone during cement manufacture.
In New Zealand, industrial processes and product 
manufacturing emit about 5 MtCO
2
-eq /yr  
(MBIE, 2015) mainly from cement manufacture  
and HFCs used as solvents. 
Based on the emission intensities, the proportion total 
GHG emissions from the various fuels used to provide 
industrial process heat were calculated to be 45% 
coal, 34% natural gas, 10% oil, and 6% electricity  
with the remainder coming from geothermal fields 
and biomass supply systems.
Global GHG emission trends for the sector
What are the global trends for the industrial  
GHG emissions?
Global direct emissions from industry have grown 
steadily by 41% since 1990, from 7.1 GtCO
2
-eq in 1990 
to 10.0 GtCO
2
-eq in 2010 (Figure 5.24). In addition,  
in 2010 the global industrial sector accounted for 
around 28% of final energy use (IEA, 2013). 
GHG emissions profile and baseline trends in NZ
What are the trends in New Zealand?
The energy consumption by the industry sector has 
been reasonably constant, but with a 10% increase in 
2014. The sector accounted for 38% of New Zealand’s 
primary energy demand and was the largest consumer 
of coal, using 39% of the total demand (MBIE, 2015). 
In 1990, direct emissions from this sector were 
MtCO
2
-eq rising to 5.1 MtCO
2
-eq in 2013, a 55% 
increase and equating to 6.3% of our total GHG 
emissions. In addition, fossil fuel combustion 
contributes around 68% of industrial heat demand. 
Dominant users of industrial heat are dairy processing 
(26% of total CO
2
 emissions), petro-chemicals (21%), 
cement (19%) and metals processing (12%). Analysis 
of EECA’s heat plant database (unpublished revisions, 
EECA, 2015) gave the fuel use shares (in energy terms) 
for industrial heat applications (Figure 5.23).
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Figure 5.23 Growth in direct GHG emissions from global industry. 
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Figure 5.24 Shares of fuels used to meet industrial heat demand in New Zealand in 2014.
Coal 26%
Biomass (including black liquor) 19%
Oil 8%
Electricity 6%
Geothermal 3%
Other 4%
Natural gas 34%
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GHG mitigation options 
How can we reduce GHG emissions  
in the industrial sector?
Greater focus on energy efficiency in industry would 
help to lower GHG emissions. Energy intensity  
(MJ input/unit of product or MJ input/unit of GDP)  
is one potential measure of this. Across New Zealand 
society, there has been a 1.1% reduction in energy 
intensity per year on average since 1990 (Figure 3.3) 
but only 0.5% per year in the industrial sector. 
However, since 2010 this has been rising, largely 
due to the restarting of methanol production at the 
Motonui and Waitara Valley plants, steady production 
at the Tiwai Point aluminium smelter, and a drop in 
production in the wood processing, and pulp and 
paper industries.
Energy demand by industry was about 170 PJ/yr 
in 2014 with coal providing 65 PJ/yr (MBIE, 2015). 
Further use of renewables by the sector could provide 
a significant GHG mitigation option. For instance, 
Hall (2013) showed that 26 PJ/yr of residues from 
the wood harvesting and processing industries are 
currently available for heating fuel. This could rise to 
46 PJ/yr by 2020 when woody biomass could become 
an alternative for coal in many solid fuel combustion 
applications. Furthermore, an additional 0.8 million 
hectares of dedicated energy forests (that mature 
around 25 years old) could store around 200 Mt of 
carbon and, on harvest, provide over 140 PJ/yr of 
bioenergy, resulting in GHG emission reductions of 
about 5 Mt CO
2
-eq/yr if displacing coal. Planting at this 
scale would increase the plantation forest coverage in 
New Zealand by about 45%, but, if grown on steep hill 
country, could provide further co-benefits of reduced 
soil erosion, lower nitrogen run-off, and improved 
water retention, though soil and waterway damage 
may occur and will need to be managed when using 
present harvesting regimes. (Section 5.6). 
Greater use of dispatchable renewable electricity 
(derived from hydropower and possibly biomass) to 
power electro-thermal technologies, or direct use of 
low to medium grade heat from geothermal sources, 
may also be options for some heat applications 
including heated greenhouse crop production. At the 
right scale, geothermal heat, including waste heat 
from power plants, can be cost-competitive with other 
thermal options95. 
95 http://www.bayofconnections.com/downloads/Mike%20
Suggate%20-%20East%20Harbour%20Energy%20-%20The%20
Economics%20of%20Geothermal%20Heat.pdf
Improvements in energy efficiency and greater 
use of renewable energy to substitute for fossil 
fuel combustion have the potential to reduce GHG 
emissions from industrial process heat demand by 
around 35% by 2035 (Figure 5.25). Emission reduction 
could be achieved by replacing or augmenting existing 
coal-fired or oil-fired boilers with wood-fired or co-
fired boilers (wood/coal or wood/gas). Other biomass 
sources such as crop residues or biogas could also be 
utilised as could high efficiency thermo-electric heat 
technologies as they become more cost-competitive.
Large single-point sources of CO
2
 emissions such as 
cement, steel and aluminium production, offer best 
available opportunity for carbon dioxide capture and 
storage (CCS) in the long term. Improvements in CCS 
technology are required and adequate nearby CO
2
 
storage sites needed before CCS can be considered, 
but the costs involve would require a high carbon 
price (around $50-100 /t CO
2
 based on current 
CCS technology and electricity demand). A number 
of likely storage sites have been identified in New 
Zealand (Field et al., 2009). Significant deployment 
of CCS would require current technological 
improvements to continue or for New Zealand  
to enact suitable legislation (Barton et al., 2013).
Coupling bioenergy and CCS technology may offer the 
most likely route to achieve negative GHG emissions 
as will be needed before the end of this century in 
order to stabilise atmospheric concentrations and 
keep global temperature rise below 2oC (Box 5.1). 
These options could provide a means to relax the 
GHG reduction requirements on sectors that are more 
difficult and currently costly to decarbonise whilst  
still moving towards net zero GHG emissions.
An attempt was made to provide an overview of 
estimated mitigation potentials, costs, and possible 
priority sequencing of mitigation actions for all 
sectors, including industry (Annex 1) but there was 
limited available data to give accurate assumptions  
of costs and potentials.
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Figure 5.25 Reduced energy demand projections for process heat in New Zealand in 2035 as a result of energy 
efficiency (EE) and low-carbon fuel option scenarios in 2035. 
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Influence of long term ambitions on near term 
actions and pathways
What steps could be taken to realise long-term 
ambitions?
GHG emissions from process heating is a key area for 
focussed attention to enable New Zealand to meet 
its GHG emissions reduction commitments. Greater 
focus on renewable heat as well as energy efficiency 
of heating and cooling systems is required, with 
implementation ideally taken now using commercially 
available technologies and leading to long-term 
benefits. EECA has successfully held the lead role in 
this area for several years but more could be achieved 
give higher resourcing.
Co-benefits
What are other benefits from GHG mitigation options 
in industry?
Reduced fossil fuel combustion can provide other 
environmental benefits such as lowering local air 
emissions to air, including sulphur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxide and particulates. These co-benefits depend 
on whether coal, gas or oil demands by industry are 
being reduced from improved energy efficiency, and 
on what form of renewable electricity or heat is used 
to displace them.
Biomass used to replace fossil fuels can also result in 
additional eco-system benefits, as well as enhanced 
local employment opportunities. 
Insights on enabling policies 
What policy interventions would be useful to 
encourage more rapid update of GHG mitigation 
options?
Currently, there are few national level mandates 
or incentives to promote GHG emission reduction 
projects in the industry sector in New Zealand.  
EECA may fund up to 40% of the costs of a feasibility 
study for industrial or commercial projects, up to a 
maximum of $50,000, to evaluate any technology or 
process that relates to energy efficiency or renewable 
energy uptake.
For marginal projects with too long a commercial 
payback period, the current price of carbon under the 
emission trading scheme (NZ ETS) is an insufficient 
driver for a business to undertake fuel switching or 
any other major capital investment needed to reduce 
emissions. The full social or national costs, risks and 
benefits that result from private sector investments 
should also be taken into account.
A factor that affects GHG emission reductions from 
industry is the NZ ETS, though this is only recently 
producing enough of a price signal to encourage 
industrial emitters to change behaviour in a significant 
way (section 4.8). A particular factor that reduces 
the impact of the NZ ETS on many industries is the 
free allocation of units to companies engaged in 
‘emissions-intensive trade-exposed’ (EITE) activities. 
These include where products such as pulp and paper 
are also produced in countries where there is no price 
on carbon or where, for example, washing machines 
are imported from China but also manufactured  
in New Zealand. 
A policy question currently under discussion is how 
long the EITE free allocation should continue, and  
on what terms. Industrial emissions vary enormously 
in their character and the activities that make up the 
industry sector are much more diverse than,  
for example, in transport. The general price signal 
coming from the NZ ETS has the potential to be 
effective in modifying economic activity in the sector 
(Section 4.8). Other measures, such as for energy 
efficiency, are harder to design and implement 
at a general level and each industry has its own 
characteristics that need to be addressed separately. 
Therefore, policy development is more complex than 
in other sectors.
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Case studies
Are there good examples that others  
might follow?
• The Sequal Lumber timber drying kilns at 
Kawerau were converted from fossil fuel 
combustion to geothermal energy in 2014, 
providing a demonstration of the competitive 
heat supply from geothermal that can be 
widely used by process industries97.
• Provision of process heat for lower 
temperature/lower capacity applications such 
as in the horticultural production sector, is 
significantly less challenging than some of the 
applications discussed above, and is easier to 
implement. A flower grower in Christchurch 
for example, uses around 100t/yr of biomass 
waste from its production as biomass fuel 
to heat the boilers to heat the greenhouses, 
thereby saving around $100,000 /yr from the 
previous purchase of coal and also avoiding 
around 3,500 t/yr of CO2 emissions. The ash 
produced also has a nutritional value for use 
as a soil amendment (Grower News, 2014).
• In Austria, cement plants began to use solid 
waste fuels (made up of recyclable plastics, 
paper, textiles and composite materials) in 
1993. All nine cement plants there now use 
solid waste fuels to a certain extent. This is 
being replicated across Europe using energy 
dense wastes as fuels, including used car tyres. 
(EUBIONET, 2015)
• Drax Power (4GW of installed capacity) 
delivers 7% of the UK’s electricity demand  
and is in the process of switching from coal  
to biomass fuel. In 2014, 29% of its production 
was derived from biomass combustion, 
97  http://sequallumber.co.nz/mt-putauaki-kawerau-new-
zealand-natures-kiln-drying-boiler/
producing 2.9TWh of electricity and reducing 
lifecycle GHG emissions by 6.1 Mt CO2-eq. 
Drax Power burnt 4 Mt of biomass, 95% of 
which were sawdust and sawmill residues, 
diseased wood, forestry residues and thinning 
wastes from the forestry/wood processing 
industries. Drax Power expect half of their 
production units to have been converted  
to biomass by the end of 2016, leading to  
a reduction in GHG emissions of about 
12 Mt CO2-eq per year (Drax, 2015).
• Charcoal has been used in Brazil, for many 
years, to provide the process heat for the 
production of metallic iron from ore – the first 
step in steel production. The lack of sulphur in 
the charcoal improves the quality of pig iron, 
and therefore of the steel that is produced. 
Today Brazil produces 10 Mt/yr of pig iron, 
generating an income of around USD 2 billion 
(FAO, 2015; UNEP, 2015c). 
There are no technical barriers to replicating 
these case study examples. The key issues are 
the relative costs and the security of supply of 
fuels over the lifetime of the capital investment. 
In many instances, given the current relatively 
low fossil fuel prices globally, investments in 
low-carbon technologies are not economically 
viable. However, other strategic drivers such 
as energy security, waste treatment, product 
quality should be considered. As for transport 
and buildings, local governments have the 
opportunity to implement appropriate policy 
frameworks to encourage mitigation initiatives to 
be implemented by small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) in their region.
Knowledge gaps
What else would be useful to know?
There are no technology barriers to the lowering of 
GHG emissions by New Zealand industries and SMEs 
at all scales. The hurdles to increasing activity are 
largely economic and the availability of some reliable 
alternative energy supplies such as geothermal 
resources. The technologies and systems are mature 
and well proven either in New Zealand or elsewhere. 
The main barrier to uptake is the knowledge by 
businesses that such opportunities exist.
The other uncertainty is at what carbon price would 
the rate of deployment of low-carbon technologies 
and systems be greatly increased and therefore to 
help New Zealand exceed its present INDC target.
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5.5 Agriculture 
Key messages
• Direct emissions from agriculture make  
up almost half of New Zealand’s gross  
GHG emissions. 
• Emissions per unit of product (or emissions 
intensity) have fallen consistently over the past 
two decades owing to increased productivity 
per animal and improved efficiency of farm 
enterprises. It is feasible to reduce GHG 
emissions if increased productivity were to be 
counterbalanced by decreased animal numbers 
such that food production is maintained.
• Nonetheless, absolute emissions have  
grown because of an increase in total 
production, largely due to increased use  
of land for dairy farming and its more  
intensive management regime. 
• Further productivity increases will reduce 
future emissions intensity further, but absolute 
emissions will continue to rise in the absence 
of significant policy change or permanent 
depression of commodity prices. 
• While there are mitigation options that can be 
used now, most only result in small additional 
GHG emission reductions above business 
as usual trends for current agricultural and 
horticultural systems, although some may also 
offer significant co-benefits such as improved 
water quality and more efficient water use.
• Research on, and investment in, new mitigation 
technologies to address, specifically, the 
formation of methane in the rumen and the 
decomposition of animal excreta in soils, 
offers the potential for significant future 
emission reductions. However, even with such 
technologies being developed and deployed 
widely, it appears very difficult to reduce 
total on-farm emissions below recent levels if 
production continues to increase strongly, as 
projected in business as usual scenarios. 
• Exploration of alternative land-uses to reduce 
GHG emissions from the agriculture sector and 
taking into account climate change and carbon 
constraints as well as other economic, social 
and environmental objectives, would have a 
major impact on reducing emissions in the long 
term, and is essential if New Zealand wishes to 
reduce agricultural emissions below 1990 levels 
by mid-century.
 Sectoral mitigation options 131
Sources of GHG emissions
Where do agricultural GHG emissions come from?
Agriculture in New Zealand directly produces GHG 
emissions in the form of methane (CH
4
) from enteric 
fermentation in the gut of ruminant animals, nitrous 
oxide (N
2
O) and some CH
4
 from the deposition of 
both animal excreta (urine and dung) and nitrogen 
fertilisers on soils, and CH
4
 and N
2
O from manure 
storage. In New Zealand, about 97% of total direct 
agricultural direct emissions come from ruminant 
livestock production (mainly dairy, sheep, beef, but 
also deer), with non-livestock sectors contributing  
less than 1% total direct agricultural emissions.  
Overall in New Zealand, about three quarters of total 
direct on-farm livestock emissions are estimated to  
be in the form of CH
4
, and about one quarter as N
2
O.
Emissions of CO
2
 arise directly from fossil fuels 
used – on-farm, such as for powering machinery 
and heating greenhouses, as well as indirectly from 
electricity demand for milking sheds, irrigation, 
vegetable packing sheds and post-harvest activities 
such as cooling, transport, and fertiliser manufacture. 
By convention, in national GHG accounts, these 
CO
2
 emissions are accounted for under energy and 
transport rather than in the agriculture sector, but 
they are relevant if a lifecycle perspective is taken. 
Lifecycle (cradle to farm-gate) assessments for New 
Zealand indicate that indirect emissions of CO
2
 on 
– and off-farm currently amount to approximately 
10% of total emissions (dependent on farm system; 
around 15% for dairy farms, less than 10% for sheep 
and beef farms). Emissions from non-livestock sectors 
contribute less than 1% of total direct agricultural 
emissions in New Zealand, although the proportion 
of CO
2
 emissions tends to be much higher for arable 
and market gardens98 (for example around 40% for 
arable crops). Mitigation options from improvements 
to agricultural transport and buildings are addressed 
in the transport, building and industry sections of this 
report.
Deforestation would have constituted a very large 
indirect emission from agriculture during New 
Zealand’s initial settlement period, but this has been 
largely halted and partly reversed over recent decades 
through marginal grazing lands reverting to scrub 
or being actively re-planted in forests. This land-use 
change is not necessarily only in this one direction 
though. For example, Landcorp had plans to convert 
25,700 ha of plantation forests to dairy farms, but this 
98 For example, Frater (2011) undertook detailed surveys of 
various stakeholders and calculated that 7.7 MJ of energy were 
consumed per kilogram of apples produced in New Zealand 
and delivered to Europe; 1.5 MJ in the orchard; 0.5 MJ during 
post-harvest and transport; 1.5 MJ from packaging; and 4.2 MJ 
for shipping.
has recently been scaled back to around  
half the proposed area due to lower milk prices99.  
Other indirect emissions arise from off-farm 
production of animal feeds, although if feeds are 
imported these emissions are not counted against 
New Zealand’s national emissions but may be relevant 
and significant if a lifecycle perspective is taken.
Post-farm gate emissions arise from processing, 
storage and transport to destination ports. Processing 
typically accounts for 10% of total lifecycle (cradle 
to consumer) emissions for dairy (due to the energy 
required for the conversion of liquid milk into milk 
powder and similar products), but only 2-3% for meat 
products. Distribution to destination ports accounts 
typically for up to 5% of the total footprint from the 
cradle to the destination port (Lundie et al. 2009; 
Ledgard et al. 2010; Lieffering et al. 2012). Mitigation 
options from improvements to transport and buildings 
are addressed in the transport, building and industry 
sections of this report.
Global GHG emission trends for the sector 
What is happening to agricultural GHG emissions 
globally?
Total direct GHGs emitted from the agriculture sector 
were estimated to account for 10–12% of total global 
emissions in 2000–2010, having almost doubled 
since 1961 (JRC and PBL 2012; Tubiello et al. 2013). 
About two thirds to three quarters of global direct 
agriculture emissions come from livestock, mostly 
ruminants. This emissions growth reflects increasing 
food demand of a growing global population  
(which more than doubled over this period) and a 
shift towards more protein-rich foods, particularly 
per capita consumption of meat and milk products 
(Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012), as several major 
economies become wealthier. These general trends 
are expected to continue until at least the middle of 
the century, when the global population is expected to 
exceed 9 billion people, and food demand is expected 
to increase by about 70% by 2050 (Alexandratos and 
Bruinsma, 2012) and GHG emissions from agriculture 
to increase by almost 30% above 2010 levels  
(Tubiello et al 2014; FAOSTAT, 2016). 
GHG emissions from ruminants are influenced both 
by the number of animals and feed consumption 
per animal. In grazing-based systems, there is a 
highly linear relationship between the amount and 
quality of feed an animal consumes from pastures or 
moderate amounts of supplementary feeds and the 
absolute CH
4
 emissions it generates through enteric 
fermentation. The quality of feed also plays a role, 
but it is not linear; in New Zealand, for most animal 
99 http://www.nzfoa.org.nz/news/foresty-news/1523-
080316forestrynews
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feeds the CH
4
 emitted per kg of dry matter consumed 
shows remarkably little difference. Similarly, N
2
O 
emissions per animal are largely a function of the 
surplus N that is excreted by the animal. Animals that 
eat more (of the same feed) generally excrete more 
N, mainly through urine, and hence cause higher N
2
O 
emissions (as well as greater nitrate leaching). This 
means that more productive animals that produce 
more milk or grow faster generally produce higher 
emissions per animal. However, emissions per kg of 
meat or milk solids (so-called ‘emissions intensity’) 
tend to be lower, because a greater fraction of the 
total feed consumed by the animal is used to generate 
the desired product (growing meat or producing milk), 
and a lesser fraction to simply maintain the animal.
Absolute emissions and emissions intensity offer two 
contrasting interpretations of historical trends and 
future prospects for mitigation in the agricultural 
sector. As climate change is caused by net emissions 
to the atmosphere, absolute emissions are clearly 
a relevant metric to understand the contribution of 
a sector to climate change. However, most of New 
Zealand’s agricultural products are exported to satisfy 
a global demand. If one assumes that New Zealand 
does not materially influence global demand and 
hence its only influence on net global GHG emissions 
is to provide the demanded products at the lowest 
possible emissions per unit of product, then the 
emissions intensity of production (GHG emissions per 
kg of meat, per tonne of corn, per litre of milk etc) is 
also a relevant metric.
Global emissions intensity of agricultural production 
decreased by around 30–50% since 1970, albeit at 
varying rates in different regions and production 
systems (Bennetzen et al. 2016). Since global food 
demand and production more than doubled during 
this period, absolute GHG emissions from the sector 
have risen nonetheless over this period, but by less 
than total food production.
The increasing global population and trend towards 
higher quality and protein rich foods makes it 
almost inevitable that emissions from agriculture 
will increase further over the next several decades. 
However, productivity of animals and crop production 
and efficiency of farm systems are also expected to 
continue to rise, although at potentially lower rates 
and with significant differences between regions and 
production systems. As a result of those competing 
trends, GHG emissions from global food production 
are projected to increase by about 30% by 2050 
(Tubiello et al., 2013; FAOSTAT 2016), which is 
significant but much less than the projected growth 
in global food demand of 70% over the same period 
(Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012).
Figure 5.26 Relationship between emissions intensity and productivity per animal for milk production. 
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Currently, there are large differences in the 
productivity and associated emissions intensity of 
ruminant livestock across world regions (Figure 5.26 
and 5.32). These differences indicate a significant 
potential to reduce emissions intensities simply by 
increasing the productivity of animals and efficiency 
of farm systems, particularly for regions where 
productivity is currently low (Gerber et. al. 2011, 
2013). New Zealand appears to be amongst a  
group of producers with the lowest emissions 
intensities of enteric methane from ruminant livestock 
(Figure 5.27), but comparisons between individual 
countries are fraught with methodological difficulties. 
There are insufficient studies that directly compare 
New Zealand with other countries to support claims 
that New Zealand is the lowest emissions intensity 
producer. Ruminant meat typically has much higher 
emissions intensities than non-ruminant meat 
(chicken and pork). Ruminant milk also tends to 
have higher emissions per unit of protein than non-
ruminant meat, although the most efficient ruminant 
milk production can have similar emissions per unit  
of protein to that of chicken and pork meat  
(Figure 5.28). 
While business-as-usual trends indicate an on-going 
and increasing global demand for livestock products, 
there is an on-going debate that for human health, 
animal welfare and environmental reasons, the 
consumption of (mostly red) meat and milk products 
per capita should be reduced at least in countries  
with already high per capita consumption levels 
(which includes almost all developed countries).  
A parallel issue is the accelerating effort to 
develop synthetic meat and milk protein products 
in biotechnology laboratories around the world. 
Synthesising milk and meat proteins from plant 
proteins is claimed to consume around half the 
energy per kg of cheese or hamburgers; produce 
only around 4% of the GHGs per unit of protein; 
and use far less land and water than dairy or beef 
farming per unit of protein. It is also becoming cost 
competitive (Bosworth, 2016). Substitution of animal 
with vegetable based proteins could thus become 
viable for reducing emissions from food production in 
future, although acceptance of such synthetic foods 
by consumers will depend on price, quality and taste 
as well as fundamental values and trust, and is difficult 
to predict.
These are only two of many possible examples (along 
with e.g. genetic modification, biosecurity risks and 
food safety perceptions) of disruptive step changes 
in both food demand and supply systems that could 
fundamentally change New Zealand’s competitive 
advantage in livestock production in the longer 
term and that could throw into doubt the long-
term baseline production and emission trends that 
underpin current long-term projections for the sector 
(see below). However, even if there is a global shift 
away from livestock products (for climate change, 
health or other reasons), there could still be  
a premium market for farm-reared, grass-fed meat 
and milk. Given the small scale of the sector relative 
to global food production, New Zealand could choose 
to exploit niche markets if the associated GHG 
emissions are not seen as prohibitive by either  
New Zealanders or consumer markets.
GHG emissions profile and baseline trends  
in New Zealand
What amounts of greenhouse gases arise from 
agriculture in New Zealand?
Agricultural emissions trends in New Zealand mirror 
global trends, with increasing absolute emissions on 
the back of growing total food product but declining 
emissions intensity. Total on-farm emissions from 
agriculture in New Zealand have increased about  
14% from 1990 to reach almost 40 Mt CO
2
-eq in 2013, 
with most of the increase due to an increase in dairy 
production, offset by a fall in sheep emissions, mostly 
due to reduced ewe numbers (Figure 5.29).  
On an assumption of continued long-term growth  
in global demand for dairy products, total agriculture  
emissions are projected to increase by around  
30% from the 2008-2012 average, to reach 45–50 
Mt CO
2
-eq in 2050, largely due to the continuing 
expansion of dairy production. Future projections 
are highly dependent on assumptions about global 
food markets (and New Zealand’s ability to access 
those markets), as well as domestic regulations and 
expectations that could influence land-use changes 
and the intensity of livestock production; very few 
transparent and publicly available studies or tools are 
available to evaluate such projections, and most use 
highly simplifying if not simplistic assumptions. The 
current low dairy prices for New Zealand farmers will 
clearly limit expansion in the near term, but there 
is no evidence that this will reflect a fundamental 
change in the long-term trend.
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Figure 5.27 Emissions intensity of enteric CH4 per unit of edible animal protein. 
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Figure 5.28 Range of emissions intensities per kg protein for different livestock products. 
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Figure 5.29 Historical and projected future emissions from agriculture, and separately dairy, sheep  
and beef in baseline scenarios. 
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Source: Reisinger and Clark (2015).
The trend towards more productive farm systems 
has resulted in about 20% reduction in emissions 
intensity on-farm in each of the dairy, beef and sheep 
sectors in New Zealand between 1990 and 2013. 
Emissions intensity is expected to continue to reduce, 
independent of additional climate policies, reflecting 
on-going economic drivers, along with regulatory and 
market drivers to continually increase the productivity 
of animals and efficiency of farm systems (Figure 
5.30). The rate at which intensity declines in future 
depends on the rate at which on-farm productivity 
increases, but could achieve around a further  
20% reduction by 2050 for dairy and beef farming  
and 10% for sheep (NZAGRC, 2015a).
The increasing productivity per animal and efficiency 
of farm systems (e.g. reductions in fertiliser use 
per cow) has avoided much greater increases in 
agricultural emissions than would have occurred 
otherwise. This can be illustrated through a ‘thought 
experiment’: Figure 5.31 illustrates how total on-
farm agricultural emissions would have increased by 
almost 40% over 1990–2013 if the historical increase 
in production had been achieved solely by increasing 
the number of animals and amount of land used for 
livestock production in New Zealand, without any 
increase in animal productivity and farm efficiency. 
Conversely, if animal productivity had increased but 
animal numbers had been reduced proportionally, 
such that total food production was maintained at 
1990 levels, absolute emissions from agriculture 
today could be about 20% below 1990 levels. This 
demonstrates that trends in New Zealand’s agriculture 
emissions reflect economic development choices 
rather than a biological necessity or the absence of 
any mitigation options. 
136 Transition to a low-carbon economy for New Zealand  |  2016
Figure 5.30 Historical and projected future changes in aggregate on-farm emissions intensity for dairy,  
beef and sheep meat production in New Zealand.
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Figure 5.31 GHG emissions from New Zealand agriculture from 1990 to 2013, illustrating the effect of changes 
in animal productivity and on-farm efficiency as well as total food production. 
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Given the projected strong growth in overseas 
demand for protein-rich food (despite year-to-year 
changes in dairy prices and low dairy pay-out in 
the past two years), total New Zealand livestock 
production is projected to continue to increase in the 
long term in the absence of fundamental, disruptive 
changes to global markets. Productivity and efficiency 
gains using current technologies and practices can 
offset some of the emissions growth that would occur 
otherwise, but on their own they will be insufficient to 
avoid a further emissions increase for at least the next 
four to five decades.
GHG mitigation options
How can we reduce GHG emissions in the agricultural 
sector?
Mitigation for the agriculture sector can be classified 
into three broad options:
1. further increases in animal productivity and farm 
efficiency;
2. additional technologies that directly seek to 
reduce emissions;
3. constraints on the level and types of agricultural 
activity and movement towards low-emitting  
land uses.
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While many technologies and practices to increase 
animal productivity and farm efficiency are already 
known and widely practiced, and many new areas are 
being actively researched, many of the technologies 
that directly seek to reduce emissions (e.g. by 
influencing the microbes responsible for producing 
CH
4
 in the rumen) are still under development.  
A range of interventions are available or currently 
under development at different levels of maturity 
(Figure 5.32). These different approaches to 
mitigation are not independent and have multiple and 
interacting effects on emissions intensity and absolute 
emissions, as discussed below.
What animal productivity, and on-farm efficiency 
gains, can be made?
The influence of efficiency and productivity gains  
on emissions is complex. Measures that increase  
the productivity per animal (e.g. higher milk yield  
per cow, faster weight gain of lambs and beef cattle)  
will generally reduce emissions intensity but increase 
emissions per animal. Hence, if animal numbers 
remain unchanged, increasing animal productivity 
increases absolute emissions. However, if farm 
stocking rates are reduced as animals become  
more productive, then absolute emissions would 
decrease as well. 
Many dairy farms use increasing amounts of 
supplementary feeds, many of which have lower 
nitrogen content and thus can help reduce the 
amount of N2O produced per unit of dry matter 
intake. However, the consequence of increased 
supplementation is often that more animals are kept 
per hectare, or that animals consume and produce 
more, and hence emissions intensity reduces but 
absolute emissions increase. Some supplementary 
feeds, such as palm-kernel expeller, are sourced 
overseas and hence emissions generated in their 
production are not counted against New Zealand’s 
national emissions, but noticeably contribute  
to total emissions from a lifecycle perspective.  
Other supplementary feed may need to be produced 
through cropping cycles, thereby reducing soil carbon 
content through cultivation oxidising a part of the 
organic matter.
Measures that improve farm efficiency (e.g. more 
targeted use of fertiliser that allows reduced fertiliser 
use without reducing milk yield per cow) mostly 
reduce emissions intensity and, if animal numbers 
remain unchanged, also reduce absolute emissions. 
However, if the increased efficiency is used to grow 
more animal feed and achieve higher total production 
on the same land area, then absolute emissions may 
not decline or could even increase.
Experience in New Zealand to date shows competing 
trends, with some farmers seeking to reduce stock 
numbers as they move to animals offering higher 
yields (including to comply with water quality 
regulations or to take stock of low-yielding erodible 
land), while on other farms more productive animals 
are used to further increase total on-farm production.
Emissions intensity is expected to continue to 
reduce further even in the absence of additional 
climate policies, reflecting existing and on-going 
economic, regulatory, social and market drivers 
towards improved on-farm efficiency and animal 
productivity (Figure 5.30). The scope for reducing 
emissions intensity further below those business-
as-usual trends is likely to be more limited based on 
existing technologies and practices alone. Potential 
opportunities exist in closing the gap between current 
high- and low-performing farms, and in linking climate 
with other environmental objectives such as water 
quality. One could also seek to further accelerate 
productivity gains across the board, given that New 
Zealand animals are not near any physiological limits, 
such that animals will be as productive in 2030 as 
they would have been in 2050 under business-as-
usual. However, if it is assumed that the current rate 
of progress reflects a balance between the benefits 
of increased performance and the costs of achieving 
this, then accelerating this performance gain is likely 
to entail additional  
(but poorly quantified) costs.
Some productivity gains are linked to breeding, which 
is difficult to greatly accelerate without recourse to 
genetic modification, while others (such as more 
precise application of fertiliser or irrigation assisted  
by remote sampling and robotics) could see more 
rapid progress. New Zealand farms show a wide 
diversity of productivity and efficiency levels 
(Anastadiadis and Kerr, 2013a), and it is tempting to 
speculate that if the lowest performing farms were 
brought to the level of the mid – to top-performing 
farms, overall emissions intensity should decline 
further. However, as discussed above, whether this 
would result in a reduction in absolute emissions, 
depends on the way such performance improvements 
are implemented, and some of the differences in 
performance are also related to differences in soil  
and climate conditions.
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Figure 5.32 Possible technical and management options, and their stage of development, to reduce GHG 
emissions in the agriculture sector by either increasing efficiency/productivity or reducing emissions per animal.
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Case study: Dairy 
In 1990, New Zealand had 3.44 million dairy 
cattle. By 2013, that number nearly doubled 
to 6.48 million and total milk production 
almost tripled over this period. This improved 
efficiency of milk production per cow resulted 
from improved pasture management (including 
more targeted use of fertilizers and irrigation), 
continued improvement of genetic merit of 
animals, and increased use of supplementary 
feeds and nitrogen fertiliser, that also enable 
some farmers to buffer crop and pasture 
shortages associated with droughts and during 
low growth periods. As a result, the average 
annual production of 256 kg milk solids per cow 
in 1990 rose to 346 kg in 2013. The more milk 
a cow produces, the more feed it consumes 
and the higher the CH
4
 emissions and nitrogen 
excretion; as a result, total direct dairy 
emissions more than doubled between 1990 
and 2013. However, since the additional feed 
goes directly towards milk production rather 
than simply maintaining the mature animal, 
the average emissions per kg of milk solids 
produced in New Zealand dropped by about 
16% between 1990 and 2013.
Case study: Lamb
Sheep numbers dropped from 57.9 million 
in 1990 to 30.8 million in 2013, and absolute 
emissions fell by more than 35% over this 
period, but New Zealand today produces 
almost as much lamb meat as it did in 1990. 
This was achieved through higher lambing 
percentages and increased lamb weights 
at slaughter, based on increased genetic 
merit of sheep, increased hogget mating, 
more pregnancy scanning, improved pasture 
production and optimized stocking rates.  
As a result, fewer ewes are needed to produce 
the same amount of lamb meat, and the 
emissions intensity (kg GHG emissions/kg 
meat) of lamb production in 2013 was less 
than 30% of the intensity in 1990. 
What additional mitigation options are there?
Substantial government and private research 
investments have been made to develop new and 
additional technologies and practices that could 
substantially reduce GHG emissions per animal 
further, in addition to continued improvements 
in productivity and efficiency. These include the 
development of inhibitors or a vaccine against the 
microbes responsible for CH
4
 generation in the 
rumen; breeding for lower CH
4
 emitting animals; and 
exploration and exploitation of natural compounds in 
plants and microbial communities in soils that could 
suppress CH
4
 and N
2
O emissions (NZAGRC and PGgRc 
2015a) for an overview. The New Zealand research 
investment is significant even on a global scale, and 
places New Zealand in the position to be a technology 
leader rather than taker.
Promising short-term trials of inhibitors indicate 
that it may be possible to reduce CH
4
 emissions per 
animal from enteric fermentation by 30% or more, 
while selective breeding could reduce them by up to 
perhaps 5–10% in the long run. However, these are 
active research programmes with a range of additional 
steps required before they can be considered 
commercially viable solutions. Most of the new 
technologies are thought to be additive (e.g. breeding 
plus inhibitors), but not all (e.g. a CH
4
 vaccine and 
inhibitors would target similar groups of microbes and 
their effects are unlikely to be fully additive).
The total mitigation effect of novel technologies 
remains uncertain, even if they are developed 
into commercially available solutions, because 
their actual use depends on international market 
acceptance and incentives for their adoption by 
farmers.100 Where new mitigation options pose 
net costs to farmers, their adoption would depend 
on whether farmers are exposed to carbon prices 
or other incentives that reward the adoption of 
such technologies. Whether new technologies are 
considered cost-effective solutions to climate change 
thus depends on both global carbon prices and 
domestic policy choices about the extent to which 
prices are passed on to farmers.
100 Since CH
4
 is an energy-rich gas, it is tempting to 
speculate that avoiding the emissions of CH
4
 should 
increase the energy available to the animal and hence 
increase its productivity. However, this effect remains to 
be demonstrated in practice. Whether adoption of a CH
4
 
inhibitor is profitable for farmers in its own right thus 
depends on the amount by which productivity increases 
as well as the commercial cost of an inhibitor and its 
application method.
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What could be the combined effect of productivity/ 
efficiency gains and new mitigation technologies?
The only publicly available modelling study indicates 
that the increase in emissions due to the increasing 
total production (mostly from dairy) under business-
as-usual scenarios may outweigh the potential 
mitigation from increased animal productivity and on-
farm efficiency as well as new technologies, such that 
absolute emissions in 2050 could fall below current 
levels but would still be above 1990 levels even if 
productivity and efficiency continue to increase and 
new technologies are developed quickly and adopted 
reasonably widely (Figure 5.33).
The mitigation potential (Figure 5.33) is indicative only 
and hypothetical as it depends heavily on adoption 
rates and availability and efficacy of new technologies 
that are still under development. Scenarios 
assuming slower scientific development, delayed 
commercialisation, or lower rates of adoption of new 
mitigation technologies, result in a smaller mitigation 
potential and correspondingly higher emissions.
The same modelling approach indicates that 
increasing animal productivity and farm efficiency, 
along with new technologies, could help achieve 
significant further reductions in emissions intensity 
(Figure 5.34). The gains from this approach would be 
particularly large if it is assumed that productivity and 
efficiency progress only slowly in business-as-usual, 
and hence accelerating this towards the upper end  
of what is considered feasible even under business-as-
usual would significantly reduce emissions intensity.
Figure 5.33 Mitigation potential for all New Zealand agriculture, against high (left) and low (right)  
business-as-usual emission trends. 
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Figure 5.34 Packages of emissions intensity mitigation options, with results aggregated across sheep, beef 
and dairy production in New Zealand.
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Note: In this graph, the baseline is for a low rate of productivity/efficiency improvement under business-as-usual. 
Mitigation options consist of improving the baseline productivity from low to high, accelerating this improvement 
further such that productivity in 2030 is as high as it would have been in 2050 under an already optimistic  
business-as-usual scenario, plus additional mitigation options as in Figure 5.33.
Source: Reisinger and Clark (2015).
 Sectoral mitigation options 143
What are the constraints on animal  
numbers/land-use?
Existing modelling studies indicate that, even 
with optimistic assumptions about productivity/
efficiency gains and development and adoption of 
new technologies, absolute direct emissions from 
agriculture are unlikely to decline below roughly  
1990 levels by 2050, and could be substantially  
above in scenarios where total production continues 
to increase but mitigation is less effective, available,  
or adopted.
This suggests that if it is considered desirable to 
reduce agriculture emissions substantially below 1990 
levels by 2050, either global market demand (or New 
Zealand’s ability to supply this market) would have to 
reduce significantly, or active constraints would have 
to be imposed on the level and types of agricultural 
activity in New Zealand. The extent to which this 
would have economic costs depends on the existence 
of alternative, lower-emitting land uses (see below).
Very few studies have actively considered national-
scale mechanisms to impose such constraints, their 
effectiveness and economic or social implications. 
The main regulatory policy options appear to be 
imposition of a price on GHG emissions from farms, 
constraints on total nitrogen loading on a catchment 
basis, or to limit the ability to convert land-uses to 
activities that imply higher emissions per hectare.  
The purpose of this report is not to analyse these 
options in detail (including because of the lack 
of relevant, publicly available and peer-reviewed 
literature that would allow an objective assessment). 
Voluntary options would include industry benchmarks 
and voluntary standards/reporting. All such options 
would rely on development of new tools to allow 
sufficiently robust monitoring, reporting and 
verification of emissions and policy development to 
manage and avoid perverse incentives and outcomes.
Imposing limits on total nitrogen loading on a 
catchment basis would have strong synergies with 
policies to limit and reduce negative effects of 
livestock farming on water quality. However, the 
extent to which such an approach would limit GHG 
emissions would vary strongly from catchment to 
catchment depending on baseline water quality and 
the overall level of ambition for improving water 
quality, especially where this might appear in conflict 
with rural economic development and well-being.
Other proxies that might be used to limit agricultural 
production, such as limiting animal numbers, would 
require frequent revision as they could prompt a 
counterproductive move towards heavier breeds, thus 
resulting in an increase in absolute emissions, and 
would make it difficult to change land-use where this 
may be a more cost-effective solution. A variation to 
such an approach would be to limit total liveweight 
per hectare, but such measures further increase the 
required complexity of reporting.
Any of the above constraints on agriculture 
production would imply a significant opportunity cost 
relative to business-as-usual. The question whether 
it is feasible to strategically move to other land-uses 
that rely less on milk or ruminant meat production 
has seen very little evaluation in New Zealand. Some 
pastoral land at routine risk of drought or erosion 
has already been afforested, converted to viticulture, 
let return to scrub or indigenous forest, or used for 
tourism purposes. However, the areas where such 
options are readily feasible appear limited if the land 
is to return similar profitability per hectare or require 
significant capital investments with a high risk profile. 
Hill country is difficult to put into other land uses 
except forestry, whose profitability depends on  
carbon prices and the extent to which agriculture is 
exposed to those, and requires a much longer-term 
investment strategy. 
As the New Zealand agriculture sector currently 
responds mostly to international rather than domestic 
demand for food products, any domestic incentives 
to encourage a long-term move away from animal 
farming would have to balance economic export 
drivers and market premiums with alternative 
land uses and domestic emission reduction 
targets. Nonetheless, growing carbon constraints 
imply that diversification of New Zealand’s land-
use towards lower-emitting activities could be of 
critical importance if we wish to achieve significant 
reductions in our net GHG emissions of 50% below 
1990 levels by 2050, and even lower levels beyond.
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This long term picture sharpens the tension between 
two contrasting characterisations of the climate 
goal for agriculture in New Zealand, namely either 
a focus on reducing emissions intensity without 
constraints on absolute emissions and agricultural 
production, or a focus on reducing absolute emissions 
by constraining further growth in emissions-intensive 
ruminant-based food production as well as reducing 
emissions intensity. These two approaches would 
have very different economic implications in the near 
term but also intersect with other goals with regard 
to environmental outcomes and rural development 
and resilience. A long-term goal to reduce absolute 
emissions appears to require a very active, long-
term programme to diversify land-use, support the 
exploration of alternative climate-smart land-based 
activities and manage potential negative social and 
economic implications of this transition. Whether 
such a shift is in fact feasible at national scale and 
consistent with economic growth and rural regional 
development expectations is debatable and deserves 
dedicated attention so that it can become part  
of a national conversation on New Zealand’s low-
carbon future.
Influence of long term ambitions on near term 
actions and pathways
What are the pathways for reducing emissions from 
agriculture?
From a physical science perspective, it is defensible 
to delay reductions in CH
4
 emissions compared with 
reducing CO
2 
or N
2
O emissions, because CH
4
 is a much 
shorter-lived gas and hence does not accumulate 
in the atmosphere in the same way as CO
2 
. Thus 
there is a physical justification for focusing on the 
development of cost-effective ways of reducing CH
4
 
emissions in future, rather than putting efforts into 
reducing emissions today. This is in strong contrast 
to CO
2 
, where today’s emissions contribute to future 
warming, and hence mitigation of long-lived gases 
is as important today as it will be later this century. 
However, the Paris Climate Agreement to keep the 
rise in temperatures to significantly below 2 oC, and 
even aim to hold it at 1.5 oC, means that reductions  
of the short-lived gases have now become more 
rather than less urgent.
From a socio-economic perspective, the land-use 
changes between forestry, agriculture, different 
livestock sectors and other land-uses that has been 
observed over recent decades indicate that land use 
does change in response to changing profitability, 
albeit sometimes slowly. Hence, in theory, there is 
ability to change away from emissions intensive land-
use in future in response to external policy or market 
signals (Kerr and Olssen, 2012).
The main exception is where significant capital 
investment in intensive dairy farm systems, including 
animal housing or large-scale water storage and 
irrigation systems with long payback times, might 
constrain future land-use changes away from such 
emissions-intensive land-uses, as the locked-in 
capital investment could present significant socio-
economic consequences if carbon prices rise rapidly, 
or if domestic policies or international market signals 
shift fundamentally. This is already becoming evident 
in New Zealand where significant dairy conversions 
occur during periods of high dairy pay-outs, but there 
appears to be little conversion back to sheep or beef 
systems during periods with low pay-outs.
An attempt was made to provide an overview of 
estimated mitigation potentials, costs, and possible 
priorities of mitigation actions across all sectors 
including agriculture (Annex 1). Limited data and 
analysis meant this could only raise issues for 
consideration, not a definitive assessment.
Co-benefits
What other benefits result from reducing agricultural 
GHG emissions?
There would be strong co-benefits from reducing 
total animal numbers in some catchments in terms of 
improved water quality where this has deteriorated 
or is set to become a problem due to livestock 
farming. Demand on water resources could also be 
reduced through such constraints, especially where 
catchments are at, or already over, their allocation and 
constrained by minimum flow rates of waterways. 
In the absence of a fundamental change in domestic 
climate policies in the short term, it is likely that some 
GHG mitigation would arise as a co-benefit of non-
climate policies and drivers for changes in farming 
practices, such as caps on total nitrogen loading 
in some catchments. New Zealand could benefit 
from joining these separate narratives and policy 
developments into a coherent whole that would 
then allow the joint evaluation of climate and water 
benefits of farm system improvements and climate-
smart land-use choices. Increasing soil carbon stocks 
can also play a part but the high level of spatial and 
temporal variability is a major constraint (Box 5.4)
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Box 5.4: Changes in soil carbon under grazed pastures101 
101 Based on NZAGRC 2015a and 2015b.
Globally, there is more carbon in soil than in 
terrestrial plants and the atmosphere combined. 
Changes in soil carbon could therefore have a 
significant influence on net GHG emissions from 
agriculture, either adding to the total burden if 
soil carbon is lost as a result of farming practices, 
or compensate for some of the direct CH
4 
and N2O 
emissions if soil carbon stocks increase over time. 
Soil carbon is affected by the type of land-use and 
land management, climate, and soil type.
While there is a reasonable understanding of 
changes in soil carbon stocks in New Zealand 
where changes in land-use occur (e.g. between 
pasture land and forestry; see 5.6), the default 
assumption in the New Zealand GHG emissions 
inventory is that soil carbon does not change 
where land remains in constant land-use over 
time. Measurements are challenging because soil 
carbon can vary significantly from year to year in 
response to disturbances (drought, floods, and 
pasture renewal), exhibits a high spatial variability, 
and very few long-term representative datasets 
exist. Soils can lose carbon quickly but tend to 
recover it only slowly, so it is important, firstly, to 
protect current stocks. Beyond that, options to 
increase soil carbon rely either on the addition 
and stabilisation of carbon, for example through 
enhancing pasture production and inputs of carbon 
into soil via roots, or on the stabilisation of existing 
carbon sources and reduction of carbon turn-over. 
Available evidence suggests that, on average, the 
soil carbon content of flat pasture land in New 
Zealand has changed very little over the past two 
to three decades, although the carbon content of 
pastures on some soil orders may have declined. 
Explanation of these observed losses in soil carbon 
is challenging because of complex interactions 
between soil properties, farm management 
practices and the weather that all affect carbon 
inputs and losses. There is some evidence of 
short-term losses in soil carbon under animal urine 
patches for some soils and conditions but further 
investigations are needed to confirm any long-term 
effects at the paddock scale. On the other hand, 
there is evidence that soil carbon in some parts of 
New Zealand’s hill country has tended to increase 
over the past 30 years. It is unclear as yet whether 
this is the result of pastures gradually recovering 
after the initial deforestation and soil perturbation 
decades to centuries ago, or whether changed 
management practices in hill countries are 
contributing to this result (and the reasons could 
differ from location to location). It is not yet clear 
whether these changes are continuing or whether 
these soils have now reached a new steady state.
There is also interest in biochar to increase carbon 
stocks. Biochar is organic matter carbonised at high 
temperatures under controlled conditions that 
restrict oxygen from the process. There is good 
evidence that biochar represents a very stable 
form of carbon, so it could be applied to soils to 
store more carbon. Specific biochars could also 
possibly help reduce N2O emissions, although 
the specific mechanisms are not yet clear. Other 
potential benefits for improving soil functions 
and reducing emissions from pastures are also 
being evaluated. However, the main challenge 
at present to any widespread use of biochar in a 
pastoral system remains its cost and the large area 
that would need to be covered, which makes this 
strategy not economically feasible to New Zealand 
farmers without a very high carbon price.
Given the relatively high existing soil carbon stock 
in New Zealand’s pastures and the scientific and 
technical difficulties in monitoring and verifying 
long-term systematic changes in soil carbon stocks, 
relying on increasing soil carbon would not appear 
to be a viable mitigation route for New Zealand 
in the near term. However, subject to substantial 
additional research and the development of cost-
effective farm-scale monitoring and reporting 
tools, it might become a more tractable avenue in 
future.
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Insights on enabling policies 
What policy interventions could encourage changes?
Some measures to improve animal productivity  
and increase farm efficiency may not imply 
significant additional costs and some, in fact, improve 
profitability, or some are necessary to ensure 
compliance with other environmental regulations. 
However, if performance were to be accelerated 
significantly beyond historical rates of improvement, 
then this could entail a more marked cost increase. 
The cost of new technologies to directly reduce 
emissions is not known until they are commercialised, 
but unless a reduction in CH
4
 emissions improves 
the productivity of animals, then most of the new 
technologies will not be cost-free to farmers. This 
implies that significant further reductions in emissions 
intensity below business-as-usual trends will occur 
only if farmers are exposed to additional costs for 
their emissions or provided with other incentives  
to apply available mitigation options.
There are significant variations in productivity per 
animal, farm efficiency and profitability across New 
Zealand farms. Some of these variations can be 
explained by differing climate and soil conditions,  
but some can be attributed to the skills and priorities 
of farm managers and land owners. This suggests 
that policies to up-skill the lowest performing farmers 
could achieve significant reductions in emissions 
intensities for some farms. However, the best 
measures to achieve this are outside the scope of  
this report. Given that farms are already exposed  
to very similar economic drivers around the country, 
a simple nation-wide price-based GHG mitigation 
measure (such as by including agriculture in the ETS) 
may be ineffectual if the goal is to lift the game of the 
lowest performing farms. An additional price measure 
would likely make the lowest-performing farms 
entirely uneconomic rather than providing an effective 
incentive to improve their performance.
If agriculture is to be included in the ETS, there is 
fairly broad sector-level consensus that the point 
of obligation should be at the individual farm level 
to allow the price signal from the ETS in order to 
ensure the emissions price signal is retained to the 
farm level to spur innovation and productivity gains 
(AgTAG,2009; KPMG, 2012). However, the compliance 
costs of accounting for GHG emissions on-farm could 
be prohibitively high and increase the total cost of 
mitigation per unit of emissions avoided. Further 
development of appropriate tools to report GHG 
emissions on New Zealand farms that have sufficient 
credibility with industry, farmers and regulators and 
do not require costly additional data collection would 
appear to be a logical and necessary step. Any such 
tool will need to strike a balance between accurate 
and detailed reporting of farm-level activities and 
mitigation measures, and costs to provide input data 
and report and verify estimated emissions, especially 
if used in a regulatory context. 
Studies that can help demonstrate the low emissions 
intensity status of New Zealand agriculture relative 
to its key competitors in international markets could 
help enable a more proactive marketing approach, 
although there is very little evidence about a price 
premium that consumers overseas would be prepared 
to pay for ‘climate-friendly’ milk and meat products. 
However, the focus of such an approach would 
inevitably be on emissions intensity, not on absolute 
emissions.
Knowledge gaps 
What else would be useful to know?
There are only a few modelling studies that robustly 
assess assumptions and uncertainties around future 
commodity prices (including their variability) and 
their effects on animal numbers, animal performance 
and the interaction of such numbers with other 
environmental, social or economic objectives such as 
water quality, carbon pricing on forestry, and irrigation 
schemes. The absence of robust and transparent 
scenarios limits the ability to discuss future agriculture 
emissions and options to limit their growth. 
Development of a transparent and flexible tool to 
represent the different drivers and pressures on New 
Zealand agriculture and their potential evolution in 
future would help foster a more informed debate, 
including about the potential for alternative land-uses 
and aid decisions that reflect multiple objectives.
Development of a credible and cost-effective tool to 
estimate, report and verify GHG emissions/emissions 
intensity on-farm, and to reflect a range of possible 
mitigation actions, could help engage farmers in 
mitigation policies. The OVERSEERTM software tool, 
designed to inform farmers and growers about their 
nutrient use (http://overseer.org.nz), has some 
potential to do this but, without further development, 
the range of mitigation actions it could reflect is 
limited. Experience with its use in support of water 
quality policies and catchment limits also indicates 
its limitations in a regulatory context or to inform 
catchment-wide nutrient caps. 
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5.6 Forests and other land-use 
Key messages
• New forest investment can make a significant 
contribution to New Zealand’s strategy on 
climate change mitigation, but should not be 
viewed as an alternative to implementing other 
direct mitigation actions. 
• Reporting rules for forest and land use under 
the UNFCCC govern estimates of carbon stock 
changes, whereas accounting rules define what 
are the eligible mitigation actions, as in the  
NZ ETS.
• Increasing the area of planted forest can 
increase carbon sequestration (trees absorb 
CO
2
 and store the carbon as they grow) and 
hence provide further offsets for CO
2
 emissions 
from future combustion of fossil fuels and 
other GHGs arising from agricultural emissions. 
• Planted forests also provide ecosystem services 
such as improved water quality, recreational 
benefits, shelter and reduced erosion 
particularly when planted on marginal land. 
• Establishing new forests is currently the only 
large-scale mitigation option that can be easily 
implemented to sequester large amounts of 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
• Recent new forest planting rates in New 
Zealand have been too small to significantly 
offset future CO
2
 emissions. 
• Given that much of our post-1989 plantation 
forests are approaching maturity age, future 
emissions are likely to significantly increase 
when they are harvested, and hence our net 
GHG emissions over the next decade will  
also increase. 
• Over 1 million ha of suitable land has been 
identified for further afforestation in New 
Zealand, but because there are ultimate land 
area limits due to land-use competition, the 
mitigation potential for forest removals in the 
long-term is unknown.
• Woody biomass residues from forest 
harvesting and wood processing operations 
can be combusted to provide useful heat, 
often cost competitively with coal or natural 
gas depending on location. In future, some of 
this resource could be converted to advanced 
liquid biofuels or chemical polymers.
• Soil carbon stock changes arising from land  
use change (such as from pasture to forest)  
are variable, poorly understood and difficult  
to assess, so are not easily incorporated within 
a carbon accounting system.
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The terrestrial biosphere contains carbon stored 
in growing plants (biomass), dead organic matter 
and the soil. Forest ecosystems generally hold more 
carbon per hectare than grasslands, savannah, 
scrub land or degraded land. Reducing atmospheric 
concentrations of CO
2 
can therefore be achieved 
through artificially planting of tree seedlings into such 
lands (afforestation) or by the re-establishment of 
forest cover either or naturally by allowing pasture 
or degraded marginal land to revert back to native 
forests (reforestation). Therefore, depending on the 
relative land-use economics, converting land used for 
pasture and grazing livestock to forests can positively 
affect a nation’s economy and ecological status, and 
have an impact on the national GHG emission profile 
over the period where new forests are growing  
to maturity. 
Sources of greenhouse gas emissions and sinks
What human activities on land (excluding agriculture) 
affect atmospheric CO
2
 content?
A forest is a reservoir of carbon stored in the biomass, 
being usually around 50% of the total dry weight of a 
tree. A forest may be a net carbon sink if the annual 
amount of CO
2
 removed from the atmosphere and 
stored as biomass via the process of photosynthesis 
is greater than annual losses from the forest due 
to decay and harvesting, or it may be a net carbon 
source if the opposite is true. A natural forest is 
usually in carbon balance as some trees die but others 
grow naturally to take their place. However, it can lose 
stored carbon if it becomes degraded, for example 
as a result of damage from possum browsing. New 
Zealand’s regenerating natural forests are currently 
sequestering around 6 Mt CO
2
 per year (MƒE, 2015a). 
A mature planted commercial forest may also be in 
carbon balance, assuming that as trees are harvested, 
others are planted and then grow to replace them. 
Land use changes can affect GHG emissions 
accounting by:
a. direct changes in carbon stocks at the time of  
land conversion and on-going changes in stocks 
due to sequestration, decay, burning and soil 
carbon changes;
b. changes to emissions from the new land use 
compared with the old; for example afforestation 
of pasture reduces emissions from livestock 
grazing and nitrogen fertiliser application on  
that land; 
c. energy used by machinery to undertake the land 
use conversions;
d. possible long-term storage of carbon  
in wood products such as those used  
in building construction;
e. substitution of more GHG emission-intensive 
alternatives by wood products such as displacing 
concrete blocks or plastic furniture; and
f. substitution of fossil fuels by using biomass  
from woody vegetation clearance and other 
biomass sources.
The GHG impacts of land use change are included  
as one of the sectors in GHG inventory reporting  
(MƒE, 2015a). Any change in land use gives rise to 
both a direct impact caused by the land conversion 
process and ongoing differences in net GHG emissions 
arising from different uses for that land. While 
stock changes within and between all land uses can 
contribute to changes in atmospheric CO
2
, changes 
involving forests make the biggest contribution.  
The land use emission sources reported in the 
UNFCCC inventory other than agriculture are 
 relatively minor in New Zealand and include open 
biomass burning through wildfires and controlled 
burns, soil drainage, non-CO
2
 emissions from drainage 
of soils and wetlands, fertilisation of forests and  
other land, and N
2
O mineralisation associated  
with land use change.
Cutting down forests eventually releases the carbon 
stored in the biomass into the atmosphere, either 
during combustion of the harvest residues to clear 
the land, as it decays over time, or in the longer term 
once any wood products reach their end-of life. This 
deforestation, whether of a natural or a planted 
forest without replanting it, represents a one-time 
addition of CO
2 
to the atmosphere, because the land 
area with a high level of carbon stocks per hectare is 
converted to one with a lower level of carbon. Forest 
fires and harvesting also release stored carbon to the 
atmosphere, but unless followed by land use change, 
the CO
2 
will be reabsorbed as the forest regenerates 
or is replanted and grows. 
Conversely, afforestation/reforestation results in 
carbon uptake, whether a new forest is planted 
into pasture, scrubland or degraded land, or results 
from indigenous regrowth. This provides a one-time 
removal of CO
2 
from the atmosphere. The amount  
of carbon held in a commercial forest, and in the 
soil, may fluctuate over time as it undergoes periodic 
harvesting with the harvested area subsequently 
replanted. Pastures in New Zealand typically have 
more carbon stored in the soil than do forested 
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lands, the average carbon stock on that land area 
outweighing the slightly lower soil carbon content 
in forests (Box 5.5). The carbon content of soils also 
often steadily changes after a land use change, but 
the rate of change and stabilisation of the soil carbon 
level reached vary with soil type and local climate 
(NZAGRC, 2015b). 
“The default assumption in New Zealand’s 
Greenhouse Gas Inventory is that soil carbon does 
not change where land remains in a constant land 
use over time. Changes in carbon are only taken into 
account when there is a change in land-use. Following 
land-use change, the soil carbon is assumed to 
transition by the same amount each year to its new 
steady state value (depending on the new land-use) 
over a default period of 20 years. After 20 years, and 
in the absence of further land-use change, the soil 
carbon stocks are assumed to remain at the steady 
state level for the new land-use class. Carbon is 
accounted for in this way because of uncertainties 
and technical difficulties of deriving accurate 
national estimates within land-use classes, and the 
requirement to estimate only those changes that are 
occurring directly as a result of local human activities” 
(NZAGRC, 2015b). 
The soil carbon content can also decrease following 
erosion, cultivation or drought. Increasing the carbon 
content of soils by incorporating organic matter, 
adding biochar102, or minimising cultivation, under 
some circumstances can store carbon that would 
otherwise have entered the atmosphere. However, 
further research is needed to better understand this 
process and its potential in New Zealand where the 
arable land area is limited, most of the land is under 
pasture, and our average soil organic carbon content 
is relatively high compared with many soils  
in Australia, USA and the UK.
102 Biochar is charcoal incorporated into the soil as an amendment 
that being porous, under some circumstances can hold water 
and nutrients and hence increase crop productivity.  
http://www.biochar-international.org/biochar/benefits
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Box 5.5: How the process of land use change can affect carbon stocks over time
As an example, taking one hectare of land in 
 New Zealand under natural forest last century, 
when it was cleared for conversion into pasture, 
the carbon stock was depleted significantly (Figure 
5.35). When a commercial forest was later planted 
into this pasture land, CO
2
 was absorbed as the 
trees grew and matured and the carbon stocks (t C/
ha) steadily increased. 
At harvest time, most of the stored carbon in 
the biomass will eventually be oxidised to CO
2
 
and released to the atmosphere. For illustration 
purposes here, all the carbon can be assumed 
to be oxidised and released as CO
2
 immediately 
after harvest. In practice, some residues left on-
site decay slowly or alternatively may be burned 
on-site as soon as the logs are removed and the 
C converted to CO
2
 during combustion; some 
biomass may be stored then later burned for useful 
bioenergy; paper and cardboard products may have 
a lifetime of a few months before being disposed 
of; and the carbon in building construction wood 
materials could be locked-up for decades until the 
building is demolished or catches fire. 
When harvested land is replanted and the 
next rotation of trees is grown, CO
2
 is steadily 
reabsorbed as the trees mature and again stored 
as carbon. This can be repeated with continuing 
rotations over time. The average long term carbon 
stock of 1 ha of land under commercial forest is 
around 100-200 t carbon, (excluding any carbon 
stored in long-lived wood products). The amount 
of carbon stored in the soil as organic matter 
varies with land use change after deforestation 
and replanting, either increasing or decreasing 
depending on the soil type and its land use history. 
Soil carbon tends to increase under pasture and 
decrease after afforestation, but due to biological 
variations, the amounts of carbon involved are 
uncertain and hard to measure (NZAGRC, 2015b).
Figure 5.35 Indicative changes to the carbon stocks in the biomass growing on 1 hectare of land when 
indigenous forest is converted to pasture land which is then later planted in a commercial forest stand 
that is then harvested and replanted over several rotations.
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Note: this excludes decay of harvest residues left on the land and any carbon stored in wood products 
that would increase the carbon sink.
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The annual net carbon uptake by a forest is influenced 
by the distribution of age classes and the annual 
harvest rate. Large changes in net uptake are 
therefore possible over a short period of time, which 
means that the rate of net uptake in a given year is 
not necessarily indicative of a wider trend. This is one 
reason why the Kyoto Protocol was based around 
commitment periods of several years (2008-2012  
and 2013–2020) rather than having a single target 
year when looking at national net emissions.
Global greenhouse gas emission trends for forests 
and other land use
Can atmospheric CO
2
 be removed by growing forests?
Estimates of emission fluxes from global deforestation 
and other land use changes in recent years cover 
a large range of around 5–6 Gt CO
2
-eq /yr (IPCC 
2014b, Chapter 11). This is similar to the volume of 
annual agricultural GHG emissions (Section 5.5), and 
accounts for around 10% of total global emissions. 
Most analyses indicate a decline in annual net CO
2
 
emissions from forests over recent years and project 
continuing declines in the longer term, largely  
due to decreasing deforestation rates and  
increased afforestation.
Reporting and accounting of land use change and 
forests internationally has become complex because 
of different rules between the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. Under UNFCCC rules, New Zealand reports 
annual carbon stocks and stock changes under  
broad land uses. A subset of stock changes  
may count towards meeting a net emissions target 
under the Kyoto Protocol when all stock changes 
due to deforestation must be accounted for, but only 
stock changes in forests first planted after 1989 into 
non-forest land (such as pasture or cropland) are 
included. For pre-1990 natural and planted forests, 
accounting under the Kyoto Protocol is with respect 
to a reference level. The carbon stocks in these 
forests are expected to fluctuate over time, and only 
deviations from ‘business-as-usual’ stock changes 
enter the accounts. 
In December 2015103, New Zealand ratified the Doha 
Amendment which created a second Kyoto Protocol 
commitment period 2013–2020, but New Zealand 
did not elect to take a binding commitment under 
this second commitment .Our current position is to 
apply the Kyoto Protocol rules under the Framework 
Convention to the 2020 target of 5% emissions 
reduction below 1990 levels104. The Paris Agreement 
did not fully clarify accounting rules for forestry and 
it is anticipated a work programme will be convened 
by the UNFCCC over the next few years (Section 2.2). 
Meanwhile, the present intention for New Zealand 
is to continue a Kyoto-like approach to forestry and 
land use accounting after 2020, but revised to better 
reflect the cyclical nature of our production forests 
by accounting for afforestation up to its long term 
average rather than accounting for all removals and 
emissions as they occur105. This results in crediting 
and debiting post-1989 forests over subsequent 
rotations, rather than focusing credits on new forests. 
It also accounts for temporary fluctuations in carbon, 
whereas using the average carbon stock would better 
reflect the long-term permanent sequestration 
potential of a new production forest.
103 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-12/01/c_134873122.
htm 
104 Application of Kyoto Protocol accounting rules for New Zealand 
forestry (Mason, 2015). The Kyoto Protocol includes two 
methods of forest reporting and accounting:
 Article 3.3 concerns afforestation, reforestation and 
deforestation of post-1989 ‘Kyoto’ forests (plus any 
deforestation of pre-1990 forest);
 Article 3.4 concerns land use, land use change and forest 
management of pre-1990 forests (both natural and exotic 
plantations using the categories of forest management; 
cropland management; grazing land management; and re-
vegetation plus wetland drainage and re-wetting). 
 Different reporting/accounting rules apply:
 For Kyoto’s 1st commitment period (CP-1) of 2008-12, parties 
were obliged to account for article 3.3 activities but it was 
optional whether or not to account for article 3.4 activities. 
New Zealand elected not to. 
 For Kyoto’s 2nd commitment period (CP-2) of 2013-20, reporting 
of forest management under Article 3.4 became mandatory, 
whereas for the other categories, reporting remains voluntary. 
NZ elected not to report.
 The mandatory requirement to report/account for forest 
management of pre-90 forest comes under Article 3.4. 
Accounting is against a ‘business-as-usual’ reference level – if 
nothing changes and actual net emissions remain as predicted, 
there is nothing to account for.
105 http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20
Documents/New%20Zealand/1/NZ%20INDC%20
Addendum%2025%2011%202015.pdf
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GHG emissions profile and baseline trends in New Zealand
How quickly has land use in NZ changed  
in recent years?
Almost 30% of New Zealand’s 26.9 million hectare 
total land area remains under natural forest (Figure 
5.36) largely protected for conservation and 
recreation. Over half the total land area is under  
high-producing and low-producing grasslands;  
around 8% grows commercial planted forest stands; 
2% is arable land used for growing permanent 
and annual crops; with around 3% used for urban 
settlements, roading etc. (MƒE, 2015a). In 2000 
the plantation forest area was 1.77 million ha but 
had declined to 1.72 million ha by 2015, an average 
reduction of 3267 ha per year, and with a further 
9,300ha awaiting a decision from the landowner 
whether or not to replant106.
106 http://www.nzfoa.org.nz/news/foa-news/foa-media-releases-
2016/1520-230216foanews
Between 1990 and 2013 there were net changes in 
land use that affected around 756,800 ha (3% of total 
land area) mostly through afforestation after 1989 
(Table 5.7). While there were expansions of human 
settlements (18,600 ha) and croplands (35,300 ha), 
especially kiwifruit and grapes, the most significant 
changes involved the afforestation of low producing 
grassland and the loss of 168,000 ha of total forests. 
In addition to the conversion of grassland to planted 
forests there has also been significant intensification 
within grassland categories. In 2015, new forest 
plantings totalled around 3000 ha but the total 
planted forest area fell by approximately 16,000ha107.
107 http://www.nzfoa.org.nz/news/foa-news/foa-media-releases-
2016/1520-230216foanews
Figure 5.36 Land use shares in 2013 of New Zealand’s total area of 26.9 Mha.
High-producing  
grassland 22%
Wetlands 3%
Other land 3%
Natural forest 29%
Pre-90 planted forest 5%
Post-89 forest 3%
Cropland 2%
Low-producing grassland 33%
Source: Based on MƒE (2015a).
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Table 5.7 Summary of land use changes in  
New Zealand, 1990–2013108 (based on MƒE, 2015a, 
Table 6.2.6)
 Net area  
lost (ha)
Net area 
gained (ha)
Natural forest 62,200  
Pre-90 planted 
forest 82,800  
Post-89 planted 
forest 22,900 682,200
Annual 
cropland  16,800
Perennial 
cropland  35,300
High producing 
grassland 106,000  
Low producing 
grassland 345,800  
Grassland with 
woody scrub 134,000  
Wetlands (open 
water)  3,900
Wetlands 
(vegetated) 1,000  
Human 
settlements  18,600
Other land uses 2,500  
Total hectares 757,200 756,800
108 These data are subject to a review due to the methodology and 
accounting method used, so may need to be adjusted in future.
New Zealand’s natural forests have been estimated 
to be a carbon sink because significant areas 
are regenerating as they recover from previous 
disturbances such as logging and land clearance 
activities. Assuming the carbon stored in the biomass 
of a mature native forest is around 300 t C /ha, if 
deforestation takes place it will eventually all be 
released (Box 5.5). Whether the forest biomass 
is burned, used for paper, furniture or building 
materials, or left on the forest floor to decay, most 
of the carbon content will ultimately be oxidised and 
hence add around 1000 t CO
2
 /ha to the atmosphere. 
New Zealand forests provided net carbon 
sequestration that offset about one-third of our gross 
GHG emissions in 2013, including 6 Mt CO
2
 annual 
removals from regenerating natural forest (MƒE, 
2015a). Future sequestration is possible but will 
eventually be constrained by land competition and 
hence land availability for more forest plantings. As an 
indication of land area needed, to offset the annual 
GHG emissions from grazing 80 cows on around 30 
ha would need approximately 10 ha of forest to be 
planted out of pasture every year. This assumes one 
hectare of land used to grow pasture for feeding cows 
at a stocking rate of 2.8 per hectare would result in 
total GHG emissions of around 6.5–7t CO
2
-eq /yr, 
arising mainly from around 100 kg of enteric methane 
emitted by each cow; N
2
O coming from animal urine 
and the use of nitrogenous fertilisers; and some CO
2
 
emitted from fossil fuel based energy sources or 
electricity consumed on the farm (Landcare Research, 
2009; Section 5.5). 
The net stocked forest area currently under planted 
forest stands (mainly Pinus radiata) is around 1.8 Mha 
of which over two thirds was planted before 1990. 
As more CO
2
 is released from the continual burning 
of fossil fuels in New Zealand, or more non-CO
2
 
emissions arise from agricultural production, more 
pasture land would continually have to be planted into 
forests, (or fenced off to revert to permanent forest), 
in order to offset those emissions. For example, if a 
100 MW gas-fired power plant generates 700 GWh /
yr of electricity, around 420 kt CO
2
 would be produced 
as a result that could be offset by planting around 
12,000ha of land into forest every year the power 
plant operated. 
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Once a new forest planting reaches a steady mature 
state, in most cases there is little or no economic 
benefit to the forest owner from participating in the 
ETS. So while forest sinks can permanently offset 
part of our historic fossil fuel emissions, they are 
not a long-term solution to mitigating our on-going 
emissions. The potential total land area available  
for afforestation is finite, so once covered in mature 
trees at equilibrium, no more direct carbon offsets  
are possible. 
Land use changes from 1974 to 2008 have been 
evaluated, and projections made to 2020, with 
assumptions made for future farming intensities of 
dairy and sheep/beef farms in New Zealand and a 
carbon price of $25 /tCO
2
 (Figure 5.37) (Anastadiadis 
and Kerr, 2013b). Dairy and planted forest land areas 
were projected to continue to increase as the sheep/ 
beef area further declines (Section 5.5) with a higher 
carbon price supporting a faster rate of conversion. 
However, with price fluctuations for agricultural 
commodities and crude oil, plus changes in currency 
exchange rates, it cannot be assessed how much 
deforestation might increase in future, what land 
might actually be reforested for carbon, and what  
tree species would be most appropriate as a truly long 
term C sink and when taking all ecosytem services into 
account. Scion calculated that on 28,000ha of land, 
forestry would produce on average $161 million /yr 
of export revenue plus $31 million for carbon credits 
whereas dairy (and meat) on the same land area 
would have $193 million /yr revenue but decreased  
by GHG and leached nitrogen costs of $18 million 
(Parker, 2016) 
Removal of CO
2
 emissions by New Zealand forests 
increased between 1990 and 2013 (Table 5.8), but 
was more than offset by a nearly five-fold increase 
of emissions from grassland production activities 
(MƒE, 2015a). In 2013, under the current accounting 
method (IPCC, 2014b), deforestation of almost 9000 
ha (including pre-1990 planted forests) resulted in 
around 4.9 Mt CO
2
 added to the atmosphere but 
this was offset by around 17 Mt CO
2
 absorbed by 
post-1989 planted forests. So around 12.1 Mt CO
2
 
of removals were reported. Further removals by 
improved forest management, including by reducing 
the emissions from land and through wood products, 
equated to around 8.3 Mt CO
2
 (MƒE, 2015a; Table 
11.1.1). 
Figure 5.37 Historic land use shares in New Zealand till 2008, then projected out to 2020 as baseline  
(solid lines) and with a $25 /t CO2 price (dashed lines partly obscured).
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Table 5.8. GHG emissions and removals from land use in New Zealand in 2013 and compared with 1990  
as reported to the UNFCCC for all forests included (MƒE, 2015a)
Category 1990 
(Mt CO
2
–eq)
2013 
(Mt CO
2
–eq)
Percentage change
Forest land* -30.2 -33.7 11%
Cropland 0.4 0.4 -7%
Grassland 1.1 6.5 486%
Total emissions -28.7 -26.8 -7%
*Removals shown as negative
After 8 years of operation of the emissions trading 
scheme (NZ ETS) (Section 4.8), more than 95% of 
emission units surrendered in 2014 by participating 
companies were not from New Zealand’s forest 
sinks but had been purchased from offshore, mainly 
emission reduction units (ERUs) from projects in 
Ukraine and Russia for around $0.10/t (EPA, 2015).  
As a direct result of introducing the NZ ETS, no sectors 
have been shown to have actually reduced emissions 
to date except ‘waste’ (MƒE, 2015a).
In addition, during 2014 around one hundred 
companies in ‘trade exposed’ industries received  
as their allocation 4.4 million New Zealand units (valued 
at around $4–5/NZU and paid for by taxpayers), hence 
reducing any obligation to reduce their emissions. 
Many of these ETS participants have banked a total 
of around 150 million NZUs whilst using cheap ERUs 
purchased from overseas to meet their commitments. 
Importing ERUs is no longer allowed, so the banked 
NZUs will now have to be used to meet the future 
commitments of these companies.  
The reduction in new forest plantings and the increase 
in deforestation (Figure 5.38) was possibly influenced 
by imports of the cheap credits. This trend explains why 
net emissions have risen in recent years (Figure 5.39) 
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Figure 5.38 Afforestation and deforestation in New Zealand from2000 to 2014.
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Figure 5.39 Historic GHG emissions in New Zealand from 1990 to 2013 under UNFCCC accounting rules with 
projected trends out to 2030 showing growing net emissions in New Zealand as existing planted forests are 
harvested and not always replanted. 
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Source: Based on MƒE (2015e).
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Greenhouse gas mitigation options
Is planting more forests a feasible mitigation option?
Planting forests in marginal pasture land presents 
New Zealand with an opportunity to contribute to 
mitigation of climate change emissions through 
carbon sequestration combined with other benefits 
such as displacing land uses with relatively high 
emissions (such as sheep/beef production on hill 
country); production of wood products with low-
carbon footprints; the provision of environmental 
services such as land stability and flood risk 
minimisation; and the supply of renewable bioenergy 
systems using biomass residues.
In the future, it may be that high carbon and fossil 
fuel prices imposed on energy users, coupled with 
low pulp and timber prices, could encourage forest 
owners to harvest their trees for sale as biomass 
fuel for conversion to heat, electricity, or transport 
biofuels and hence to displace more costly fossil fuels. 
Assuming the harvested land is soon replanted, the 
biomass is deemed to be a relatively low-carbon fuel 
since although CO
2
 is produced during its combustion 
(as for the combustion of fossil fuels), the CO
2
 is, in 
effect, reabsorbed as the replanted forest grows. 
Even with full replanting, forests could be a net source 
overall due to a function of age class distribution and 
harvesting. It may also be that some planted forests 
are not harvested due to steep terrain or low  
log prices.
If the maximum reforestation rate achieved during 
the 1990s could be repeated and sustained until 
2030, just over 1 million ha of new planted forest 
would be established. Total carbon sequestration by 
such new plantings would be at least 23 Mt CO
2
 /yr. 
Hence, assuming revised accounting rules are agreed 
internationally after 2020 (MƒE, 2015b, Addendum), 
these new plantings could, by 2030, offset over half of 
our non-agricultural gross CO
2
 emissions, or a quarter 
of total gross GHG emissions109. Forest biomass 
from residues could also displace coal and gas for 
renewable heat (Section 5.1).
109 2030 emissions from New Zealand’s 6th National 
Communication on Climate Change; Scion’s forestry 
calculations.
In May 2015, the NZ Government announced the 
Afforestation Grant Scheme that, for a range of 
reasons including storing carbon, aims to encourage 
15,000 ha of new plantings over the period 2015–
2020 by providing a $1,300/ ha grant110. Under Kyoto 
rules, the existing post-1989 plantation forest estate 
may become a net source of CO
2
 as it matures and 
particularly when harvesting the 1990s peak planting 
area that will commence around 2020111 (Figure 
5.39). This means the CO
2
 absorbed by our planted 
forests would be unable to even partly offset the CO
2
 
emitted from our continual burning of fossil fuels. This 
is exacerbated since, under the UNFCCC reporting 
convention, and hence the ETS requirement, it is 
assumed that at harvest, all carbon stored in the 
wood is immediately released as CO
2
. As a result, 
New Zealand’s net emissions (total gross emissions 
minus CO
2
 removals) are projected to rapidly rise for 
the next decade or longer (Figure 5.39). Harvested 
wood products are included in all UNFCCC and Kyoto 
reporting under accounting rules since 2013 and also 
being considered further in the current review of the 
NZ ETS (Section 4.8).
Several studies have quantified the area of marginal 
land potentially available in New Zealand for 
afforestation (see for example Trotter et al., 2005). 
Watt et al. (2011) analysed three scenarios of 
afforesting 0.7 million, 1.1 million and 2.9 million ha, 
based on a variety of spatial datasets and  
exclusion criteria. In all cases, arable land and  
land with potential for high value grazing were 
excluded, as were indigenous tussock and scrublands. 
The scenarios differed in the erosion severity of the 
land targeted: 
• Severe to extreme for scenario 1 (mainly North 
Island East Coast and Manawatu-Wanganui 
regions).
• Moderate to extreme for scenario 2. 
• Slight to extreme for scenario 3.
110 https://www.mpi.govt.nz/funding-and-programmes/forestry/
afforestation-grant-scheme/ 
111 Pre-1990 planted forest removals have fallen from ~22.2 Mt 
in 1990 to almost zero in 2013 due to increased maturity 
and harvesting. (MƒE, 2015a Table 6.4.2). Post-89 forest will 
probably become a net source when the forests planted in the 
mid-1990s boom start to be harvested, by which time pre-1990 
planted forests should be a sink again.
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If the highest estimate of 2.9 million ha of 
afforestation is to be achieved in practice, it would 
largely displace low intensity agriculture, but 
could meet public resistance for aesthetic, local 
environmental constraints, and increased water 
demand reasons. Other trade-offs from expanding 
the planted forest area include higher risks of pest 
damage from growing monocultures, forest fires, 
and the spread of wilding pines, which need to be 
considered against the positive ecosystem services 
provided by forests.
A ‘Rapid Afforestation Scheme’ has also been 
proposed to encourage planting of 50,000 ha per 
year from 2015 to 2040 leading to a total conversion 
of around 1.3 M ha of low producing land (Mason, 
2015). This estimate was based on the Land Cover 
Database that was produced later than that used by 
Watt et al., (2011) with most of the identified area 
being low producing grasslands in the South Island 
(Table 5.9). 
Table 5.9. Potential low producing land area available that could be used for a Rapid Afforestation Scheme 
(ha) with land above 900m above sea level (ASL) in the North Island excluded, and above 700m ASL in the 
South Island. 
North Island South Island Total for  
New Zealand
% share
Depleted grasslands 163 84,337 84,500 6%
Gorse and/or broom cover 67,159 119,328 186,487 14%
Low-producing grasslands 219,758 850,905 1,070,663 78%
Mixed exotic scrub-lands 7,178 29,974 37,152 2%
Total 294,258 1,084,544 1,378,802
Source: Mason, 2015. Land Cover Database v. 4.
However, if afforestation of this entire land area 
occurred, it would not necessarily provide a net 
public benefit. Barry et al. (2014) used an integrated 
spatial economic model to assess the net private and 
public benefits from converting marginal agricultural 
land into planted forests in New Zealand. Results 
suggested that with a low carbon price per tonne 
CO
2
, little of the total 1.38 Mha potential area would 
be economically viable for landowners to convert to 
forestry. But where land use change is uneconomic, 
additional net public benefits would justify payment 
of government incentives to increase the rate of forest 
planting and natural regeneration.
Where marginal pasture land on hill country can be 
fenced off and planted or left to regenerate naturally 
to native forest over time, carbon credits can be 
awarded to the landowner under the ETS for post-
1989 forests or the Government’s ‘Permanent Forest 
Sink Initiative’112. Reforestation to native forest can 
achieve annual carbon uptake of around 15t C / ha 
112 http://www.mpi.govt.nz/funding-and-programmes/forestry/
permanent-forest-sink-initiative/ 
(Whitehead et al., 2001). Regeneration of existing 
natural forests through pest control was recently 
assessed at around 2tC /ha (MƒE, 2015a). Pinus 
radiata plantation forests were assessed to have a 
higher annual average carbon removal potential of 
19–22.5 t C /ha (Hollinger, 1993) though a loss in 
soil carbon may occur and eco-system services are 
often less than for native forests.These can then be 
sold to businesses or individuals wishing to offset 
their carbon footprints. The rate of carbon fixation 
by regenerating natural forests is lower than planted 
forests and therefore would not be a satisfactory 
option where a rapid increase in carbon stocks is  
the aim. 
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Encouraging further land use change from pasture 
and scrubland to planted and natural forests will 
remove more CO
2
 from the atmosphere as well as 
provide other GHG emission offsets. This could be 
achieved by a higher carbon price for an NZU and 
the desire of GHG emitters to trade directly with 
landowners who can offset their emissions. 
While New Zealand’s planted forests have been used 
in the past to offset increasing GHG emissions from 
fossil fuels and agriculture, the most appropriate role 
for large-scale new plantings (or reversion of pasture 
to indigenous forest) would be in conjunction with 
a well-thought out and widely understood strategy 
to reduce New Zealand’s gross carbon emissions. 
This could include consideration of the temporal 
benefits of focusing on low-cost forestry mitigation 
opportunities in the near term, while other sectors 
still lack deployment of technological mitigation 
solutions. Once this has been formulated and agreed, 
a large scale planting programme would allow  
New Zealand to reach its target for reduced  
emissions much earlier.
What are the opportunities and barriers for these 
mitigation options?
The opportunities for taking up mitigation options for 
forestry and other land-use include:
• Revenue per hectare may be increased after 
planting forests on marginal pasture land.
• Design and construction of wooden buildings 
to lock-in carbon with possible export potential 
(Section 5.3).
Barriers to these options being taken up include  
the following:
The carbon price remains too low to drive new forest 
plantings. Although the New Zealand Unit (NZU)  
price under the ETS has risen to around $12/NZU  
(as at April 2016), it is still deemed too low to 
encourage forest planting. 
• Some planted land may prove unsuitable for 
harvesting due to excessively steep terrain  
or high water table.
• There is inequitable competition for land use  
if not all land uses (as for agriculture) are liable  
for their emissions. 
There is uncertainty of UNFCCC accounting for forest 
sinks after Paris COP 21 and hence the future ETS 
rules and government intervention in the carbon 
market are unknown.
The current ETS reporting treatment of forests at 
time of harvest assumes instantaneous emissions of 
all carbon embodied in harvested wood. If the ETS 
reporting convention changes to include the carbon 
embodied in harvested wood products, then the 
assumed impact at harvest of post-1989 forests may 
be reduced. 
An attempt was made to provide an overview of 
estimated mitigation potentials, costs, and possible 
priority sequencing of mitigation actions across all 
sectors including forestry (Annex 1) although data 
scarcity limited the analysis.
Co-benefits
What other benefits exist when reducing GHG 
emissions in forestry and other land use?
There are a number of benefits that can result for 
undertaking mitigation options for forestry and other 
land use:
• Land stabilisation of hill country and minimisation 
of flood risks.
Economic return and employment from commercial 
forestry and wood processing.
• Production of wood materials and products with 
low-carbon characteristics.
• Biomass resources used for bioenergy applications.
• Contribution to improved water quality (due to 
lower N and P additions compared with more 
intensive farm systems) and aquatic biodiversity.
Provision of habitat for native species that prefer 
forest environment to farmland.
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Knowledge gaps
What else would be useful to know?
• Reporting rules govern estimates of carbon stock 
changes, whereas accounting rules define what 
are eligible mitigation actions. International 
accounting methods for assessing carbon removals 
or emissions by forests and land use change are 
complex and may evolve under the post-2020  
Paris Agreement. How these rules will be  
reflected in the revised NZ ETS is uncertain  
and will continue to require continuous 
improvement and development to ensure that 
they are as efficient as possible and meet the  
new reporting requirements. 
• A carbon mitigation strategy based on 
afforestation requires an understanding of the 
potential impacts on other ecosystem services 
(both positive and negative).
• Accounting for harvested wood products requires 
better information on the carbon content of 
products and the appropriate discard rates for 
different types of products in different markets.
• The role of soil carbon as a sink or a source is 
uncertain under both constant land use or in 
association with land use change.
• The effect of future climate change on forest and 
soil carbon stocks and processes, together with 
adaptation options, need further investigation. 
Methods for disseminating information to decision 
makers are required, such as planning tools for 
landowners, managers and policy analysts to 
quantify the GHG impacts of alternative land uses 
and mitigation options on their properties.
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Section 6:  
Emission reduction pathways
There is a strong case for immediate mitigation based on 
existing, well-proven low-carbon technologies and systems 
whilst research continues and innovative solutions emerge. 
Analysis of alternative mitigation pathways is lacking but 
delaying action whilst new knowledge is sought is not an option. 
If we wish to commence on a smooth and rapid transition to a 
low-carbon economy, there is potential to achieve deep cuts  
in greenhouse gas emissions and to gain the co-benefits from  
so-doing over the next several decades and across all sectors.  
The exception is agriculture that will move relatively slowly 
along a transition pathway towards zero emissions.
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Key messages
• A transition to a low-carbon economy is possible 
over the next few decades if we start now 
and include coherent aspirations and actions 
across agencies and businesses as well as by 
communities and individuals. 
• If New Zealand wishes to take domestic 
actions to significantly reduce our current GHG 
emissions, households, cities, commercial 
enterprises and land-users will all need to make 
changes in order to reduce their GHG emissions 
significantly. 
• Although there have been some useful studies 
of future mitigation pathways for New Zealand, 
information to enable quantitative and realistic 
pathways to be produced is scarce and there is 
a lack of detailed data to enable further analysis 
to be undertaken to fill the knowledge gaps. 
• The term ‘pathways’ suggests that there are a 
number of different ways to proceed towards 
approaching net zero emissions around the 
second half of the century. However, all 
routes that might achieve this goal include 
implementing all feasible means of avoiding 
activities, products and services that involve 
releasing CO
2 
from the burning of fossil fuels. 
• Models developed for emission reduction 
pathways elsewhere could be adapted for use 
by New Zealand assessments, given time and 
resources. 
• Judgements based on current knowledge 
of innovative technology development and 
assumptions on future costs, deployment rates, 
and carbon prices, can be used to provide 
at least an indication of future mitigation 
trajectories in each sector. 
• All sectors have good potential to reduce 
emissions and gain the many co-benefits 
including cost savings, although for some 
sectors, the mitigation costs in terms of  
$/t CO
2
-eq avoided, are unknown.
• To support immediate and short-term mitigation 
actions, especially those relating to behavioural 
changes by households and businesses, an 
effective carbon pricing regime would increase 
the rate of mitigation.
• The more uncertain or politically difficult GHG 
reductions, such as agricultural emissions, can 
evolve over the longer term whilst other sectors 
move more rapidly along a transition pathway 
towards zero emissions.
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6.1 Review of approaches to producing 
mitigation pathways
What has been undertaken elsewhere to enable 
emission reduction pathways to be assessed?
The Paris Agreement invites parties to submit long-
term mitigation pathway plans by 2020. Mitigation 
pathway analyses elsewhere, often led by non-
government organisations, have included a range 
of emission reduction options that can be simply 
classified as:
1. feasible at low-carbon prices, especially if justified 
by valuing the many co-benefits or by removing 
other barriers to adoption;
2. requiring fundamental shifts in values and strategic 
signals, thereby indicating a need for cross-
societal change that cannot be achieved simply 
by disseminating a low-carbon price through the 
economy; or
3. requiring high carbon prices to justify and 
motivate an early transition to mitigation options 
rather than waiting to be regulated.
Such analysis has not been undertaken in New 
Zealand due to a shortcoming in government-led 
analysis to date so it was not possible to undertake 
this task for this study, also partly due to a lack of 
readily available data on costs and potentials for most 
sectors. The lack of publicly available data seriously 
hampers having informed discussions about long-
term pathways and debate about near-term goals for 
mitigation that may or may not be consistent with 
our longer term ambitions. This is a key knowledge 
gap that will be hard to fill without government taking 
responsibility and leadership to help furnish such 
data. Filling data gaps will enable the outputs from 
future analyses to underpin good insight, discussion, 
and policymaking. 
Detailed integrated assessment modelling to analyse 
possible emission reduction pathways and hence 
develop a strategy for immediate and future GHG 
emission reductions is a useful approach taken by 
many countries, and globally by the IPCC (2104b). 
From such analysis, emission reduction actions can be 
prioritised. An outline of several analytical approaches 
used in New Zealand and elsewhere is given 
below, with commentary on possible New Zealand 
applications where appropriate. 
1. The UK ‘2050 Calculator’ 
 The UK Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) has produced an on-line calculator113 
to enable users to create their own preferred 
mitigation pathway making choices and trade-offs 
that will be realistically faced when reducing GHG 
emissions across the energy supply, transport, 
building and industry sectors. Agriculture and land 
use are specifically covered in this calculator under 
the levers ‘Land dedicated to bioenergy’ (including 
four land-use scenarios that include options for 
growing 1st and 2nd generation crops for biofuels, 
agriculture, food crops and forestry) and ‘Livestock 
and their management’.
 The calculator has since been adapted for use by 
many other nations including China, Japan, South 
Africa, India and Belgium, and a global version 
has recently been launched114. It is included here 
as although perhaps more of a communication 
tool, the detailed spreadsheet behind the visual 
presentation has value for undertaking detailed 
analysis in order to compare a range of possible 
mitigation pathways. In New Zealand, the National 
Energy Research Institute (NERI), in association 
with Victoria University, has started to adapt the 
Calculator for New Zealand conditions but the 
task has not been fully completed. This work was 
unable to include any cost analyses to the degree 
that was achieved for the UK Calculator, because 
limited cost data exists for New Zealand. 
 The Calculator has been successfully adapted 
by NERI for use by the Wellington City Council115 
to assess how the city might meet its emission 
reduction targets of 30% below 2001 levels by 2020 
and 80% below 2001 levels by 2050 (Fig. 6.1 and 
Box 6.1). However, cost analyses were again not 
included due to a lack of available data, and land-
use change and forests were not evaluated in detail.
113  http://2050-calculator-tool.decc.gov.uk/#/guide 
114  http://tool.globalcalculator.org/ 
115  http://climatecalculator.org.nz/#/home 
164 Transition to a low-carbon economy for New Zealand  |  2016
Figure 6.1. Screen shot of one section of the Wellington City Council 2050 Pathways Calculator showing just 
a few of the many variables that can be changed to assess the technical mitigation potential for the city. 
Changing each variable as a “pathway action” reduces or increases the total annual GHG emissions
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Box 6.1: What might a low-carbon future  
look like for a city?
Note this case study is purely an illustration 
of what the Calculator can be used for and is 
simply presenting one of many possible sets of 
solutions. All pathway options identified by users 
of the calculator will involve an extensive range 
of choices for the many aspects of residential, 
industrial, commercial and land use activities. 
The Wellington City Council has a target of 
reducing GHG emissions to 80% less than 2010 
levels by 2050. Using their on-line climate 
calculator, one set of actions which would achieve 
this reduction target is outlined below. The list 
gives a good idea of how widespread the changes 
need to be to reach this target, but, at the same 
time, shows that many of the changes are both 
technically and financially feasible today.  
Some can be achieved quickly, while others need 
a longer lead time, especially where they involve 
long-term investments in infrastructure. (While 
this calculator is designed for Wellington City’s 
emissions, it recognizes that some sources of 
emissions are at a national level, such as electricity 
generation distributed through the grid.)
Supply
• 100% of electricity is generated from 
renewable resources.
• National biomass supplies, including from 
forest residues, are undergoing significant 
growth as outlined in the NZ Bioenergy 
Strategy.
• 50% of food waste and all sewage sludge are 
used for production of biogas for energy.
• Most of the other available biomass, such 
as garden and park residues, is converted to 
liquid fuels and/or biogas.
• 50% of local biogas is used for electricity 
generation, the remainder displaces LPG  
and CNG.
• 50% of houses have solar PV, plus there is 
another 71,000 m2 of larger-scale PV panel 
installations.
• 50% of houses have solar hot water, plus there 
is another 70,000 m2 of additional collection 
panel installations on commercial buildings.
• Food waste is reduced by 20% from  
2020 levels
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Demand
Travel:
• Travel demand per person is 40% lower.
• 80% of car travel is in zero emission vehicles, 
20% is in plug-in hybrids.
• 5% of trips are by cycling, 3% by walking.
• 12% of trips are by bus and 10% by electric train.
• Bus and train designs are 20-40% more fuel 
efficient.
• Diesel buses are replaced by electric buses  
by 2035.
• Buses are higher capacity and carry an average 
of 60 passengers per trip.
• Aviation fuel consumption is 25% less due to 
efficiency gains.
• The share of freight using rail increases from the 
current 14% to 25%.
• Freight movements are 45% more energy 
efficient per tonne kilometre.
Households:
• The energy demand of space heating reduces 
at 0.4% a year, and water heating by 0.8% per 
year due to greater technology efficiencies and 
improved building designs.
• All new houses and half of existing ones use 
electricity for space and water heating and 
cooking.
Industry:
• Production output grows at 0.5% per annum.
• The energy intensity of industry improves by  
2% per annum.
• There is considerable substitution of electricity 
for fossil fuels in industrial processes and heat.
• GHG emissions from HFCs from solvent and 
product use declines at 5% per year.
• Commercial:
• Energy used for space heating reduces at 0.3% 
per year, and for water heating by 0.4% per year.
• Commercial space heating is 74% electric, and 
water heating is 82% electric, mainly from  
heat pumps.
• More efficient lighting systems means electricity 
demand reduces to 81% of 2012 levels.
• 75% of commercial cooking uses electricity  
or biogas.
Land use:
• In the Wellington City region, national cattle 
numbers remain constant and sheep numbers 
decline by 2% per year; methane emissions per 
animal remain constant after 2020
• The area of native vegetation in Wellington 
increases by 9ha per year
• Pine plantations are all replanted after harvest, 
and an additional area is planted annually.
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2. New Zealand analyses. 
 Recently, Motu has been developing a creative  
Low Emission Future Dialogue by working back from 
the assumption that an attractive low-emission 
future has been reached (Motu, 2016). The aim is 
to generate as many ideas for specific actors and 
actions that could be undertaken to contribute 
to ‘milestones’ likely to be important parts of a 
transition to low emissions.  
The milestones are then grouped within broader 
sector categories (Table 6.1). This approach 
presented a positive image for the future and  
the study concluded that New Zealand’s approach 
should:
i. focus on a long-term climate change mitigation 
goal that everyone can agree on;
ii. consider current actions compatible with 
achieving this goal;
iii. implement many actions and policies that will 
be needed to meet this goal;
iv. identify a variety of different roles for a 
multitude of actors to produce society wide 
change;
v. prepare to be agile since the shape of a 
low-carbon emission future is uncertain with 
many pathways possible and numerous novel 
technologies and systems yet to be developed; 
vi. take a positive approach to an uncertain 
future: experiment, fail early and keep 
evolving. Engaging with an uncertain future 
involves being prepared to fail, although the 
risk of ‘failing early’ is usually avoided by 
politicians and policy advisers.
 
 ‘Pivot points’ have also been generated that, if 
happen, such as the rapid implementation of a 
disruptive technology, would force society to shift 
from one possible mitigation pathway to another. 
Such ‘adaptative pathways’ would involve stopping 
doing some things whilst putting more emphasis on 
others. 
 A range of other models exist in New Zealand or 
could be adapted from international sources that 
could support better quantification of sectoral 
or economy wide mitigation pathways, including 
their costs and interactions with other societal 
objectives. 
 For example, the electricity supply sector (Section 
5.1) can utilise the Electricity Authority’s ‘GEM’ 
optimisation Interactive Electricity Generation 
Cost Model – 2015 (MBIE, 2016). This tool enables 
future demand growth to be assessed and 
potential costs of new generation capacity to be 
evaluated and compared prior to construction. 
Sensitivity analyses can be made using various 
assumptions for future fuel prices, carbon prices, 
currency exchange rates, etc. The long-run 
marginal costs116 of a range of possible individual 
projects can be assessed to enable them to be 
ranked and compared. Various transport models 
also exist (Section 5.2) and for the building sector 
(Section 5.3), modelling of future household 
demand is in process (Jack et al., 2016).
116  The average wholesale price a generator needs to receive to 
recover investment and operating costs plus earn an economic 
return on investment.
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Table 6.1. Milestones to be reached by 2050 across sectors as part of the transition to a low-carbon future for 
New Zealand as presented in the Low Emission Future Dialogue.
2050 vision Sector category Possible sector characteristics 
New Zealanders have 
access to secure, 
resilient and affordable 
zero-net-emission 
energy to power their 
homes and businesses.
Electricity and heat 
supply 
Utilities supply nearly 100% renewable generation.
Distributed renewable generation displaces some utility generation.
Heat for industrial production and buildings is primarily produced with 
renewable electricity or other non-fossil fuels.
Emissions from fossil fuel or biomass combustion are removed by CCS.
Disruptive technologies transform the supply of power and heat.
Electricity and heat 
demand
Enhanced energy efficiency and energy conservation generate multiple 
benefits.
Disruptive technology transforms demand for power and/or heat.
New Zealand's 
transport system 
ensures efficient, 
resilient and affordable 
zero-net-emission 
mobility for people  
and goods*.
Transport fuel supply
Transport is powered primarily by electricity.
Transport is powered primarily by bioethanol, biodiesel, biogas*.
Disruptive technology transforms transport energy supply.
Vehicle fuel demand Vehicle fuel efficiency increases significantly. 
Passenger transport 
demand
Private motor vehicle use is heavily displaced by public, other shared or 
active transport modes.
Private motor vehicle use is significantly reduced by urban planning 
and/or culture change. 
Freight transport 
demand
Freight shifts significantly from road to rail and coastal shipping.
Freight transport demand declines significantly due to changes in 
technology or consumer demand. 
New Zealand operates 
a highly efficient, low 
GHG emission food 
production system.
Food supply
NZ operates an ultra GHG-efficient livestock sector. 
NZ produces zero-CH
4
, low-N
2
O nutrition.
Food demand
NZ reduces food waste across the chain of food production and 
consumption.
Consumers demand low-emission food
* Transitional use of gas-derived fuels (CNG, LNG) as an alternative to petroleum fuels was not included.
Source: Motu, 2016.
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3.  Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves. Also 
known as McKinsey curves, these have been used 
for many analyses internationally to provide a 
snapshot of relative costs and potentials for a range 
of mitigation options. One example is  
the abatement potential for the Irish agricultural 
sector (Figure 6.2). The width of each bar indicates 
the estimated annual abatement potential of each 
technology. Bars below the zero line (to the left) 
represent mitigation technologies or systems that 
are considered to be economic to deploy (even in 
the absence of any carbon price) since they can 
reduce GHG emissions whilst also saving costs. The 
bars for mitigation technologies or systems above 
the zero line (to the right) are economic only if a 
carbon price is applied with the height of a bar 
representing the carbon price (as shown on the 
y-axis here as EUR/t CO
2
-eq) that would be needed 
to give cost-effective uptake of the technology or 
system. 
Figure 6.2 Marginal abatement cost curve for Irish agriculture showing emission reductions from  
increased efficiency (dark green), land use change (light green) and technological interventions (blue).  
The width of each bar represents the annual abatement potential (Mt CO2-eq/year).  
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 MAC curves can help identify priorities for a nation 
or a city and provide a comparison between 
mitigation options, but they do not account for the 
costs and abatement potential changing over time 
as new and improved technologies are developed, 
nor for the limited lifetime of investments and 
their contribution to an overall pathway towards 
a low-carbon future. This omission is important 
for investment in long-lived infrastructure. For 
example, fuel switching from coal to gas in a heat 
plant often seems to be a cost-effective way of 
reducing emissions, but if the goal is to become 
carbon neutral within a few decades, then the gas 
infrastructure will have to be leap-frogged. This 
is because once investments are ‘sunk’ then the 
financial imperative is to keep using the plant, but 
this could be for decades longer than is consistent 
with the need to rapidly lower emissions. 
 There are also open questions regarding why, in 
the MAC curve, apparent mitigation potentials 
that are cost-effective even in the absence of 
a carbon price, are, nonetheless, not taken up 
in practice. For a business this can be due to 
lack of understanding, behaviour issues, staff 
culture, psychology, and how firms make financial 
decisions. It also raises questions about the 
feasibility of additional mitigation options given 
the introduction of a carbon price. For some 
businesses, perhaps there is a lack of knowledge 
on energy efficiency opportunities since they  
are not related to core business. For others, the 
 payback period may be too long compared with 
making other investments to increase production.
 The absence of any published MAC curve for key 
sectors in the New Zealand economy hampers 
technical analysis and public discussion about 
feasible mitigation options and pathways. They 
can provide a very useful means of gaining a better 
and quantitative understanding of New Zealand’s 
options and choices towards a low-carbon future 
and could also be a useful tool to assist prioritising 
areas for R&D investment by government. However, 
given the short-comings of MAC curves, it is not 
suggested that they should dictate policy decisions 
about mitigation priorities.
4. ‘Pathway Towards a Sustainable 2050’  
was published in 2010 by the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).117 
Compiled by representatives from 29 companies, 
it provided a vision for a world moving towards 
sustainability and provided milestones at 2010, 
2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050 for each of the 10 
tracks of energy and power; building; mobility; 
materials; global economy, finance and business 
models; governance; people: values behaviours 
and development; agriculture; forests; ecosystems; 
and biodiversity. An infographic (Figures 6.3 
and 6.4) identifies 40 risks and 350 milestones 
including 40 that are ‘must-haves’ and must be 
achieved in the near term if the world is to reach 
the sustainable vision envisaged. 
 
117  http://www.wbcsd.org/vision2050.aspx
Figure 6.3 Screen shot of a small section of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development’s 
infographic mural showing some of the 10 sector pathways towards sustainability for the 2010s and 2020s 
(ENERGY AND POWER, BUILDINGS, MOBILITY etc.). 
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Figure 6.4 Screen shot of details from a small section of the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development’s infographic mural showing some measures of success by 2050 for sector pathways aiming to 
reach greater sustainability. 
5. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  
Co-ordinating lead authors of the IPCC 4th 
Assessment Report, Mitigation (IPCC, 2007) 
jointly developed a detailed spread sheet for use 
by Chapter 11 Mitigation from a cross-sectoral 
perspective. It enabled global and regional 
mitigation potentials for all sectors to be produced 
for various future costs of carbon (Figure 6.5). 
The complex spreadsheet is available and could be 
used to produce a similar analysis for New Zealand. 
However, because of the time and resources needed 
to make the necessary data inputs and amendments 
to better suit New Zealand conditions, it was not 
possible to undertake this task as part of this study. 
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Figure 6.5 Estimated sectoral economic potentials for global mitigation for different regions  
as a function of carbon price in 2030 compared to the respective baselines assumed in the sector 
assessments. 
Source: IPCC (2007.)
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However, this was not a systemic approach since it 
ignored inter-sectoral interdependencies such as 
competition between sectors for the same resources. 
For that reason the IPCC chose a different approach in 
the 5th Assessment report (IPCC, 2014b).
6.2 Mitigation pathways for New Zealand
What are the options for New Zealand to reduce its 
GHG emissions over the next few decades?
It has not been possible in this study to produce 
detailed pathways for a range of mitigation options 
out to 2050 and beyond. Undertaking comprehensive 
studies to fill these knowledge gaps is needed, 
but were not possible for this study partly due to 
time and resource constraints but mostly due to 
lack of available data due to a dearth of analyses 
of mitigation potentials, costs, co-benefits and 
trade-offs associated with their implementation, 
and the inability to combine discrete measures into 
comprehensive packages that would enable a gradual 
transition over time. 
The various tools listed above from IPCC, WBCSD and 
DECC took considerable time, effort and resources 
to produce. Adapting them to New Zealand’s 
circumstances would capitalise on this work and 
provide valuable insights for future pathways.  
In this regard, to have adapted parts of the DECC 
2050 Calculator for Wellington City Council was a 
commendable effort, even though it is still lacking in 
key components such as costs and benefits.
In parallel with this study, a group of New Zealand 
industry associations and organisations (including 
renewable energy technology associations, energy 
management groups, business councils, and 
representative local governments), has come together 
to contribute to designing a low-carbon future. 
Under the brand ‘Yes we can’ their aim is to present 
the technical and economically viable renewable 
energy and energy efficiency opportunities that can 
contribute to reducing GHG emissions. The members 
are actively involved in developing an analysis of 
practical and realistic mitigation opportunities 
that can be either implemented immediately 
or in the foreseeable future. In addition, policy 
recommendations will be made to ensure the various 
government targets (90% renewable electricity by 
2025; 11.2% reduction of GHG emissions below 1990 
level by 2030, and 50% reduction below 1990 level 
 Emission reduction pathways 173
by 2050) can be met in practice. Being industry led, 
the cost effectiveness of such mitigation options will 
be presented in their forthcoming report and related 
Symposium planned for the end of May, 2016. This 
work should help to fill in some of the cost gaps in the 
knowledge as identified in this study.
Although ‘pathways’ suggests that there are a 
number of different ways to proceed towards net zero 
emissions over the next few decades, the evidence 
makes it clear that there is only one main highway 
that will achieve it. This would be by implementing 
all feasible means of avoiding the burning of fossil 
fuels and compensating for unavoidable emissions 
through afforestation and, in the longer-term, 
bioenergy combined with CCS. The highway includes 
displacing the use of coal, oil and gas (in that order 
of importance) with renewable heat, renewable 
electricity, biofuels, and possibly ‘green’ hydrogen. 
A strong focus on reducing demand and increasing 
efficiency is imperative. 
The main highway diverges from business-as-usual 
 in some respects, but in others it picks up on 
a pathway that is already being taken by many 
businesses, councils, communities and individuals 
who are consciously reducing their GHG emissions 
whilst enjoying positive economic, social and 
environmental outcomes.
There are no technical reasons why moving along 
the main highway towards a lower dependence on 
fossil fuels cannot start immediately by undertaking 
changes that are no longer in need of further debate 
(Figure 6.6). Delaying action makes the whole 
transition more difficult, more costly overall, and with 
higher resulting total GHG emissions to reach the 
same end-point (Box 2.2). In order for New Zealand 
to rapidly move along the core transition highway, 
there is an urgent need to develop strong targets 
and present coherent aspirations and actions across 
agencies, businesses, municipalities, communities and 
householders across all sectors (Annex 1). 
There are many additional low-carbon actions that 
can also be undertaken, but they may require further 
information, engagement and/or debate. Some are 
choices about the precise route of this main highway 
and will determine whether it reaches the goal faster 
or slower. These choices include having a greater or 
lesser focus on:
• Reducing methane and other emissions which 
affect New Zealand’s ability to reduce overall GHG 
rather than only CO
2
 emissions.
• Using afforestation to offset fossil CO
2
 and other 
emissions.
• Reducing HFCs, other F-gases, and black carbon 
emissions.
• Achieving on-going economic growth (assuming 
less growth results in less emissions), as opposed 
to a broader focus on societal well-being.
• Reducing forms of consumption that result in GHG 
emissions.
• Long term costs and benefits on the basis that 
investing for a low-carbon future requires a 
long-term strategy, particularly for long-lived 
investments.
Other determinants of the precise main highway are, 
as yet, unknown and will become clearer over time, 
but action cannot wait until they are fully understood. 
Such uncertainties include: 
• The future financial viability of various forms of 
carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS).
• The cost trajectories for innovative low-carbon 
technologies, some of which may be disruptive.
• The future price of carbon. 
• Broader societal concerns about the climate 
change performance of New Zealand and other 
countries. 
• The response of markets to either climate-friendly 
or climate-polluting activities and products. 
• The speed at which climate change impacts will 
eventuate and increase global concerns such as 
the rate of sea level rise and the frequency of 
extreme weather events. 
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These uncertainties lead to negotiable and fungible 
aspects to the goal of achieving a future low-carbon 
economy. 
If moving along the main low-carbon highway is 
implemented immediately, it will give time for 
decisions to be made about additional variants to the 
pathway which are more uncertain, under-researched 
or require time for engagement and negotiation. 
These variants can then evolve and contribute to the 
momentum and speed of the transition pathway over 
time. For example, strategic long-term transitions for 
the agricultural sector differ from other sectors in 
that reaching zero emissions within several decades is 
unlikely but also not strictly necessary. This therefore 
involves a choice being made by New Zealanders 
between either: 
• shifting away from current growth trajectories for 
meat and dairy production to alternative climate-
smart land-use scenarios with a lesser focus on 
ruminant livestock as the dominant land-use; or 
• accepting that, even with large and successful 
R&D investment and implementation of new 
technologies using all practical solutions available, 
reducing non-CO
2
 emissions from agriculture 
is unlikely to decline to below 1990 levels. This 
assumes current industry growth trajectories 
and targets will be maintained and that there 
is no movement towards changing current land 
uses and agricultural production to lower GHG-
emitting alternatives per hectare than for current 
enterprises. In the long term, New Zealand would 
acquire an even more unusual emissions profile 
and, inter alia, would be unlikely to be able to 
meet the long term target of reducing net GHG 
emissions in 2050 to 50% below 1990 levels. In 
addition, any spillovers would mean that some 
food production could shift to other parts of the 
world and result in higher emissions per unit of 
product with no benefits to the global commons 
and the overall food security reduced. 
Realisable mitigation trajectories for each sector in 
New Zealand have been developed based on expert 
evaluations and wide ranging assumptions (Fig. 
6.6). The wedges are approximations that serve to 
indicate a number of major actions that could make 
the greatest impact on GHG emission reductions for 
each sector, largely based on assumed costs where 
these were not available and ‘realistic’ potentials. 
Each sector wedge also indicates the time in the 
future when zero-carbon emissions could possibly 
be achieved. Improving data analysis would enable 
more precise projections to be developed but large 
uncertainties will always remain. However, a more 
precise analysis of carbon budgets, target dates and 
timeframes for reaching zero net emissions in each 
sector is needed, enhanced by including probabilities. 
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Figure 6.6 Indicative illustrations of selected mitigation pathways for each New Zealand sector starting from 2010 
emission levels and based on assumptions for business as usual (BAU) growth; rate and scale of deployment of 
major low-carbon technologies and systems; and a future time when zero emissions could be achieved.
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The transition pathway to a low-carbon economy  
for New Zealand in the future suggests moving along  
a pathway that should begin immediately since 
delaying action will make the whole transition more 
difficult, more costly overall, and with higher total 
GHG emissions resulting when reaching the same  
end-point (Box 2.2). 
To reach a low-carbon economy in New Zealand after 
the next few decades implies the need for aspirational 
targets across all sectors, coherent ambitions, and 
strong actions being taken now and going into 
the future. Government agencies, businesses, 
municipalities, communities and householders  
will all have to play a part. 
Agriculture 
Zero emissions not considered possible even in the long term especially for livestock based systems.
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Use energy-efficient 
appliances
Use low-carbon 
fuels for space 
heating and 
water heating
Improve 
energy 
efficiency 
of buildings
Minimise 
use of 
air travel
Use 
low-carbon 
fuel-efficient 
vehicles
Maximise 
vehicle fuel 
efficiency 
through driver 
behaviour
Plant trees 
to offset 
emissions
Accelerate 
and adopt best 
farming practices; 
commercialise 
novel mitigation 
options
Increase 
use of public 
transport, 
walking and 
cycling
Displace coal and 
natural gas for heat 
with lower-carbon 
fuels including 
bioenergy and 
renewable electricity
Invest in 
fuel-efficient 
fleet vehicles
Convert more 
marginal land 
area to forest 
stands
Use low-carbon 
materials and 
products in building 
construction
Encourage 
low-carbon 
freight 
movements
Encourage 
uptake of 
fuel-efficient 
vehicles
Invest in 
infrastructure 
that supports 
low-carbon 
transport 
choices
Strengthen 
policies to support 
greater efficiency 
of buildings and
appliances
Enable 
compact 
urban form
Discourage 
landowners 
from converting 
forest stands to 
other land uses
Ensure the price 
of GHG emissions 
is sufficient 
to incentivise 
low-carbon 
choices
Improve energy 
efficiency of 
industrial processes
Invest in on-site 
generation of 
renewable electricity
Improve the efficiency 
of existing generation 
plants and turbines
Increase renewable 
electricity generation to 
meet 90% target by 2025
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What might we do now to commence the pathway 
towards a low-carbon future for New Zealand?
Actions we can take now towards a low-carbon future for New Zealand – by individuals, 
businesses and central and local government
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Annex 1:  
Summary of possible 
mitigation actions for 
New Zealand
This Annex provides a summary of possible mitigation 
actions for New Zealand by institutions, organisations 
and individuals with an indication of sequence priority, 
level of mitigation potential and costs per tonne of 
CO
2
 avoided. More details can be found in the relevant 
sections of the main text.
The Annex identifies a number of actions that  
New Zealand could take as outlined in the text, but 
the study was unable to make a detailed assessment 
of these in terms of their social and economic 
impacts with any great accuracy. It is recognised 
that, when identifying the sequence of potential 
mitigation actions as below, understanding the trade-
offs, risks and challenges as well as the opportunities 
for specific actions would be necessary to provide 
full information of the implications of those actions. 
This table of actions is purely indicative and further 
analysis is required.
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Possible 
sequence 
of actions
Relative 
levels of 
annual 
GHG 
mitigation 
potential. 
L = Low  
M = Med  
H = High
Possible mitigation actions by sectors
Coloured dots indicate approximate relative costs in terms of $/t CO
2
-eq avoided,  
based on existing technologies and systems, expert opinion, and assumptions  
on future developments.
 Green = low cost  Blue = medium cost  Orange = High cost
Note: These costs, potentials and sequencing priorities are only indicative.  
They will vary widely with the specific circumstances, rate of technological  
development, trade-offs, and consumer behaviour, choice and perceptions.
Immediate Industry
M Greater focus on energy efficiency in industrial processes.
Buildings and appliances
M Labelling of appliances to better inform consumers.
M Standards implemented to encourage ‘doing better’.
M Removal from the market of the most inefficient appliances through the use  
of minimum energy performance standards (MEPS).
Forest and land use
H Convert additional land area, especially marginal land, to plantation forest stands. 
Reduced erosion and cleaner waterways can be co-benefits.
Agriculture
M Increase and accelerate development and adoption of best practices that increase 
productivity of animals and greater efficiency of farm systems.Whether this approach 
reduces absolute emissions depends on whether the gains are used to increase total 
production, or to increase profitability with retirement of less productive land and 
farm system. 
Support research on novel technologies to reduce CH
4
 from enteric fermentation,  
N
2
O from soils, and enhance soil carbon storage.
Transport for individuals
H Purchase the most fuel efficient vehicle suitable for mobility needs and consider car- 
pooling, taking the bus, and for short journeys, walking or cycling to also improve health.
Transport for businesses
M Select fuel efficient vehicles for fleets and adequately maintain them. 
L Avoid journeys by tele-conference meetings.
H Encourage freight movement by rail or coastal shipping in preference to road.
Transport for local and regional government
M Encourage use of comfortable and time-efficient transit through buses and light-rail.
M Develop infrastructure to encourage cycling and pedestrians.
Transport for central government
H Encourage urban densification and provision of economically viable inter-city  
low-carbon transport options.
Electricity
M Increase shares of renewables towards meeting the 90% target by 2025
Heat
H Expand uptake of bioenergy (wood, biogas etc.) to displace coal for heat.
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Short term Industry
H Increase use of renewable heat (solar thermal, geothermal, bioenergy)  
to displace coal and gas.
Buildings
M Promote more efficient appliances through programmes such as Energy Star.
L Enable new building designs to incorporate passive solar systems and energy efficiency 
above current Building Code levels.
H Provide training and education for everyone involved in designing, manufacturing, 
installing and using low-energy buildings and equipment.
Forest and land use
H Incorporate more wood materials and products for building construction giving  
stored carbon benefits and lower carbon footprints than using steel or concrete.
Transport for individuals
L Avoid journeys through use of electronic social media, better planning of trips, internet 
shopping, combining trips. 
L Use public transport, especially trains, where available.
M Maximise vehicle fuel efficiency by good driving skills and behaviour, vehicle 
maintenance, correct tyre pressures, etc. 
Transport for businesses
L Do not provide free car parks for staff and encourage car-pooling with incentives  
such as preferential parking or use of public transport.
L Allow flexible working hours to minimise travel times during congested periods  
and enable employees to work from home when practical to do so.
M Monitor fuel efficiency and distance travelled in work vehicles with possible  
rewards for above average performance by drivers.
Transport for local government
H Develop compact urban form to incentivise non-motorised transport. 
M Prioritise provision of more public transport infrastructure.
L Encourage car-pooling by staff and citizens and community car-sharing
L Support installation of electric vehicle public recharging points.
Transport for central government
H Encourage purchase of fuel efficient and low emission vehicles by introducing  
vehicle fuel efficiency standards across the fleet.
M Provide education on fuel efficient and non-motorised low-carbon transport 
technologies, electric vehicles and promote the co-benefits such as improved  
health, reduced traffic congestion, staying connected to electronic devices etc.
H Encourage freight movement by rail and coastal shipping in preference to  
road or air.
M Support development and deployment of advanced biofuels from  
ligno-cellulosic feedstocks.
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Electricity
M Improve efficiency of existing generation plants and turbines.
Heat
M Expand uptake of bioenergy, geothermal, to displace coal and gas.
Short to 
medium  
term
Buildings
H Promote more efficient new and existing buildings through programmes  
such as Greenstar and NABERSNZ and use of low-carbon materials.
L Develop appropriate minimum building performance levels for implementation  
in the New Zealand Building Code.
M Undertake regular surveys (5 – 10 years) of energy use and end-uses  
in order to identify new and untapped opportunities for energy savings.
Forest and land use
M Use more woody biomass residues for bioenergy applications.
M Continue to plant forests on marginal land and reduce pests in natural  
forests to further encourage regeneration
Transport for individuals
L Encourage personal contacts to minimise their transport emissions by,  
for example, minimising the use of air-conditioning in vehicles.
L Service your vehicle and engine regularly in accordance  
with manufacturers’ recommendations.
Transport for businesses
L Encourage low-carbon modal choice by employees and provide  
education on fuel efficient driving vehicle operation.
M Locate business offices and work spaces close to public transport,  
especially rail, to minimise transport emissions of freight and staff.
Transport for local government
M Deploy electric buses and bus rapid transit systems
Transport for central government
L Incentivise efficient load-carrying capacity freight vehicles and back-loading. 
M Increase the proportion of renewables in the electricity system to minimize  
emissions from recharging battery and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles.
Electricity
L Encourage deployment of smart-grids and local distributed generation.
Heat
M Expand uptake of electro-technologies for process heat applications.
L Use efficient wood pellet stoves for domestic and small business application.
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Medium 
term
Industry
H Invest in generation of renewable electricity or heat for on-site use.
Forest and land use
M Discourage landowners from converting forest stands to other land uses.
Agriculture
M Select supplementary feeds with a lower GHG emissions based on life-cycle analysis; 
integrate manure and feed management to minimise use of nitrogen fertiliser.
L Enhance manure management and biogas production from pigs, poultry,  
dairy and use organic waste feedstocks where available in horticulture.
M Selectively breed cattle and sheep that emit relatively lower volumes of methane
Transport for individuals
L Avoid driving, especially in rush hour traffic and consider not owning a car. 
M Use biofuels, LPG, CNG and biogas where available in preference to gasoline  
and diesel fuels.
L Minimise particulate emissions from diesel fuel by substitution with  
renewable hydrogen, biofuels, or improved battery electric hybrid vehicles.
Transport for local government
L Monitor passenger flows and optimise public transport options. 
M Install smart-control systems for road transport management, freight logistics  
and efficiency at airports and ports.
L Implement congestion charging in major cities using number plate recognition.
Transport for central government
M Require regular vehicle emission testing to ensure vehicle fuel efficiency  
is optimised and black carbon emissions are minimised.
L Evaluate national infrastructure for renewable hydrogen.
M Encourage smart-control systems for road transport management,  
freight logistics and efficiency at airports and ports.
Electricity
M Increase shares of renewables closer to 100% by improved integration of variable 
generation through more flexible grids, demand-side management with back-up  
generation in the mix for dry years.
L Assess potential for CCS based on latest technologies in place overseas.
Heat
M Encourage more solar water heating installations on commercial buildings  
and air-to-water heat pumps.
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Medium to 
long term
Industry
H Explore potential to couple bioenergy with CCS technology to achieve  
negative GHG emissions in future.
Forest and land use
L Plant more trees on farms, with complementary land uses and eco-services.
Electricity
L Evaluate and demonstrate potential for a) ocean energy technologies and b)  
CCS for any remaining thermal power stations such as gas peaking plants
Heat
L Displace all remaining coal combustion heat plant with low-carbon alternatives.
Transport for central government
L Encourage installation of national infrastructure for renewable hydrogen.
Encourage port facilities to accommodate larger maritime freighters
Long-term Agriculture
M   ? Introduce new nitrification inhibitors on pasture having tested for  
no side-effects or food contamination.
H  ? Deploy methane inhibiting technologies for ruminant animals  
(inhibitors, vaccines, selective breeding).
H  ? Move towards low-emitting land-uses. Note the cost of this would  
critically depend on the profitability and viability of alternative land-uses.
Agriculture, forestry and land use
M Increase soil carbon by improved management practices.
Transport for individuals
L Live near work place and tele-commute where possible to minimise travel.
Transport for local government
H Develop very rapid electric vehicle recharging and hydrogen infrastructure.
L Provide real-time information on travel times, congestion, public transport  
timetables, recharging and hydrogen refilling stations.
Transport for central government
L Support research on novel low-C emission technologies. 
Transport for individuals
H Use community owned, driverless vehicles
Transport for central government
M Encourage use of biofuels in transport for domestic aviation. 
L Build fast-rail infrastructure.
NOTE: Establishing an effective carbon pricing regime to support these immediate and short-term changes, especially those relating to 
behavioural changes by householders and businesses, would increase the rate of mitigation, as would simplifying the resource consenting 
process to make it less challenging and expensive for low-carbon projects and potentially more incentivising.
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Increase and 
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and adoption of best 
practices that increase 
productivity of animals 
and efficiency of 
farm systems
Actions we can take now towards a low-carbon 
future for New Zealand
Discourage 
landowners 
from converting 
forest stands to 
other land uses
Purchase the 
most fuel 
efficient vehicle 
suitable for 
personal needs
Maximise vehicle 
fuel efficiency by 
driver behaviour, 
car pooling, vehicle 
maintenance, 
correct tyre 
pressures, etc. 
Increase shares 
of renewable 
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100% through more 
flexible smart-grids 
and demand-side 
management
Develop 
infrastructure 
for cycles and 
pedestrians
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providing heat 
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efficiency 
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generation plants 
and turbines
Remove the 
most energy 
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the market
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the energy 
efficiency of 
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better inform 
consumers
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for building construction
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Actions we can take now towards a low-carbon future for New Zealand – by sectors
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